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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation will support full ethical endorsement of terminal sedation for 
those most urgently in crisis and need of beneficence, those who are dying and in the 
final hours or days and suffering.  To clarify the practice I first detail ethical differences 
between euthanasia, physician assisted suicide and terminal sedation.  Moreover, I 
identify new areas where harms and benefits need to be evaluated as affecting not only 
patients, but also families and caregivers.  I evaluate the current practice to allow the 
development of ethical guidelines and greater consensus on deciding the hard cases.  This 
work may also serve to assist those looking to enlarge the practice in the future with ETS 
for those with debilitating diseases or disability, but they are not my primary goal.  
Below is the standard I propose for moral allowability for the use of terminal 
sedation. I will refer to it often in the pages that follow simply as my standard.  
Terminal sedation is the appropriate and intentional use of medications 
(benzodiazepines and/or narcotics) to produce ongoing, deep unconsciousness 
upon 1) a terminal patient’s (or surrogates) request due to 2) suffering intractable 
pain or other distressing clinical symptoms intolerable to the patient when 3) 
death is expected within hours or days (less than two weeks) due to the terminal 
illness, injury, or disease. 
 
I offer two versions of initial guidelines for development of hospital policy. The 
first version outlines minimal guidelines that ought to be utilized to allow TS for patients 
who fit my standard.  The minimal guideline is based upon the recommendations of the 
American Medical Association with some modifications. The guideline is admittedly 
restrictive in hopes of gaining wider societal support for a currently controversial 
practice.  Secondly, I offer more moderate guidelines for policy that could become a 
standard in the future. It maintains the restrictive focus of the minimal guidelines and 
offers additional education and support to others which has yet to be broadly provided. 
The moderate guidelines would mark an important step forward for allowing more 
choices in dying and offering additional supports to those involved with dying patients.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
WHAT IS TERMINAL SEDATION? 
 Introduction 
 
This dissertation will be evaluating the benefits and harms of terminal sedation 
and will focus on bringing light to potential harm yet to be thoroughly evaluated.  
Improving our moral inventory about the types of harms and benefits involved in the 
practice of terminal sedation will assist us in making decisions on the tough cases within 
the current scope of practice.
1
 Issues related to dying have been in the forefront of 
medical ethics since its inception, yet appropriate methods for treating the dying are still 
debated and clearly no consensus has been reached.  The practice of terminal sedation has 
been hailed as a legal practice of choice to relieve intractable suffering for those dying. It 
is utilized to address intractable pain or other distressing clinical symptoms in those who 
are known to be in the final phase of terminal illness.   
It will be important to clarify several related terms for use in clearly 
understanding this issue.  First, let us define a terminal disease as a disease process that 
will advance to produce death in a patient.  Patients may live with a terminal disease for 
many months or years due to our current advanced medical treatments. Sometimes 
persons with terminal diseases look and feel perfectly normal and can work or carryout 
normal activities.  Those who have a terminal disease will eventually reach a state of 
terminal illness with their disease and this is commonly understood to be when it is 
expected that they have less than six months of life expectancy.  This is an inexact 
                                                 
1
 A thorough evaluation will also assist in evaluating the options of expanding this practice but this will not 
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amount of time but is often used to allow those persons with a terminal disease to qualify 
for other benefits such as hospice insurance benefits. Usually by this point in their disease 
process patients are looking and feeling ill and may require assistance completing normal 
daily activities. When those who have been living with terminal disease progress to 
terminal illness and come to the final phase of the disease (sometimes also called the 
terminal phase), body processes are slowing down (such as urine output, intestine 
motility, heart rate), and breathing becomes shallow and ragged, they are said to be 
‗actively dying‘.  When someone is actively dying, death is expected in hours to days, 
perhaps a week or two as the outside marker.   
Terminal sedation (TS) is the provision of medications to sedate to 
unconsciousness, usually in patients who have stopped eating and drinking with the intent 
to maintain this sedation until the death of the patient.  Although terminal sedation is 
legally allowable in the United States and elsewhere, there remain significant ethical 
concerns that prevent this practice from being wholeheartedly endorsed by many.  The 
practice of terminal sedation has yet to obtain any widely accepted normative guidelines 
and this has hampered the philosophical acceptance of the practice as well.  Since, at root, 
most of these concerns are based upon the notion that palliative sedation may 
prematurely end the life of a person, these are grave moral concerns and therefore 
deserve careful philosophical evaluation.   
Terminal sedation is currently a practice that is justified and established as a legal 
option for end-of-life care but sorely lacking in any wide spread normative consistency in 
application.  Evaluation of any harm or benefit will suffer from the incumbent 
perspective of the philosophical framework utilized and therefore what is clearly 
 3 
beneficial from one perspective may be harmful in another.  It is not my goal to render 
conclusions on what counts as a benefit or harm in cases where terminal sedation may be 
utilized as these must be evaluated on an individualized basis.  Rather, I will attempt to 
identify additional potentially relevant concerns deserving careful ethical evaluation.     
This work will serve to assist in making decisions to allow or deny terminal sedation in 
particularly hard cases and in making relevant normative guidelines.   
I focus my evaluation primarily in terms of benefits and burdens. This is not done 
due to a Utilitarian intent, but because this is the most common method utilized in 
medical ethics to evaluate complex situations. Principlism
2
 utilizes four mid-level 
principles; autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence and justice, to evaluate ethical 
situations.  These principles are then weighed and balanced within each situation as is 
appropriate. This method has been utilized extensively in medical ethics and although 
additional methods may also be used, Principlism remains a primary starting point for 
evaluations.  When utilizing a Principlism framework, TS may be ethically appropriate 
for some and not for others given the personal evaluations of the patients and physicians 
involved.  This evaluation is more than a simple Utilitarian consequentialism looking at 
the benefits verses burdens, as it gives substantial weight to the preference of the patient 
and her autonomous choice, and her evaluation of the benefits and burdens involved to 
herself and others.   
The principles and their respective benefits and burdens may be evaluated 
differently given differing individual‘s situations and perspectives and this is to be 
                                                 
2
 Beauchamp, T., L. , & Childress, J., F. . (1994). Principles of Biomedical Ethics (Fifth ed.). New York, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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expected. At times, the principles may also highlight conflicts apparent in the medical 
situation.  I endorse this variation as strength of Principlism in allowing each case to 
weigh and balance differently to allow a moral decision to be reached in each situation. 
These decisions should be based upon the unique factors and values of the case despite 
the fact that many, if not most, cases will involve similar components. Many 
Deontological concerns will be addressed in Chapter 2 where I focus on the intentions 
and actions involved in differing end-of-life options.   
Since terminal sedation is as yet a relatively obscure and rarely utilized treatment, 
the current literature and case studies have focused almost exclusively on either the clear 
benefit for the suffering patient as an overwhelming benefit or perceived harms of the 
practice being too closely related to physician-assisted suicide (PAS), or euthanasia.  This 
focus has limited serious consideration of other potential effects related to this manner of 
medically managing a death by elimination of consciousness.  
While the practice of terminal sedation has had many critics, their opposition is 
mostly due to concerns that terminal sedation is too close to either physician-assisted 
suicide, or euthanasia.  I will argue the restricted focus of ethical evaluation 
concerning TS thus far has eliminated investigation into other potential harms and 
benefits related to TS and these factors are deserving of careful philosophical 
evaluation. These concerns affect not only the patient but many others who are 
involved with the process of enduring a modern death with TS.  My dissertation will 
focus on broadening the scope of evaluation of the potential harms and benefits of 
TS to allow better evaluation of the difficult cases to establish a baseline for ethical 
guidelines for consideration of utilizing TS.  
 5 
 Does accepting TS mean giving up other important goods, perhaps those that 
make for a good death?  Could perhaps surviving family members be harmed in 
important ways? They are the ones who must live on with the legacy of how the death 
occurred.   There may also be unintended harm to professional caregivers, both MD‘s and 
RN‘s, who provide and monitor the provision of medications. Do they carry additional 
emotional burdens which stem from their participation in TS? Might even the trust our 
society has in the physician-patient relationship and the healthcare system be harmed if 
TS can be seen as an expedient way to reduce costs involved in caring for the dying?  By 
altering the traditional dying process and the roles assigned to those involved in that 
process, are we harming our sense of connectedness and relationships in ways which 
ought not to be altered?  Or are we perhaps restoring an ancient rite of passage?  I will 
explain why I believe some of these fears are well-founded and deserving more intense 
ethical analysis. Further where harms are substantiated, I will show how we might 
institute new policies to reduce the potential for these harms to occur or to limit their 
effects.   
Background and History   
 
Terminal sedation is a way of arranging one‘s death with assistance from health 
care professionals. The health care professionals provide medications to eliminate 
consciousness until death. Currently, it is the only legal method available to many of  
those in the final stages of incurable illness who are suffering intolerably. This is an 
option not available until relatively recently, at least not available openly or not called by 
this name.  In times past, humans simply awaited death and endured as best they could.  
 6 
Nowadays, most deaths occur following lengthy illness and many, at least in part, come 
about as a result of withholding or withdrawal of medical interventions.  This 
withholding or withdrawal of medical intervention usually comes only after some process 
of negotiations with patients, families and medical staff.  Thus, one may now, in part, 
negotiate when their death occurs. How did we get to this point?  
Death in the Middle Ages was much simpler, there was little medicine could do to 
prevent death and those who were dying often advised others of the fact that they would 
soon die.  Phillipe Ariès quotes Jean Guitton in his epic book The Hour of Our Death.  
We see how the [people] in those bygone days passed from this world into the next simply and 
straightforwardly observing the signs, and above all, observing themselves. They were in no hurry 
to die, but when they saw the time approaching, then not too soon and not too late, but just when 
they were supposed to, they died like Christians.
 3
   
 
Most persons died at home or where they fell due to illness, accidents or injury, 
and they were expected to be the ones directing how their death would go.  Medicine had 
little to offer in the way of preventing the progression of disease or easing death.  ―In 
those days death was rarely sudden, even in the case of accident or war, and sudden death 
was much feared, not only because there was not time for repentance, but because it 
deprived a man of the experience of death.‖4  There was great ritual over dying and ―As 
soon as someone was helplessly sick in bed, His room filled with people- parents, 
children, friends, neighbors, fellow guide members……The approach of death 
transformed the room of a dying man into sort of a public place.‖5  Not only did others 
know they were expected to arrive and speak to the dying, ―The leading role went to the 
                                                 
3
 Aries, P. (1981). The Hour of Our Death (H. Weaver, Trans.). New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Pg. 10.  
4
 Aries, P., translated by Valerie M. Stannard. (1974). The Reversal of Death: Changes in Attitudes toward 
Death in Western Societies. American Quarterly, 26(5 Special Issue: Death in America ), 536-560.pg 538. 
5
 Ibid. pg.  539. 
 7 
dying man himself. He presided over the affair with hardly a misstep, for he knew how to 
conduct himself, having previously witnessed so many similar scenes.‖6  Ariès reports 
that in the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries, the dying person gave the orders, even when this 
person was very young, or almost a child.
7
 He further notes the dramatic changes today, 
Today nothing remains either of the sense that everyone has or should have of their impending 
death, or of the public solemnity surrounding the moment of death.  What used to be appreciated is 
now hidden; what used to be solemn is now avoided. 
8
 
 
      Medical science was advancing dramatically throughout the late 1800‘s and early 
1900‘s. The advancement was uniformly heralded as a societal good. It allowed improved 
health, prolonged life, and the eradication of prevalent diseases, such as polio as well as 
cures for many illnesses that were previously untreatable. This advancing medical science 
altered daily life in many ways including moving both birth and death out from family 
homes.  Both being born and dying shifted to occur routinely in hospitals, aided by 
doctors and nurses even when no problems were anticipated. In the 1800‘s and early 
1900‘s the family had a primary role when a member was dying. Family members were 
tasked to stand bedside and wipe a brow, be a comforting presence, or listen for final 
words. Medicine had a rather small role, mostly for rudimentary pain relief.  Following 
the 1920‘s discovery of antibiotics, medical science was booming and seemed always to 
have something new to offer in attempts to keep death at bay. Families were ushered 
away from the hospital bedside and out into sterilized waiting rooms only to be told later 
if the patient had survived or died from the doctors intensive efforts.  
                                                 
6
 Ibid. pg.  540.  
7
 Ibid., pg. 540. 
8
 Ibid., pg. 540. 
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 By the 1980‘s many people began to fear a death that was artificially prolonged 
due to the use of medical technology and intensive medical care. There was a growing 
mistrust in physicians making all of the decisions regarding what treatments and medical 
care one would receive. Moreover, the costs of all this technology was starting to add up. 
Signs of public unrest with the fast advancing medical technology were starting to 
surface. The landmark cases of Karen Quinlin (1985) and Nancy Cruzan (1990) led the 
way for progress in one‘s right to refuse medical interventions.  The 1990 OBRA9 
amendment mandated that all patients must be asked if they have an advance directive 
and offered the opportunity to complete one upon hospital admission through the Patient 
Self-Determination Act.  The import of allowing patients the right and opportunity to 
have written directions regarding healthcare that they would not want to receive was 
further enforced by Health Care Financing Association (HCFA) and the Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) mandates 
controlling Medicare and Medicaid payments to healthcare institutions.  Facilities failure 
to comply could result in losing certification and thereby state and federal dollars.  
Medical institutions during the first half of the 19
th
 Century made great advances 
in the ability to cure disease and prolong life, but did little to ease the final agony of 
death. The hospice movement started in the United States in the early 1970‘s and grew 
into a distinct discipline about the time of the AIDS epidemic. Hospice allowed those 
dying new options for focusing on comfort and quality of life while dying versus ongoing 
curative efforts and aggressive medical treatment. Part of this included the greater use of 
                                                 
9
 The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, (OBRA-90) was enacted November 5, 1990 in efforts 
to reduce the United States federal budget deficit.  The Patient Self-Determination Act was a portion of this 
act directed at healthcare institutions. The act also included other efforts to affect Medicare and Medicaid 
recipients related to prescription drugs.  
 9 
narcotics for pain and symptom relief. This effort was increased following the landmark 
SUPPORT study
10
 which began a period of greater interest in palliative care that 
continues today.   
           Today, almost 70% of persons die in hospitals or other medical institutions.
11
 
Further, most now die from chronic diseases following a lengthy period of disability. 
Most deaths are now, at least in part, negotiated or, as Stefan Timmermans states, 
brokered.
12
  This is often due to the reliance on therapeutic interventions to postpone 
death for as long as possible. Then many patients become stuck, late in the game, 
dependent upon lifesaving technology and merely prolonging an inevitable death.  One 
must then decide when to withdraw or withhold medical interventions in order to allow 
death to occur.   
The ability to accurately predict when someone is likely to die is now 
significantly more difficult than in the days before our technological advancements.  In 
fact, many persons dying with congestive heart failure are routinely given a 50% chance 
of living six months three days before death.
13
 Further, one may remain unconscious and 
dependent on medical interventions for all bodily processes or in a Persistent Vegetative 
State (PVS) for years without the ability to improve or return to any active form of life.  
These cases have pushed our ethical sensibilities and forced us to evaluate the concern 
                                                 
10
The Study to Understand Prognoses and Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of Treatments (SUPPORT),  
―A Controlled Trial to Improve Care for Seriously Ill Hospitalized Patients‖.  JAMA Vol. 274, No. 20. 
(1995).  
11
 Teno, J. M., Clarridge, B. R., Casey, V., Welch, L. C., Wetle, T., Shield, R., et al. (2004). Family 
Perspectives on End-of-Life Care at the Last Place of Care. JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical 
Association, 291(1), 88-93. 
12
 Timmermans, S. (2005). Death brokering: constructing culturally appropriate deaths. Sociology of Health 
& Illness, 993-1013. 
13
 JW.Levenson, Carthy, E. M., Lynn, J., Davis, R., & Phillips, R. (2000). The Last Six Months of Life for 
Patients with Congestive Heart Failure. J Am Geriatr Soc, May, 48(5 Supp), 101-109. 
 10 
that ‗even though we can continue extensive medical support for biological existence, is 
continued medical treatment what ought to be done?‘  
 Medical ethics developed in the late 1960‘s and continued to grow into a distinct 
profession in the 1980‘s and 1990‘s as society struggled with the questions of how we 
ought to utilize the technology available and where limits were needed.  Questions of 
how we ought to best allow death were also inevitably caught up in this discussion. In the 
United States, this discussion included movements for the support of Physician Assisted 
Suicide (PAS) and the Hemlock Society. 
14
 The legal options for physicians to provide 
assistance to the dying vary according to location, culture and political landscape and 
remain open to further changes. Although the legal options may change, the ethical 
responsibility to provide relief for end-of-life suffering remains unchanged since the 
origin of the practice of medicine.   
 Opiates were used even in Hippocrates‘ time for pain relief and insomnia.15 He 
was one of the first to dispute the ―magic‖ and promote the juice of the poppy as a 
narcotic to treat internal diseases and diseases of women.
16
 Following the invention of the 
hypodermic needle in 1853, morphine became a primary and effective form of narcotic 
pain reliever for both surgical intervention and end-of-life care. The provision of 
medications to relieve extreme end-of-life pain, or to provide relief from air hunger and 
the feeling of suffocation for someone being removed from a ventilator, has been a well-
                                                 
14
 The Hemlock Society (originated by Derek Humphrey in 1980) changed its name to End-of-life  Choices 
(2003) and merged with Compassion in Dying in 2004 to become currently Compassion and Choices.  
15
 The Poppie Shop, The Discovery of the opium poppy. http://www.poppiesshop.com/poppies-
information/opium-poppy.html  (accessed on July 19, 2010).   
16
 Opioids: Past, present and future. http://www.opioids.com/opium/hippocrates.html (accessed on July 19, 
2010).  
 11 
used and routine medical practice.
17
 Originally, this part of medical care was done by the 
physician, upon his order alone, without much oversight or examination, and was 
considered as part of good care for the dying patient when nothing more could be done.  
Narcotics were commonly and quietly used to provide a peaceful death without much 
comment until the practice came under ethical review and new terminology sprang up.
18
  
This scrutiny began with an article focused on concerns that cancer patients were dying in 
pain.  
The Problem of Definition   
 
Dr. Robert E. Enck is the physician most often cited for coining the term ‗terminal 
sedation‘.  This occurred in September, 1991 in the article, ―Drug-induced terminal 
sedation for symptom control‖, in The American Journal of Hospice & Palliative Care. 
Enck‘s initial article provided a needed review of recent studies of the time19 showing 
that up to 50% of patients dying of cancer reported the pain and suffering was 
―unendurable‖.   Enck did not specifically define ‗terminal sedation‘ but presented 
studies showing that some patients dying with cancer had unrelieved suffering in their 
final days and that providing medication to relieve this suffering could only be 
accomplished by reducing their consciousness as well. Enck questioned the apparent 
confusion in that while some studies showed no increase in end-of-life cancer pain other 
studies showed ―unendurable pain‖ for some.  He opined, ―One answer may be that 
                                                 
17
 Way, J., Back, A. L., & Curtis, J. R. (2002). Withdrawing life support and resolution of conflict with 
families. BMJ, 325(7376), 1342-1345. 
18
 Ibid.  
19
 Green, W. R., Davis, W.H. . (1991). Titrated intravenous barbituates in the control of symptoms in 
patient with terminal cancer. Southern Medicine Journal, 84, 332-337. And also, Ventrafridda, V., 
Ripamonti, C., & DeConno, F. e. a. (1990). Symptom prevalence and control during cancer patients' last 
days of life. Journal of Palliative Care, 6, 7-11. 
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results of scientific inquiry do not always reflect the realities of hospice care. Another 
answer may be confusion regarding terminology such as pain, symptom definition, 
suffering and the like.‖20  Unfortunately, this confusion has continued and may be 
considered as a paramount issue in understanding the conflicts involved in determining 
the ethical permissibility of terminal sedation 
Terminal sedation (TS) is one of many terms used to identify the practice 
whereby  persons purposely undergo a medically induced sedation to an unconscious, or 
near unconscious state to relieve otherwise intractable distress at the end of their life. It 
has been called palliative sedation (PS), by those favoring its use in aggressive palliative 
care
21
 or alternatively slow euthanasia
22
 by those who view it as simply a cloak of 
nomenclature for an unethical and illegal practice.  Various other names have also been 
used to describe the practice, such as: Sedation for Intractable Distress in Dying, (SIDD); 
Sedation for or in the Imminently Dying patient (SFTID, SITID); Palliative Sedation to 
Unconsciousness (PSU) or Palliative Sedation Therapy (PST).
23
 (See Table 1, Definitions 
of Terminal Sedation, next page.)  
 
                                                 
20
 Enck, R. E. (1991). Drug-induced terminal sedation for symptom control. American Journal of Hospice 
and Palliative Medicine, 8(5), 3-5. 
21
 John F. Peppin, ―Intractable Symptoms and Palliative Sedation at the End-of-life ‖ Christian Bioethics, 
Vol. 9, No. 2-3, (2003), pp. 343-355.  Also, C. Peruselli, e. a. (1999). Home palliative care for terminal 
cancer patients: a survey on the final week of life. Palliat Med, 13, 233-241. 
22
 David Orentlicher, ―The Supreme Court and physician-assisted suicide – rejecting assisted suicide but 
embracing euthanasia‖. N.Engl J Med  Vol. 337, No. 17 (1997), pp. 1236-1239.  Also, Billings, J. A., 
Block, S. (1996). Slow Euthanasia. [Forum ]. Journal of Palliative Care, 12(4), 21-30. 
23
 See Table 1. Definitions of Terminal Sedation table is a listing of terms used for practice of sedation for 
those suffering at end-of-life compiled by date seen in research literature. I will use the terms terminal 
sedation or palliative sedation interchangeably, although I have a slight preference for terminal sedation as 
I am using it exclusively to discuss the use of the practice for those in the terminal phase of illness rather 
than as an intermittent palliative therapy that may be utilized at any point in a serious or life threatening 
illness.  
 13 
Table 1. Definitions of Terminal Sedation 
Group 
Defining  
Definition  
TS – Terminal Sedation 
PS – Palliative Sedation 
Others as listed  
Terminal Px 
Required?  
Expected 
survival 
Only for 
Intractable 
symptoms?  
Year 
Developed or 
endorsed 
Robert E. 
Enck, MD24 
   (TS) 
Drug-induced terminal sedation for symptom 
control 
 
 
Yes Not stated Yes 1991  
Ventafridda
25 et al  
(Sedation-
induced 
sleep)  
* No definition provided by authors, however 
mentioned made of sedation-induced sleep 
for physically unendurable symptoms.  Article 
cited by Enck.  
 Yes “last days of 
life”  
Seemingly so 
– not 
specifically 
addressed 
1990  
Billings & 
Block26 
(Slow 
Euthanasia) 
*The clinical practice of treating a terminally 
ill patient in a fashion that will assuredly lead 
to a comfortable death, but not too quickly.  
 
 
Yes “last few 
days of life”  
No 1996 
Fondras 
(Sedation 
from Latin 
sedare, to 
calm) 
*Sedation may be defined as the prescription 
of psychotropic agents, in the main 
benzodiazepines and neuroleptics, with a 
view to controlling physical symptom (pain, 
dysponoea), psychological symptoms 
(insomnia, anxiety crises, agitation), or to 
make a patient unconsciusin certain dramatic 
situations (eg. sudden haemorrhage).  
 
No  Not stated  No  1996  
Morita et all  
 (Sedation) 
*A medical procedure to palliate patients’ 
symptoms by intentionally making their 
consciousness unclear. It includes an increase 
in morphine dose resulting in secondary 
somnolence, and the use of sedative drugs.  
 
 
No  Not stated No 1996 
Quill27 et al  
 (TS)  
Suffering patient is sedated to 
unconsciousness, usually through ongoing 
administration of barbiturates or 
benzodiazepines.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes Days to 
weeks 
Yes 1997 
 
                                                 
24
 Enck, R. E. (1991). Drug-induced terminal sedation for symptom control. American Journal of Hospice 
and Palliative Medicine, 8(5), 3-5. 
25
 Ventrafridda, V., Ripamonti, C., & DeConno, F. e. a. (1990). Symptom prevalence and control during 
cancer patients' last days of life. Journal of Palliative Care, 6, 7-11. 
26
 Billings, J. A., Block, S. (1996). Slow Euthanasia. [Forum ]. Ibid., 12(4), 21-30. 
27
 Quill, T. E., Lo, B., & Brock, D. W. (1997). Palliative options of last resort: a comparison of voluntarily 
stopping eating and drinking, terminal sedation, physician-assisted suicide, and voluntary active euthanasia. 
Jama, 278(23), 2099-2104. 
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Table 1. Continued 
 
Group 
Defining  
Definition  
TS – Terminal Sedation 
PS – Palliative Sedation 
Others as listed  
Terminal Px 
Required?  
Expected 
survival 
Only for 
Intractable 
symptoms?  
Year 
Developed or 
endorsed 
Chater28 et al  
(TS)  
The intention of deliberately inducing and 
maintaining deep sleep, but not deliberately 
causing death in very specific circumstances. 
These are: -for the relief of one or more 
intractable symptoms when all  other possible 
interventions have failed and the patient is 
perceived to be close to death, or – for the  
relief of profound anguish (possibly spirtiual, 
psychological,or other interventions, and the 
patient is perceived to be clsoe to death.  
 
Yes Close to 
death 
Yes 1998  
Fainsinger 29 
  (TS) 
*30The prescription of psychotropic agents to 
control physical and psychological symptoms 
by makin gthe patint unconscious  
 
Yes   1998 
Fleischman 
  (TS) 
*Sedation at the end-of-life  to alleviate 
severe and unremitting pain.  
 
Yes  “end-of-life ”  Yes  1998 
Hallenbeck  
  (TS)  
* The induction and maintence of a sedated 
state with the intent of relieveing otherwise 
intractable distress, both physical and mental,  
in a patient close to death.  
 
Yes  “close to 
death” 
Yes 1999 
Morita 31et 
al  
  (Sedation)  
A medical procedure to palliate 
patients’symptoms refractory to standard 
treatment by intentionally diminishing their 
consciousness .  Levels of sedation defined as 
primary, secondary, intermittent,and 
continuous. Mild and deep sedation also 
defined.  
 
Yes Not defined Yes 1999, 2000 
Peruselli et 
al  
(Total 
pharmacolog
ical 
sedation) 
*The administration of drugs to obtain total 
loss of consciousness.  
No  Not defined  No  1999 
 
 
                                                 
28
 Chater, S., Viola, R., Paterson, J., & Jarvis, V. (1998). Sedation for intractable distress in the dying- a 
survey of experts. Palliat Med, 12, 255-269. 
29
 Fainsinger, R. L., Landman, W., Hoskings, M., & Bruera, E. (1998). Sedation for uncontrolled symptoms 
in a South African hospice. J Pain Symptom Manage, 16(3), 145-152. 
30
 Beel, A., McClement, S. E., & Harlos, M. (2002). Palliative sedation therapy: a review of definitions and 
usage. International Journal of Palliative Nursing, 8(4), 190-199.  * Definitions denoted by * are from 
Beel, et al. 2002 a good source for review of terms, definitions and research study done in the first ten years 
of the accepted use of palliative sedation therapy.  
31
 Morita, T., Tsunoda, J., Inoue, S., & Chihara, S. (1999). Do hospice clinicians sedate patients intending 
to hasten death? J Palliat Care, 15(3), 20-23, Morita, T., Tsunoda, J., Inoue, S., & Chihara, S. (2000). 
Terminal sedation for existential distress. Am J Hosp Palliat Care, 17(3), 189-195. 
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Table 1. Continued 
 
Group 
Defining  
Definition  
TS – Terminal Sedation 
PS – Palliative Sedation 
Others as listed  
Terminal Px 
Required?  
Expected 
survival 
Only for 
Intractable 
symptoms?  
Year 
Developed or 
endorsed 
Quill 32et al  
  (TS)  
*Heavy sedation to escape pain, shortness of 
breath, other severe symptoms. The patient is 
sedated to unconsciousness to relieve severe 
physical suffering and is then allowed to die of 
dehydration or some other intervening 
complication. 
 
Yes  Yes 2000 
Krakauer et 
al  
Sedation for 
Intractable 
Distress of a 
Dying 
Patient  
(SIDD Pat)  
* Use of sedating medications to relieve 
severe symptoms that cannot be controlled 
adequately despite aggressive efforts without 
sedation.  
 
 
 
 
Yes “dying”  Yes 2000 
Wein 
(TS, and 
sedation in 
the 
imminently 
dying 
patient) 
*Uses Chater et al (1998) definition of TS, 
however, emphasizes that the term ‘terminal 
sedation’ should be avoided because it could 
be interpreted as meaning sedation intended 
for terminally ill patients or sedation for the 
purpose of terminating the patient’s life.  
Wein suggests using the term ‘sedation in the 
imminently dying’.  
 
Yes  Near end-of-
life , or 
imminently 
dying 
Yes 2000 
American 
College of 
Physicians- 
American 
Society of 
Internal 
Medicine 
Consensus 
Panel33 
(PSU) 
The purpose of the medications is to render 
the patient unconscious to relieve suffering, 
not to intentionally end his or her life. 
However, in the context of far-advanced 
disease and expected death, artificial 
nutrition, hydration. antibiotics, mechanical 
ventilation, and other life-prolonging 
interventions are not instituted and are 
usually withdrawn if they are already in place.  
Yes “End-of-life ”  Yes 
 
March 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32
 Quill, T. E., Lee, B. C., & Nunn, S. (2000). Palliative treatments of last resort: choosing the least harmful 
alternative. University of Pennsylvania Center for Bioethics Assisted Suicide Consensus Panel. Ann Intern 
Med, 132(6), 488-493. 
33
 Quill, T. E., Byock, I. R., & For the American College of Physicians-American Society of Internal 
Medicine End-of-Life Care Consensus, P. (2000). Responding to intractable terminal suffering: The role of 
terminal sedation and voluntary refusal. Annals of Internal Medicine, 132(5), 408-414. 
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Table 1. Continued 
 
Group 
Defining  
Definition  
TS – Terminal Sedation 
PS – Palliative Sedation 
Others as listed  
Terminal Px 
Required?  
Expected 
survival 
Only for 
Intractable 
symptoms?  
Year 
Developed or 
endorsed 
 
Calgary 
Regional 
Hospice34 
(PS) 
Palliative sedation defined as “the intention of 
deliberately inducing and maintaining deep 
sleep, but not deliberately causing death in 
very specific circumstances: (1) for the relief 
of one or more intractable symptoms when all 
other possible interventions have failed and 
the patient is perceived to be close to death 
or (2) for the relief of profound anguish (such 
as spiritual anguish) that is not amenable to 
spiritual, psychological, or other 
interventions, and the patient is perceived to 
be close to death. 
 
Yes Days Yes 2003 
Council on 
Ethical and 
Judicial 
Affairs, 
American 
Medical 
Association35 
(PSU) 
Palliative sedation to unconsciousness is the 
administration of sedative medication to the 
point of unconsciousness in a terminally ill 
patient.  It is an intervention of last resort to 
reduce severe, refractory pain or other 
distressing clinical symptoms that do not 
respond to aggressive symptom-specific 
palliation. 
Yes “Final stages 
of terminal 
illness” 
 *not 
supported 
for 
existential 
distress only 
Yes June 2008 
 
International 
Consensus 
Panel36 
(PST) 
PST is defined as the use of specific sedative 
medications to relieve intolerable suffering 
from refractory symptoms by a reduction in 
patient consciousness, using appropriate 
drugs carefully titrated to the cessation of 
symptoms. 
Yes Hours to 
days 
Yes 2007 
Royal Dutch 
Medical 
Association37 
The deliberate lowering of a patient’s level of 
consciousness in the last stages of life. 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
One to two 
weeks 
Yes Jan 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34
 Braun, T. C., & Hagen, N. A. (2003). Development of a Clinical Practice Guideline for Palliative 
Sedation. Journal of Palliative Medicine, 6(3), 345. 
35
 http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/code-medical-ethics/2201a.pdf.  Accessed June 9, 2010.  
36
 Graeff, A. D., & Dean, M. (2007). Palliative Sedation Therapy in the Last Weeks of Life: A Literature 
Review and Recommendations for Standards. Journal of Palliative Medicine, 10(1), 67-85. 
37
 knmg.artsennet.nl/web/file?uuid=e9a9c569-39de-4dd7. Accessed on June 10, 2010 
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Table 1. Continued 
 
Group 
Defining  
Definition  
TS – Terminal Sedation 
PS – Palliative Sedation 
Others as listed  
Terminal Px 
Required?  
Expected 
survival 
Only for 
Intractable 
symptoms?  
Year 
Developed or 
endorsed 
Cowan and 
Walsh 
Palliative 
Care of E. 
TN, and 
Cleveland 
Clinic38 
(PS) 
We consider it involves the following: (1) the 
patients are terminally ill with advanced and 
incurable illness; (2)they are actively dying i.e. 
death is expected in hours or days as judged 
from blood pressure, pulse, respiration, urine 
output, and level of consciousness; (3) acute 
or refractory symptoms such as pain, nausea, 
myoclonus, restlessness, or respiratory 
distress are present; (4) these symptoms have 
not responded to conventional management, 
or the severity of the symptoms and 
trajectory of the illness require prompt 
intervention to relieve distress;(5) sedation is 
chemically induced using a nonopioid drug to 
control the symptom; (6) causing death is not 
the intent, although it is implicit that it may 
not be possible to achieve adequate symptom 
control except at the risk of shortening life. 
 
Yes Hours to 
days 
Yes  May 2001  
American 
Academy of 
Neurology 
(AAN)  
(SFTID) 
Sedation for the imminently dying (SFTID).  
Allows for the administration of titrated 
sedation to patients who are imminently 
dying and whose suffering remains refractory 
to other interventions. 
 
YES Imminently 
dying 
Yes 2004 
 American 
Academy of 
Hospice and 
Palliative 
Medicine39 
(PS, but def. 
seems more 
like PSU) 
Palliative sedation (PS) to unconsciousness  
The administration of sedatives to the point of 
unconsciousness, when less extreme sedation 
has not achieved sufficient relief of distressing 
symptoms. This practice is used only for the 
most severe, intractable suffering at the very 
end-of-life . 
Yes “Very end-
of-life ” 
Yes 
 
September 
15, 2006 
 
Those who practice in the specialty of Palliative Care often use differing types of 
sedation as treatments for addressing distressing symptoms during the course of treating 
incurable illness prior to the final days of life.  They are more likely to cite the differing 
levels of sedation and intent more clearly, and to endorse more precise terminology to be 
used for justification of sedation.  Palliative Care specialists may order sedation, with 
                                                 
38
 Cowan, J. D. a. D. W. (2001). Terminal sedation in palliative medicine –definition and review of the 
literature 
Support Care Cancer 9, 403-407. 
39
 http://www.aahpm.org/positions/sedation.html  Accessed June 9, 2010.  
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distinctions made between level of sedation, such as light or moderate sedation where the 
patient may still be able to converse or to be aroused if needed, and deep sedation to  
unconsciousness.  Other distinctions physicians may make are between lengths of 
sedation desired, such as episodic or intermittent, to allow patient a respite from 
symptoms or assistance to sleep at night versus continuous sedation until death occurs. 
Intractable distress or refractory symptoms are the common terms as defined by Cherny 
and Portenoy
40
 utilized for extreme suffering experienced. ‗Intractable‘ or ‗refractory‘ are 
used to describe pain (or other coexisting noxious symptoms such as dyspnea, vomiting, 
nausea, delirium, agitation, myoclonus, or others, including some forms of existential 
suffering) that has proven to be resistant to multiple attempts at traditional treatment.  ―It 
is when a patient‘s symptoms become refractory that sedative medications can be 
considered a therapeutic option.‖41   
Another of the confusing factors in evaluating the practice of terminal sedation is 
that there is a not universally accepted criterion of what exactly is considered to be 
terminal or palliative sedation versus what is considered to be routine symptom control or 
routine palliative care at the end-of-life.  Sedation to the point of unconsciousness in 
palliative care has been used for three related, but distinct, purposes: (1) to relieve 
physical pain and produce amnesia of uncomfortable medical interventions; (2) to 
produce an unconscious state before the withdrawal of artificial life support; (3) to relieve 
                                                 
40
 Cherny, N. I., & Portenoy, R. K. (1994). Sedation in the management of refractory symptoms: guidelines 
for evaluation and treatment. J Palliat Care, 10(2), 31-38. 
41
 Kathryn Lanuke, et al., ―Two Remarkable Dyspneic Men: When Should Terminal Sedation be 
Administered?‖, J of Palliative Medicine, Vol. 6 No. 2,(2003), pp. 277-281. pg. 279.  
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non-physical suffering.
42
 The use of large doses of narcotics in providing palliative care 
to achieve the first objective has been relatively uncontroversial.  This large dosage of 
narcotics has been questioned at times in achieving the second objective but remains in 
those cases still markedly less controversial than when used to achieve the third 
objective. It now appears that a fourth category, one that merges parts of those above and 
serves to eliminate one‘s participation in the final act of dying has developed.  In the 
newest cases, terminal sedation is used to achieve a peaceful dying process for patients 
and for those caring for them upon explicit request for this type of death.  It is important 
to note that the first two purposes have traditionally been initiated by physicians and are 
commonly accepted as ethically allowable. The third is exclusively and controversially 
requested by patients and has yet to gain widespread ethical support. The fourth (the 
primary focus of this dissertation) is usually part of a negotiated death including patients, 
families, and physicians and also remains ethically controversial.  
The word sedation is itself a very slippery term at times.  Consider the following:   
Do we want to talk about a patient who is sedated to the point of feeling no pain but is 
arousable or one who is completely unconscious?  Do we intend for sedation due to 
narcotics for pain relief only (so we may rouse the patient intermittently to converse, 
evaluate pain control or relief) or continued unremitting sedation due to benzodiazepines 
with the expressed effect of permanent analgesia through unconsciousness (perhaps in a 
patient with existential suffering who does not want to be awakened again)? In all the 
                                                 
42
 Rob McStay, ―Terminal Sedation: Palliative Care for Intractable Pain, Post Glucksberg and Quill‖ Am. J 
of Law & Medicine, Vol. 29 (2003) pp. 45-76.  pg. 46.  
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above cases medical staff would state, ―The patient was sedated‖ and that is how it would 
likely look in a hospital record.   
Drugs and Dosages 
 
A further inconsistency related to the use of terminal sedation is the great variety 
of drugs and dosages used to obtain sedation as well as the route administered. Most 
current studies in America and Europe show a preference for the benzodiazepine drug 
Midazolam.  Although Midazolam is favored, Haloperidol and Morphine are also not 
infrequently used and occasionally Levomepromazine, Hyoscine or barbiturates such as 
Phenobarbital are utilized.
43
  A much newer drug, Propofol is also considered by some to 
be a ‗good drug‘ to use for palliative sedation but is restrictive in that it is expensive, 
must be given in the hospital, and requires intravenous (IV) for route of drug delivery.
44
  
Midazolam offers quick and effective sedation, is cheap, and may be given IV or 
subcutaneously (SC), it also has an antidote (Flumazenil) available if reversal of sedation 
is required.
45
  Midazolam is historically known and utilized in medicine for its amnesic 
effects and is often given to patients in intensive care on ventilators to reduce the stress of 
being on the breathing machine, or given prior to and during surgery in order to allow 
patients to forget the experience. A well known side effect of Midazolam, and other 
similar drugs, is the potential to slow heart rate and breathing and thus its use requires 
close supervision. This known and usually unwanted side effect is what produces the 
                                                 
43
 Porta Sales, J. (2002). Palliative sedation : Clinical Aspects. In C. Gastmans (Ed.), Between Technology 
and Humanity: The Impact of Technology on Health Care Ethics (pp. 219-238): Leuven University press. 
Pg. 230. 
44
 Ibid. pg. 234.  
45
National Institute on Health, MedlinePlus on line.    
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/druginfo/meds/a609003.html  (accessed on July 12, 2010).   
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‗double effect‘ often attached to the ethical controversy regarding palliative sedation.  
Narcotics, such as morphine, also have the side effect of respiratory depression and 
respiratory depression is greatly exacerbated when benzodiazepine and narcotics are 
combined. 
The mean dosage of drugs used has been evaluated in a review study by Josep 
Porta Sales and showed daily rates of Midazolam used in patients for palliative sedation 
in published studies between 1996 and 2001 varied from a 24mg/day to as high as 
88mg/day.
46
 While benzodiazepines are most often used for sedation, opioids may also be 
used for pain control in patients who are sedated. Mean Morphine dosage varied from a 
low of 12 mg/day to as much as 100mg/day.
47
  Such great variations in the amounts of 
medications used clearly show that a universal practice has yet to be defined.  It also may 
allow the ethical intentions of the practice to be questioned.  Usually in cases of palliative 
sedation as currently practiced, the intention is for both relief of physical symptoms and 
sedation to unconsciousness and therefore includes the use of both opioids and 
benzodiazepines. In some cases, such as those with severe dyspnea or delirium it may be 
possible to utilize only the sedation to offer relief, but those with great pain such as 
cancer pain will require narcotics to relieve symptoms as well.  They may also increase 
pain medications if breakthrough pain becomes apparent.  In this aspect, the term 
palliative sedation to unconsciousness (PSU) does provide greater clarity and 
transparency.  The concern regarding physician intentions and double effect will be 
                                                 
46
 Ibid. (Sales 2002).  pg. 232.  
47
 Ibid.  
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addressed in greater detail in the following chapter as this is a separate concern in the 
ethical debate on terminal sedation.  
An Evolving Consensus or More Conflict?   
 
Despite these significant obstacles, it does now appear that some consensus is 
starting to emerge at least on a few primary points. Terminal sedation is most often 
considered a medical treatment for a patient when three components combine in a patient 
situation.   This is when patients are diagnosed with a terminal disease and experiencing 
intractable symptoms of pain or suffering and are in the last days or weeks
48
 of life. 
Terminal sedation is frequently,
49
although not always, accompanied by the withdrawal of 
any other life sustaining interventions such as nutrition and hydration, ventilator support 
or intravenous medications which maintain cardiac function. The National Hospice and 
Palliative Care Organization
50
 has compiled a resource guide and encourages hospitals 
and palliative care providers to develop formal practice guidelines for the use of TS but 
they have yet to gain wide application.  Furthermore, there is currently debate on 
widening the use of TS and changing guidelines to include allowing more existential 
suffering and for death to perhaps come from the expected TS dehydration rather than 
exclusively from the underlying disease process.
51
 That TS is practiced as a treatment for 
those exclusively facing the end of their lives has prompted the intense ethical debate to 
                                                 
48
 Admittedly, this is an inexact determination but can usually be assessed by decrease in urine output, 
respirations, and other bodily functions combined with physician practice knowledge. 
49
 Sedation may be unaccompanied by withdrawal of other medical technology or nutrition and hydration 
due to expected closeness of death or never having started these treatments.  
50
Total Sedation: A Hospital and Palliative Care Resource Guide. Alexandria, VA: National Hospice and 
Palliative Care Organization; November 2000. Accessed at www. 
Nhpco.org/files/public/NHPCOTotalSedationSHORT.pdf on May 25,2010.  
51
 Berger, J. T. (2010). Rethinking Guidelines for the Use of Palliative Sedation. Hastings Center Report, 
40(3), 17-21. 
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focus on comparisons to the practices of physician assisted suicide (PAS), and 
euthanasia, both of which are illegal in most jurisdictions in the United States.
52
  This is 
an important ethical concern but it may not be the only important concern related to the 
practice of TS. With the majority of interest focused on the above concerns, ethicists have 
mostly ignored other potential harms and hence those potential other harms are the focus 
of this dissertation.  
 Despite some emerging consensus, there continues to be controversy concerning 
terminal sedation, with a great deal of published discussion occurring following the 
Supreme Court‘s tacit endorsement of the practice in 1997.53  The fact that the goal of TS 
is continuous medication which renders patients permanently unconscious, coupled with 
the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration, pricks the ears of those ethically 
uncomfortable or unconvinced of the moral nature of this practice.  The ethical concept 
of autonomy has been clearly shown and legally established to support allowing patients 
to refuse any medical treatment, including the provision of nutrition and hydration, and 
this principle also supports the patient when this refusal is combined with the request for 
TS.  Autonomy is strongly supported when TS is requested by the patient herself and it is 
increasingly addressed by palliative care physicians prior to the final stage of an illness 
when discussing advance directives.  Yet the fear exists that the medications and methods 
used in TS are used to hasten death rather than merely eliminate intolerable symptoms by 
those without a clear understanding of the practice. This would make the practice of TS 
closer to euthanasia and therein unacceptable to many.  Many studies state terminal 
                                                 
52
 This topic will be explored in Chapter 2 in detail.  
53
 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521, U.S. 702 (1997) and Vacco v. Quill, 521, U.S. 793 (1997).  
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sedation is most commonly utilized only in the last hours or week of life.
54
 Peppin and 
others
55
 have suggested that, ―from the current studies there is no difference in survival 
between those who receive PS (palliative sedation) and those who do not.‖56  This is 
easily believable assuming that palliative sedation is in fact only utilized in those who 
have already been diagnosed with an imminently terminal stage of illness or disease and 
who have mostly stopped eating and drinking. However, even with these assumptions, 
questions can be raised in how these statistics were gathered and how terms (such as 
‗intractable‘, ‗sedation‘, and ‗end-of-life ‘) were defined. In fact, Peppin admits that 
although further research is needed to more accurately evaluate changes in survival rates 
between those who undergo TS and those who do not, the only way to ―prove‖ these 
claims would be to do randomized, placebo controlled, double blind studies which would 
neither pass Institutional Review Boards (IRB‘s) nor be ethical to attempt.  Thus, he 
argues, the only approach feasible to evaluate when TS is medically appropriate is the 
judgment of the palliative care and pain medicine specialist.
57
 Even then, in a summary of 
international guidelines for the practice of PSU,
58
 although there was agreement on TS 
used with 1) only those with terminal illness and, 2) only if symptoms are intolerable and 
                                                 
54
 Peruselli, et al., found 25% totally pharmacologically sedated during last 12 hours of life. Peppin, J., F. 
(2003). Intractable Symptoms and Palliative Sedation at the End of Life. Christian Bioethics: Non-
ecumenical Studies in Medical Morality, 9(2/3), 13.Peppin, cites multiple studies, Italian and Canadian 
study which found average time from palliative sedation until death was 1.3 days, Japanese study 3.9 days, 
South Africa 2.5 days.  It may be important to note that none of these studies were conducted in the United 
States and cultural differences may be important to consider when relating to the use of palliative sedation 
practices. This is an area where concurrent American research results would yield valuable contributions to 
the discourse.  
55
 Ibid. Also, Morita, T., Tsunoda, J., Inoue, S., & Chihara, S. (1999). Do hospice clinicians sedate patients 
intending to hasten death? J Palliat Care, 15(3), 20-23, Muller-Busch, H. C. C., Andres, I., & Jehser, T. 
(2003). Sedation in palliative care- a critical analysis of 7 years experience. BMC Palliative Care, 2(2). 
56
 Peppin, pg. 347.  
57
 Ibid. pg.349-350.  
58
 Jeffrey T. Berger, ―Rethinking Guidelines for the Use of Palliative Sedation‖, Hastings Center Report. 
Vol 40. May-June ( 2010), pp. 32-38.  
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refractory, there was variance in its use for 3) existential suffering in addition to physical 
pain, and 4) in expected survival until death from hours up to one to two weeks or vague 
terminology such as ―end-of-life‖. There remain concerns that TS will be used on those 
who may survive for several weeks or longer and some fears that it will be overused. 
Prevalence of the practice of TS varies from lows of 2% up to 52% of deaths in patients 
with terminal illness.
59
 In part, the wide divergence in percentages shown for the practice 
must come from the differences already mentioned concerning how one defines the 
practice of palliative sedation as distinct from general good end-of-life palliative care.
60
  I 
believe it also shows that much more information on the entire field of TS needs to be 
gathered and evaluated.    
Is TS a type of Death?  
 
 There has been a renewed interest in reevaluation of the Uniform Determination 
of Death Act and discussion of the whole brain versus higher brain definition of death.  
Critical in the higher brain definition is the total loss of consciousness and inability to 
communicate or perceive. Higher brain death is not currently a definition of death in any 
jurisdiction in the United States.  But I bring up this issue because the practice of terminal 
sedation, while providing aggressive symptom control, forces patients to accept a total 
loss of consciousness and inability to communicate as a trade off for no longer perceiving 
their intolerable symptoms. Further, this medically induced state is intended to persist 
until biological death occurs.  Is terminal sedation therefore, in effect, producing a type of 
                                                 
59
 Angela Barreth, et al., ―The Challenge of Communicating Intent of Sedation in Advanced Illness‖, J of 
Palliat Care, Vol 19. No. 3,(2003). pp. 217-219.  pg. 218.  
60
 It may also in part come from methods of either including or not including TS to those who are 
incompetent and may have had surrogate or lack of surrogate consent.  Surrogate consent will be addressed 
more fully in both Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.   
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death by eliminating personal consciousness of one‘s dying?  Clearly, once enacted, the 
patient who has entered a final medically induced coma and ceased all consciousness, 
communication or perception has ended her social and biographical participation in her 
life.  But, does this equal death?  I think not.   
Although terminal sedation, as a treatment at the end-of-life, does affect how one 
will die, once chosen, one will no longer be able to converse with family or hear their 
voices saying loving words of farewell or have any perceptions due to a deeply 
unconscious state. This state is medically induced and at least potentially reversible.
 61
  In 
TS the perception of sensation has been altered by medications and the organic 
functioning of the brain remains unaltered. In those who have suffered higher brain death, 
the lack of perception and consciousness is due to organ damage (in the brain) and is 
rarely, if ever, chosen by those who lose consciousness in this manner.  The election of 
terminal sedation in a competent patient allows one‘s reason and autonomy to reign in 
choosing to forego consciousness in order to eliminate suffering. This occurs when the 
patient has been informed and accepts both the benefit (relief from intolerable suffering) 
and harms (loss of consciousness, perception, and ability to communicate) involved in 
requesting terminal sedation. In cases of underlying dementia, delirium, or other illness, 
the decision to utilize terminal sedation must meet the requirements of surrogate request 
based upon overriding beneficent concern or prior requests of the patient.  
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many months or years after becoming unconscious due to irreversible severe brain injury. 
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Operational Definition 
 
 For the purpose of clarity in this dissertation I will utilize a standard to allow 
terminal or palliative sedation when the following conditions apply.  Terminal sedation is 
the appropriate and intentional use of medications (benzodiazepines and/or narcotics) to 
produce ongoing, deep unconsciousness upon 1) a terminal patient’s (or surrogates) 
request due to 2) suffering intractable pain or other distressing clinical symptoms 
intolerable to the patient when 3) death is expected within hours or days
62
 (less than two 
weeks) due to the terminal illness, injury, or disease. This may be done with or without 
the concurrent withdrawal of artificial nutrition and or hydration, but would exclude the 
starting of such support in all but the most extraordinary of circumstances.  This 
definition seeks to exclude the sort of coma or unconsciousness that many experience 
naturally at the end-of-life due to advancing disease, or that which may come from 
purposeful cessation of eating or drinking or from accidental overdose or buildup of 
medications in those with advanced disease.  Further, I include not only patient requests, 
via current or previous discussions with physicians but also the requests of those close 
family members, loved ones or other surrogates who are often called upon to make end-
of-life decisions.
63
 I also include the requirement that the pain or other clinical symptom 
causing the patient‘s suffering be evaluated as intractable or refractory.  This serves to 
eliminate those who may be able to be effectively treated in other ways, and does signify 
TS as a practice of last resort.   
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and Chapter 3.   
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I do not explicitly exclude existential suffering, as it may also become unbearable 
and intractable, this is less often the case, and existential suffering is often inseparably 
connected to other physical forms of unendurable suffering at the end-of-life.  I do mean 
to deny TS for those who do not have any physical suffering and cases of exclusively 
existential suffering in those who do not also have a terminal diagnosis and are not in the 
active phase of dying.  Attempts to relieve these sorts of existential crises are not without 
philosophical merit, but they do not fall under the classical medical purview and inpatient 
hospital care that I have focused this dissertation to address.   
Lastly, although I acknowledge that the practice of TS may also rightly serve 
those suffering intractable symptoms from illness or disease or those who are not able to 
be categorized as imminently terminal or those who justly and autonomously desire relief 
from ongoing chronic suffering due to grave disability, I have purposely excluded them.  
Some suffering (such as those undergoing burdensome but curative cancer or burn 
treatments) may be better treated with intermittent, light or moderate episodic sedation.  
This is not to say that I am indifferent to those suffering chronic grave disability or 
ongoing non-terminal suffering.  Rather, I exclude them in an attempt to clarify the 
current debate and delimit a practice that has many vague and variable factors.  
 For those who are suffering with diseases of a progressive disabling nature such 
as Alzheimer‘s disease, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), and other non-imminently 
fatal diseases or not imminently fatal at the point in time TS is requested, the use of TS to 
allow death, has significantly different moral evaluations.  The refusal of nutrition and 
hydration prior to the state of actively dying (although well within their autonomy rights) 
significantly hastens death and then may alter the moral evaluation of the physician‘s role 
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in providing sedation for symptom control to be closer to providing assistance for suicide. 
The practice of allowing those with debilitating illness to use TS has been recently 
termed Early Terminal Sedation (ETS) by Victor Cellarius
64
 because without the TS the 
patient may survive for additional months prior to dying from their underlying disease. 
Although I anticipate important progress into this area of inquiry, it is beyond the scope 
of this work.  
This dissertation will support full ethical endorsement of terminal sedation for 
those most urgently in crisis and need of beneficence, those who are dying and in the 
final hours or days and suffering. Moreover, I will attempt to identify new areas where 
harms and benefits may need to be evaluated as affecting patients, families and 
caregivers.  I will evaluate the current practice to allow the development of ethical 
guidelines and greater consensus on deciding the hard cases.  This work may also serve to 
assist those looking to enlarge the practice in the future with ETS for those with 
debilitating diseases or disability, but they are not my primary goal.  
To review, below is the standard I propose for moral allowability for the use of 
terminal sedation. I will refer to it often in the pages that follow simply as my standard.  
Terminal sedation is the appropriate and intentional use of medications 
(benzodiazepines and/or narcotics) to produce ongoing, deep unconsciousness 
upon 1) a terminal patient’s (or surrogates) request due to 2) suffering intractable 
pain or other distressing clinical symptoms intolerable to the patient when 3) 
death is expected within hours or days
65
 (less than two weeks) due to the terminal 
illness, injury, or disease. 
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 The prediction of an anticipated death is always inexact but ought to be anticipated to occur within two 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
DISTINGUISHING TERMINAL SEDATION FROM 
 PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE OR EUTHANASIA AND 
THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE EFFECT  
 
Introduction 
 
 A moral concern exists in that the appropriate use of the practice of terminal 
sedation may be viewed by some as equivalent to euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide 
(PAS).  This position has been held by many, including ethicists,
66
 physicians and 
families. It is important to have a clear understanding of the differences among the three 
types of death currently requested by those wanting more control in arranging their 
manner of death.  Each option gives the dying person, to a greater or lesser extent, more 
control over when and how death will occur. One ought to also consider that these three 
forms are all choices that one would usually make only under extreme situations, when 
suffering was felt to be unendurable during the dying process.
67
  Many persons, perhaps 
even most, are able to tolerate their dying process and able to utilize the conventional 
medical and social supports to allow a death to happen more naturally, that is without 
additional medical interventions.   
This chapter will first provide a brief examination of the practices of euthanasia 
and physician-assisted suicide with a focus on the moral intent, specific actions, and the 
methods utilized.  I will then do the same for the practice of terminal sedation to allow 
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the only option currently available in most of the United States.   
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evaluation of the critical similarities and differences amongst the three methods. This will 
allow us then to concentrate more fully on terminal sedation.  
Next, I will illustrate where the ethical debate on terminal sedation has mostly 
been focused since its inception in1991 and the major positions held by the proponents 
and those opposed to utilizing TS. Included in this debate is whether or not TS can be 
morally justified by utilizing the Doctrine of Double Effect.  There are many varied and 
complex interpretations of how the Doctrine of Double Effect applies or does not apply to 
TS. There is also great debate as to whether TS is one act or two. My intent is not to 
resolve these issues here, but merely to advise the reader of the current positions and my 
evaluation of them at this date. Then we will be able to move forward to looking at other 
potential harms and benefits of TS that have thus far escaped close ethical evaluation. Let 
us begin by clarifying the differences between euthanasia (EU), physician-assisted 
suicide (PAS) and terminal sedation (TS).  
Euthanasia  
  
In active euthanasia,
68
 the physician intent is to alleviate intractable suffering by 
the death of the patient.  Death is obtained by application of specific medicines (usually 
through injection) and dosages which will, in themselves, produce death.  The physician 
is responsible for administering the final dosage of medications and usually remains 
present until breathing and respirations have stopped and the patient is pronounced dead. 
When speaking of euthanasia one is usually, more accurately, speaking of voluntary 
active euthanasia, wherein a patient has voluntarily made the explicit request for 
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at all times and will not address any other form of euthanasia.  
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physician administration (active process) of drugs to assist in dying. There are also, 
however, many reports of cases of what might be called presumed voluntary euthanasia 
in which the patient is not competent and her wishes are not known but it is believed that 
a reasonable person in her situation would have wanted relief from the suffering her 
situation involves.  A variety of mediations may be utilized to achieve this goal. These 
include potassium chloride, to stop heart function; a combination of sodium thiopental to 
sedate and pancuronium bromide to paralyze heart/lung function; or a large dose of a 
single barbiturate such as Phenobarbital or opioids such as morphine to stop respiratory 
functions.   In most cases death occurs in minutes following the injection of lethal 
medication. Physicians may, where legal, provide additional medications if needed when 
the original dosage does not quickly provide cessation of heart and lung function.    
Voluntary euthanasia is not legal in the United States. It is legal in the countries of 
The Netherlands (since 1984), Belgium (since 2002), and Luxembourg (since 2009).
69
  
Euthanasia was briefly legal in Australia (1996-1997), then rescinded.
70
 It is technically 
legal in Japan but does not meet our usual American understanding of the term.
71
    
Involuntary euthanasia, without patient request for death, would be murder and is not 
legal (except in cases of ordered execution) in any country.   
The Netherlands is the country with the most experience with physicians‘ 
provision of active voluntary euthanasia upon patient request.  Frances Norwood is an 
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anthropologist who lived in The Netherlands and completed an ethnographic evaluation 
on the practice of euthanasia for over 15 months.  She worked directly with the medical 
practitioners, called huisarts, who provide euthanasia to their patients who request it.  In 
her recent book, The Maintence of Life: Preventing Social Death through Euthanasia 
Talk and End-of-Life Care- Lessons from The Netherlands, 
72
 Norwood sheds a 
remarkable light upon what has been, at least to American eyes, a shadowy practice.   
The huisartsen follow a well developed protocol that requires multiple steps and involves 
both the patient‘s extended family members and other physicians prior to the request for 
euthanasia being granted.  This protocol follows The Netherlands national policy, 
Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide Act of 2002.  
The Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act 
(The Act 2002)   According to the Act, euthanasia and assisted suicide must 
always be provided by a  physician who:  
a. holds the conviction that the request by the patient was voluntarily  and well-
considered 
b. holds the conviction that the patient‘s suffering was lasting and unbearable 
c. has informed the patient about the situation he was in and about his prospects 
d.  be provided by a physician who holds, as does the patient, the conviction that 
there was no other reasonable solution for the situation he was in, 
e. has consulted at least one other, independent physician who has seen the 
patient and has given his written opinion on the requirements of due care, 
referred to in parts a-d and  
f. has terminated a life or assisted in a suicide with due care (Requirements for 
Due Care, Article 2 The Act 2002) 
73
  
 
In addition to the above legal requirements, Norwood has elucidated the informal 
and unspoken rules that shape the practice of euthanasia in The Netherlands. Importantly, 
Norwood identifies the practice of ‗euthanasia talk‘, as requiring multiple conversations 
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between patient and family; patient and doctor; doctor and family; and patient, family, 
and doctor; and lastly, patient and consulting doctor.  Euthanasia talk is significant in 
playing an essential part in acknowledging the dying patient as an important person in the 
lives of others.  Euthanasia talk also serves in reducing the social death and isolation the 
dying often feel, and feelings of being marginalized because they now must take the lead 
in requesting and justifying their request for euthanasia.  Therefore, euthanasia talk often 
begins months prior to the time that it would be required.  
 There are five stages of euthanasia talk required.  The first is an initial verbal 
request and then a written declaration of intention.  These two stages may occur 
anywhere from years to days before death.  According to Norwood, ―Initial request and 
written declarations and subsequent repeated requests are typically as far as most people 
go in the stages of a euthanasia discussion.‖74  This fact is verified by the national 
statistics showing that in 2005, of 28,600 initial requests for euthanasia or PAS, only 
8.6% continued on in the process to eventual euthanasia death.
75
  The third stage occurs 
only if the huisartsen concur with the request and all conversations with family have 
occurred (the huisartsen, may agree or may not agree that euthanasia is the best option) 
then the huisartsen will schedule a consulting doctor to evaluate the patient for a second 
opinion.  If a second physician‘s opinion agrees to the appropriateness of euthanasia and 
the patient is still requesting it, then a date will be set when death is getting near. Finally 
at the agreed upon time of the patient choosing, if all remain in agreement, death by 
injection will proceed.  The death by injection is hastening with clear intention as 
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compared to the dying process that would have occurred from the disease progression 
alone. But, as is apparent, there are many points, even up to the day set for death, that the 
patient, family or physician may decline this option, delay the time or choose to try other 
efforts.  Also, patients may die from the disease process or other complications prior to 
reaching a date for euthanasia to occur.  
The act of choosing euthanasia also provides the patient and all others involved a 
clear role related to the upcoming death with duties involved. This clearly demarked and 
socially endorsed role delineation for the dying process has benefits for both the dying 
and the surviving in terms of providing norms and social role identification throughout 
the process.  Even when euthanasia is not ultimately the manner of death, the evaluation 
of this possibility requires both patients and families to have direct conversations with 
each other and the physician that proclaim death as immanent and that elicit patient 
preferences for how it ought to occur. It also validates the dying process as a ‗special 
event‘ of sorts in one‘s life and one that ought to be prepared for and marked by unique 
preparations.  This is in opposition to dying in American society where death is often 
denied right up until the final moments.  
To use the Dutch process as a well established example of medically endorsed 
euthanasia we can see unmistakably that the physician intends his action (providing an 
injection of medication(s)) to have the effect of the death of his patient.  The dosage and 
type of medication used are those that will directly cause death.  There is a requirement 
for ‗the conviction that the patient‘s suffering was lasting and unbearable‘ but this 
requirement does not specify that the suffering be physical or that the patient have a 
terminal diagnosis.  That euthanasia is autonomously the patient‘s desire and relieves her 
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of extreme suffering are important ethical considerations. But, it is the physician intent 
and actions that are most clearly at issue regarding the topic of how terminal sedation is 
similar or different from euthanasia.  Euthanasia is the physician act of providing lethal 
medications in lethal dosage with the intent to provide a hastened (usually to only 
minutes) death for the patient.   
Physician-Assisted Suicide (PAS)  
 
 In PAS the physician intent is to allow the patient the choice to take her own life 
in order to relieve intractable pain or other distressing clinical symptoms by giving the 
patient medications (or a prescription for medication) which will provide a dosage to 
allow suicide.
76
  The physician is responsible for writing a prescription for medications 
which when taken in sufficient amounts would be lethal and for educating the patient on 
the amounts and route of administration which will likely produce death. The 
medications ordered are usually in pill form (which may be crushed and put in liquid or 
soft food) or liquid form and this requires the patient to be able to swallow the drugs and 
to maintain their ingestion without vomiting.  The drugs utilized are usually barbiturates, 
such as Secobarbital or Pentobarbital to induce sleep or in combination with opiates like 
morphine or Fentanyl for pain relief.   
 Currently PAS is legal in the states of Oregon (since 1997), Washington (since 
2008), and Montana (since 2009). PAS is also available in the countries of Switzerland 
(since 1937), The Netherlands (since 1984), Belgium (since 2002), and Luxembourg 
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(since 2009).
77
 PAS is technically legal in Germany but lacks acceptance of routinely 
established and open procedures.
78
 Physicians or others may or may not be present when 
the patient takes the lethal dosage of medication.  That the final act is intended to be 
autonomously done by the patient is what holds ethical import. This ‗final act‘ of 
ingesting the lethal dosage of medication has been interpreted in various ways.  Some 
interpret it to hold the patient as acting entirely independently in obtaining and ingesting 
the drugs while others hold that assistance in obtaining and preparation of the drugs is 
fine as long as the final ingestion is a voluntary act of the patient.  
             In Switzerland, the organization, Dignitas, is a group that offers assistance in 
PAS that has attracted international visitors for the explicit purpose of obtaining PAS.  
They have a well established protocol for offering assistance with the final act of suicide. 
This is only done after a physician evaluation of the patient to determine that they are 
suffering intolerably and facing certain, if not imminent, death from their disease or 
disability. American professor, Craig Ewert was living in Britain and allowed his PAS to 
be filmed for a Public Broadcasting System (PBS) television documentary.  He narrates 
for viewers, with his wife assisting, the process of obtaining and undergoing PAS 
authorization and his death.
79
  As shown on video, once the physician has evaluated and 
written the prescription, the Dignitas assistant will prepare the medication and even assist 
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in holding a cup with a straw for the patient requesting death.
80
  This process is 
videotaped for the authorities and the patient is clearly asked if they understand that 
drinking the liquid will produce death and if that is in fact their intention.  If the patient 
confirms that they understand and consent, the process proceeds and the patient‘s death 
follows the ingestion of the lethal medications. This usually occurs within minutes.  It is 
the patient who must initiate and voluntarily ingest the lethal medications with the 
knowledge that doing so will bring about their death.    
 Many of the processes and benefits of PAS are either the same as or close to that 
of euthanasia.  First, as in requests for euthanasia, the physician must evaluate and agree 
that the patient is both suffering and has few, if any, other options for elimination of 
continued suffering until death in order for the authorization of the practice to proceed.  
Second, similar to euthanasia, the act of requesting PAS may in itself offer the patient 
solace that options exist for the quick elimination of extreme suffering should it ever 
become too much. This may then be the end of the process if the patient is reassured.  
Moreover, the request for PAS offers an opportunity for the clear acknowledgement that 
death is approaching and a frank discussion of how it may occur, fears related to dying, 
and options available for orchestration of the dying process to meet the goals and desires 
of the patient.  Finally, PAS also requires a considered process which takes time for 
approval and allows the patient time to reflect upon her decision. Differing from 
euthanasia, this option, once the medication is procured, is entirely in the patient‘s control 
as long as they can prepare and swallow the drugs. This knowledge also may in itself 
allow the patient to continue living with her illness until a natural death occurs. Knowing 
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that an escape is possible and can be had based upon the patient‘s determined time and 
desire allows strong autonomy needs to be fulfilled.    
 In The Netherlands the process for PAS is combined with the request for 
euthanasia in The Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide Act (The Act 
2002), cited above and includes a concurring second physician opinion.  The Oregon 
Death with Dignity Act was the first statute in the United States to legalize PAS in 1997 
and also has a detailed protocol requiring: 
an adult who is capable, is a resident of Oregon, and has been determined by the attending 
physician to be suffering  from a terminal disease, and who has voluntarily expressed his or her 
wish to die, may make a written request [to physician] for medication for the purpose of ending 
his or her life.‖ (ORS 127.800 to 127.897 1997)81  
 
The physician, if agreeing to provide PAS, must then fulfill the following additional  
 
steps. 
  Attending Physician Responsibilities. 
(1) The attending physician shall: 
(a) Make the initial determination of whether a patient has a terminal disease, is capable, and has 
made the request voluntarily; 
(b) Request that the patient demonstrate Oregon residency pursuant to ORS 127.860; 
(c) To ensure that the patient is making an informed decision, inform the patient of: 
(A) His or her medical diagnosis; 
(B) His or her prognosis; 
 C) The potential risks associated with taking the medication to be prescribed; 
(D) The probable result of taking the medication to be prescribed; and 
(E) The feasible alternatives, including, but not limited to, comfort care, hospice care and 
pain control; 
(d) Refer the patient to a consulting physician for medical confirmation of the diagnosis, and for a 
determination that the patient is capable and acting voluntarily; 
(e) Refer the patient for counseling if appropriate pursuant to ORS 127.825; 
(f) Recommend that the patient notify next of kin; 
(g) Counsel the patient about the importance of having another person present when the patient 
takes the medication prescribed pursuant to ORS 127.800 to 127.897 and of not taking the 
medication in a public place; 
(h) Inform the patient that he or she has an opportunity to rescind the request at any time and in 
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any manner, and offer the patient an opportunity to rescind at the end of the 15 day waiting period 
pursuant to ORS 127.840; 
(i) Verify, immediately prior to writing the prescription for medication under ORS 127.800 to 
127.897, that the patient is making an informed decision; 
 
 
(j) Fulfill the medical record documentation requirements of ORS 127.855; 
(k) Ensure that all appropriate steps are carried out in accordance with ORS 127.800 to 127.897 
prior to writing a prescription for medication to enable a qualified patient to end his or her life in a 
humane and dignified manner; and 
 (l)          (A) Dispense medications directly, including ancillary medications intended to facilitate 
the desired effect to minimize the patient's discomfort, provided the attending physician is 
registered as a dispensing physician with the Board of Medical Examiners, has a current Drug 
Enforcement Administration certificate and complies with any applicable administrative rule; or 
                 (B) With the patient's written consent: 
                                 (i) Contact a pharmacist and inform the pharmacist of the prescription; and 
 
                                 (ii) Deliver the written prescription personally or by mail to the pharmacist, 
who will dispense the medications to either the patient, the attending physician or an expressly 
identified agent of the patient. 
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the attending physician may sign the patient's 
death certificate. [1995 c.3 s.3.01; 1999 c.423 s.3]
82
 
The Oregon Department of Health and Human Services has maintained rigorous statistics  
on the utilization of the Death with Dignity Act (DWDA) since its inception.   
In 2009, 95 prescriptions for lethal medications were written under the provisions of the DWDA 
compared to 88 during 2008 (Figure). Of these, 53 patients took the medications, 30 died of their 
underlying disease, and 12 were alive at the end of 2009. In addition, six patients with earlier 
prescriptions died from taking the medications, resulting in a total of 59 DWDA deaths during 
2009. 
83
 
 
As you can see, the number of persons actually going through with PAS is much lower 
than those who requested a prescription and completed all the required additional steps in 
order to obtain it.  The reasons for requesting PAS are those that you might expect to see:  
“As in previous years, the most frequently mentioned end-of-life concerns were: loss 
of autonomy (96.6%), loss of dignity (91.5%), and decreasing ability to participate 
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in activities that made life enjoyable (86.4%).‖84 Each of these reasons has a primary 
locus of evaluation from the patient‘s viewpoint.  Many persons and groups opposed to 
allowing legalized PAS in the United States have voiced concerns that it would be 
overused or lead to physician misuse.  Yet in 2009 only one case was referred to the 
Oregon Medical Board for review for a physician who failed to submit a witnessed 
written consent form. 
85
 
 The Oregon statute serves as a clear example of legalized PAS.  We can see the 
physician act of providing a prescription for lethal medication(s) and education on drug 
use, with the intent of allowing the patient the option of independently taking the 
medicine to bring about her death at a time of her choosing. The physician intent is to 
support patient autonomy by providing the means to allow the patient the choice of 
ending her suffering and her life by suicide. It is by the patient‘s hand, or direct action 
that the medication is taken and the patient has much greater autonomy in deciding the 
time for her death to occur.  PAS cannot occur here without direct patient intent to end 
her life. Again, as in the euthanasia guidelines, there is not explicit requirement that there 
is extreme physical pain. However, the Oregon statute does require the patient to have a 
terminal diagnosis. The ethical support is still focused upon the patient‘s autonomy. 
Many may find the comfort they need in the knowledge that they may use the medication 
if needed and do not ever actually take the drugs. 
 I have detailed how I think the process of legalized PAS ought to commonly 
occur. I would be remiss if I did not also note that many persons, with or without the 
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knowledge and/or assistance of their physician, may stockpile prescription drugs or 
request prescriptions for barbiturates to aid in sleeping with the intent to secretly take 
their own life.
86
 There are also numerous published stories of physicians or family 
members aiding their dying loved ones.
87
  This underground practice undoubtedly occurs 
in every state where open PAS is not allowed and may also occur where PAS is allowed.  
Terminal Sedation 
 
In terminal sedation (TS) the physician intent is to relieve the patient‘s suffering 
and both the medicines and dosages used are aimed at producing relief of intolerable 
symptoms. TS has moral grounding in the principles of beneficence, mercy and 
compassion towards relieving the suffering of the dying. Medications are ordered by 
physicians and may be administered by physicians or nurses with the intent to alleviate 
the patient‘s pain and provide deep sedation until death occurs from the underlying 
disease process. This is usually combined with the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration. 
This practice is not specifically prohibited in any country and it is done in the United 
States. It has been evaluated by some as merely the end point of the provision of good 
palliative care.
88
   As stated in Chapter 1, there are no universal guidelines as yet for the 
practice of terminal sedation.  In 2009 the Royal Dutch Medical Association (KNMG) 
Committee on National Guideline for Palliative Sedation compiled a 75-page guideline 
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booklet to provide descriptive and detailed assistance to their practitioners.
89
 This has not 
been done in the United States or other countries, although the American Medical 
Association did make a recommendation report to the Council on Judicial and Ethical 
Affairs in 2008 which gave a guideline for TS.
90
  TS is to be utilized only with those 
diagnosed with a terminal condition and in the active phase of dying.  Most patients have 
also already decided on a Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) status order in case of pulmonary or 
respiratory arrest. While closeness to death is an imprecise requirement, those who have 
been working with the dying are able to identify some markers.  The following Dutch 
guideline gives a good approximation of how to make that determination.  
It is not always easy to estimate how long a patient is likely to live. But once a number of 
characteristics of the phase of dying have been observed, it can be assumed that the patient is 
approaching the point at which death is inevitable. The most characteristic feature is that patients 
virtually cease to eat and drink. In addition, they are frequently cachectic, tired and debilitated, 
and bedridden. They may also be drowsy and disoriented. It is up to the physician to factor these 
matters into the decision-making, along with the worsening symptoms of disease, without the 
expectation that the moment of death can be predicted precisely.
91
 
 
 When the distressing and intolerable symptoms cannot be eliminated, sedation is 
used to reduce the patient‘s conscious awareness of the distress through sedation. The 
medications used (detailed in Chapter 1) vary but are generally benzodiazepines, such as 
Midazolam, that produce both sedation and amnesia, and opioids, such as morphine, for 
pain relief.  The physician orders medications and monitors the effects, but the actual 
drugs may be administered by nursing staff.  It is common for the physician to be present 
at the initiation of TS and it is recommended in several of the guidelines that currently 
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exist.
92
 The administration of medications by the physician is directed at relieving the 
primarily physical symptoms that have been unable to be controlled by other methods. 
The primary ethical motivation is from beneficence to eliminate the unbearable suffering. 
The goal is to allow the patient relief from intolerable symptoms therefore the dosage of 
medications required for this to occur will vary according to the patient‘s past tolerance 
of the medication and the severity of the symptom(s) experienced.  Once again, the Dutch 
have developed a clear protocol for medicating patients to produce sedation to 
unconsciousness (see next page).  
 The patient is monitored to assure that there is deep sedation and that it does not 
appear that she is experiencing distress or pain (done by monitoring of blood pressure, 
facial grimacing, moaning, or twitching).  Unlike in euthanasia or PAS, death with TS 
may take hours, days, or up to two weeks to occur as it is not intended to be due to the 
sedating medications. Death is intended to come from the advancement of the terminal 
disease process.
93
  Usually, but not always the patient (or surrogate) has made the 
decision to forgo artificial nutrition and hydration.  TS may be done while continuing to 
provide artificial nutrition and hydration but these measures are often evaluated as non-
beneficial since they will not assist the patient to return to good health (the usual goal of 
medical treatment).  Moreover, they may serve to delay inevitable death or cause 
additional problems if the patient has abdominal motility problems or fluid overload. 
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 Drug Bolus Continuous  administration 
Phase 
1 
Midazolam 10mg  s.c. at 
the initiation of 
sedation, 5 mg 
s.c. every 2 hrs 
if necessary 
Initially 1.5-2.5 mg/hr  s.c./i.v., increase dose by 50% 
after a minimum of 4 hrs I f effect is insufficient, always 
combined with a bolus of 5 mg s.c.  
If risk factors are present  (age >60, weight<60kg, severe 
kidney or liver function disorder, very low serum 
albumin and /or co-medication that could exacerbate 
the effect of sedation):  
-lower initial dose (0.5-1.5 mg/hr), and 
-longer interval (6-8hrs) before increasing maintenance 
dose.  
In the case of doses > 20mg/hr, see  
phase 2.  
Phase 
2 
Levomepro-
mazine 
25 mg s.c./i.v.,  
Followed by 50 
mg 2 hours 
later if desired 
0.5-8 mg/hr s.c./i.v. in combination with midazolam. 
After 3 days halve the dose to prevent accumulation.  
If the desired effect is not achieved, stop administering 
midazolam and levomeproma-zine; see phase 3.  
Phase 
3  
Propofol 20-50 mg i.v. 20 mg/hr i.v., increased by 10 mg/hr every 15 minutes.  
Administration under supervision of an anesthetist 
advisable.  In hospital setting, may also be considered for 
phase 2.   
The initial doses are based upon the average patient.  The physician should base his decision on the  
effect of the medication.  In  the presence of extreem risk factors, such as patient with a high  
(e.g. 100kg) or low (40kg) weight, the intial and subsequent doses may be adjusted upward or  
downward correspondingly.  In the case of doubt concerning the dose to be administered, the  
opinion of a palliative care consultant should be sought. 
Figure 1 : The Dutch Guideline for Sedation 
94
 
 
At times death may come from the resulting dehydration due to lack of artificial 
hydration.  Again, this is not the intention of the treatment, merely a potential side effect.  
In these cases death is anticipated to arrive within hours, days or a couple of weeks and if 
it is shortened at all for a particular patient, it is not greatly shortened.  Nutrition and 
hydration – whether given or forgone – for the group of patients I have included in my 
TS standard, will not greatly affect their life expectancy for they will die soon (hours to 
two weeks), regardless, due to their underlying disease.  
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TS in the above patients differs greatly from the cases of those patients facing a 
future death with known advancing debilitation due to disease but, who are not yet 
actively dying.  If patients, who are facing death (in perhaps many weeks to months or 
years) due to chronic and progressive diseases, such as ALS, have requested TS, then I 
would classify them as not meeting my proposal for standard TS.  Rather, if allowed TS, 
they would meet Cellarius‘ standard for early terminal sedation (ETS), in which case they 
would in fact die as they would intend due to malnutrition or dehydration rather than 
their underlying disease.   
 Respiratory depression is also a known side effect of both benzodiazepines and 
narcotics.  This causes both a lowering of the hypoxic drive to take in oxygen (lowering 
partial pressure oxygenation, pO2 intake) and also a buildup of the waste gas (carbon 
dioxide, CO2) due to lack of complete expiration.
95
 This respiratory depression may also 
cause the resulting death.  These possibilities should be explained to the patient and 
family in advance of initiating TS.  In my experience, during 25 years of working in 
hospitals, often in ICU situations with dying patients and families, this detail of what 
respiratory depression actually means is rarely, if ever, adequately explained.   
Optimally, the patient herself has had prior conversations with the physician to 
discuss the fact that extreme distress in dying may occur and that it is possible that the 
benefit of symptom relief may come only at the expense of losing consciousness.  It is 
only when symptoms become intolerable to the patient that such measures for relief will 
be utilized.  As with euthanasia and PAS, for many patients, simply knowing that an 
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option exists to end their intolerable suffering may be the reassurance they need to allow 
them to continue living until a more natural death occurs.  If the patient has not been alert 
or oriented prior to the onset of such extreme, intolerable symptoms, due to illness or 
dementia, TS may be requested by the surrogate or family member.
96
  A benefit of TS in 
end-of-life care is that although clear communication between physician and patient and 
family remains a requirement, it does not necessarily need to occur days or weeks before 
the provision of TS. Unlike in euthanasia or PAS, there is no prior written documentation 
requesting sedation required. The intent of TS is not to produce death, but to allow death 
to occur while ensuring the patient remains free from the intractable pain or other 
distressing clinical symptoms as it ensues.  The patient may, in fact, desire a hastened 
death, and the physician may concur that a death sooner rather than later would in most 
evaluations be ‗best‘, all things considered, but the medications given and the dosages 
administered in TS ought not to produce that effect.    
To review the primary ethical points involved in TS:  The physician intent in TS 
is to eliminate the patient‘s ability to experience intolerable symptoms producing distress 
by the provision of medications to ensure unconsciousness.  The medications are given, 
based upon physician order or by the physician, in an initial and then ongoing dosage to 
ensure deep sedation.  The sedating medications are not, in themselves, lethal 
medications nor are they intended to be given in lethal dosage. TS is initiated when it 
becomes apparent that the patient‘s symptoms are both unbearable and refractory.  This is 
a marked difference between euthanasia and PAS, where the patient‘s desired timeframe 
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is the primary determinant in timing due to a primary focus on autonomy.   Death may 
not occur for hours to days or even up to two weeks following the initiation of sedation.  
Thus, the intent is to relieve intolerable symptoms, not to hasten death.
97
  
 Narcotic medications are given to relieve intolerable pain. In some cases, the 
ongoing provision of narcotic medication in the dosage required to relieve the pain may 
affect respirations and therein shorten life.  But that may happen even without TS and the 
provision of pain medications at the risk of shortening life has been an ethically accepted 
practice since the beginnings of modern medicine.  The risk of shortening life due to 
respiratory depression from the combination of sedating medications and pain 
medications is surely a significant risk and may also be a burdensome side effect.  But it 
is one that, when there exist no other options, may be morally allowable. Many other 
medical treatments also come with significant risks involved (such as open heart 
surgery), even when the intent is to prolong life.  This moral permissibility in the case of 
TS is usually based upon beneficence and the good intention to provide relief from 
intense pain and/or suffering and is granted by utilizing the Principle or Doctrine of 
Double Effect (DDE). 
The Doctrine of Double Effect 
  
The Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) was originally developed by St. Aquinas to 
support the religious and moral permissibility of actions which have two or more effects, 
a primary good or intended effect and a secondary less good or bad effect.  The concept 
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has been used often in both medicine and law since many human actions have more than 
one effect.  The DDE has several necessary conditions that must be met in order to assure 
the moral permissibility of a proposed action.  First, the intended final end (good effect) 
must be good in itself. Second, the intended means to that end must be morally 
acceptable. Third, the foreseen bad effect must not be intended or the means to obtain the 
good effect. Lastly, the good effect must be of proportionally greater import to justify the 
foreseen bad effect.
98
  
As related to palliative care in general, the aim of narcotic medication is for pain 
relief and quite often patients must make decisions concerning the undesired side effects   
of sedation or loss of lucidity.  At times one may choose to simply be free of pain. One 
may be unconcerned that they may be unable to maintain alertness or lucidity or have 
prominent confusion that impairs conversations with family members or others.  Other 
times, patients decide that they will tolerate even considerable amounts of pain in order to 
maintain alertness. They choose to prioritize having full competence when conversing 
with loved ones or others over having all pain eliminated. When the former (pain relief 
with less lucidity) is chosen by the patient, the DDE supports the pain relief (good effect) 
even when the loss of lucidity (bad effect) is foreseen. In this situation the mental 
impairment (bad effect) is judged allowable since the need for pain relief (good effect) is 
greater than the harm of being less alert or confused.  
This concept has also been used for those experiencing extreme and intolerable 
suffering at the end-of-life. In order to obtain relief from intolerable symptoms (good 
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effect) patients may request medications that will also eliminate all consciousness and 
have potential to depress respirations (bad effect).   The medication (Midazolam) and the 
amounts used are, in themselves, morally allowable since medications are routinely used 
to eliminate the consciousness and memory of events which are known to be extremely 
painful (as is routinely done in surgery or when patients must be maintained on 
ventilators). The good effect (relief from suffering) is seen as a proportionally greater 
good to the bad effect (loss of consciousness and respiratory depression).   
For those who are experiencing extreme pain at the end-of-life, the use of large 
doses of opioids to relieve pain (good effect) even when acknowledging the foreseeable 
reduction in respiratory function and therein a shorten life (bad effect) has also been 
evaluated as morally allowable. The large dose of medication (morphine) is given with 
the intention of providing pain relief. It is not immoral to administer morphine to achieve 
pain relief.  The patient‘s death is not the means for achieving pain relief and the good of 
providing relief from extreme pain at the end of a life is proportional to the bad effect of a 
potential shortening of that life.  That life is, in fact, shortened by the use of TS has also 
been debated as some studies have shown that TS does not hasten the occurrence of 
death.
99
 
Stated in this way, TS can appear to be relatively uncontroversial. However, much 
of the moral permissibility rests in the evaluation of the ―intentions‖ and how they are 
interpreted.   One of the basic tenets on almost any moral framework is the overwhelming 
imperative to never intentionally cause the death of an innocent person.   This is the 
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moral reasoning many use to unequivocally disallow the practices of both euthanasia and 
PAS.  Although both have the same goal as TS, the relief of intolerable suffering at the 
end-of-life, they do so by causing with intent the hastened death of the patient, or stated 
another way, death is the means of obtaining relief from suffering.   
Many of those who oppose TS argue that using the DDE merely obfuscates the 
intentional hastening of the death for a terminally-ill patient.
100
  Further, some argue that 
in medicine, as in many parts of life, intentions are often multiple and complex and are 
thereby too difficult to clearly delineate in actions that have more than one outcome.
101
   
Others, opposed to TS, declare DDE acts merely as a ―psychological defense‖ to 
physicians.
102
  Admittedly, part of the issue is that the combination of benzodiazepines 
and narcotics is known to have a greatly exaggerated yet imprecisely (in any one patient) 
identifiable effect of respiratory depression which may, in fact, hasten death, especially if 
this is combined with the refusal of artificial nutrition and hydration.  The medications 
may be a significant risk to those who have also made decisions not to undergo ventilator 
support for breathing.  This decision though seems a reasonable one to someone who is 
dying of a terminal disease. Being put in ICU on a ventilator to die is seen for many as 
one of the worst sort of deaths imaginable. Yet, if given a certain death with 
uncontrollable and intolerable suffering and or pain, versus calm death with even a 
foreseeable hastening, hastening may be allowable if one believes the bad effects are not 
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what is intended.  But not everyone believes you can only have good intentions related to 
TS, and the DDE will, therefore, not hold moral sway.  
There are those who argue that TS, when it is accompanied by withholding or 
withdrawal of nutrition and hydration, must be done with the intention of hastening 
death.
103
  Some, such as David Orentlicher, dispute that one can not intend to cause death 
when intentionally withholding or withdrawing nutrition and hydration from a comatose 
person.  He states the clear intention to make the patient comatose and clear intention not 
to provide nutrition and hydration to someone unable to eat or drink (due to being 
comatose) couple to produce an intention to hasten death.  This is because it is known 
that anyone not given nutrition or hydration will die and that in those weakened by 
advanced disease, this is especially so.  Thus, these bioethicists find fault with the 
previous argument that the overriding good intention is solely to provide relief from 
suffering and dispute DDE as holding moral sway.  
Their argument, I believe, is misguided. Although the intent to undergo TS will 
understandably bring up the issue of nutrition and hydration, it does not mandate that it 
be stopped.  In the imminently dying patient, the provision of nutrients and hydration 
cannot be evaluated in the same rubric as when they are evaluated in a patient who, 
although comatose and ill, may be expected to recover.  The issue of providing artificial 
nutrition and hydration always must be evaluated on its own merits for the patient and 
family involved.  Patients or families may not believe that there is sufficient benefit to 
either maintain or initiate artificial treatments which could have the effect of prolonging 
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the dying process. This evaluation of the burdens and benefits ought to be done from each 
patient‘s specific value set. The principle of autonomy allows them the moral authority to 
make decisions related to any treatment or refusal of treatment. Moreover, the right to 
forgo medical treatment, including nutrition and hydration, has been a well established 
legal right based on autonomy for the patient.
104
  Further, TS may be provided along with 
the continuation or initiation of artificial nutrition and hydration.  The fact that this is 
rarely done is not based upon any prohibition incumbent in the practice. Rather, it is 
likely due to the null or limited benefits that such treatment would offer the patient.
105
   
Additional Criticism against Terminal Sedation  
   
There are other criticisms of terminal sedation. The combination of bad effects 
involved in TS, the respiratory depression due to medications and the common 
withholding of nutrition and hydration, has led some to declare that TS is merely ―slow 
euthanasia.‖106 In a widely cited article, ―Slow Euthanasia‖,107 Billings and Block unveil 
the practice of ―turning up the morphine drip‖108 for patients at the end-of-life.  Although, 
they are widely cited as being against TS, what they described in their article and the 
physician quotations cited regarding pushing or ordering increasing administration of 
morphine, regardless of patient response, is not equivalent to TS.  Orders to turn up a 
narcotic drip past the point of obtaining patient relief from symptoms and knowing it will 
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hasten death could be malpractice, negligence, or euthanasia.  Billings and Block 
correctly state this practice, when done with attempts to use DDE to justify the actions, as 
an ―unconvincing rationalization.‖  They also emphasize the slowness of the effects as a 
sort of psychological defense. ―The slowness of the process - the series of small steps that 
gradually lead to death - softens the sense of the physician‘s agency in this instance of 
mercy killing.  ….Moreover, many physicians may have written orders on the patient and 
many nurses may have been involved in care, thus diffusing responsibility.‖109 This 
practice may indeed occur in many hospitals surreptitiously, but the provision of 
narcotics beyond the amount required for adequate symptom relief is not TS and ought 
not to be evaluated as such.   
 How ought one to then evaluate or attempt to determine the differences between 
what may be euthanasia and what is appropriate TS of a patient suffering intolerably at 
the end-of-life?  I will argue that there are identifiable differences including stated intent, 
and close evaluation of actions and prescribing practices.  
A physician who states, ―Let‘s get this over today‖ and who writes orders to 
increase morphine by 2mg/hr continuously will ensure both that the patient will not suffer 
and that she will not survive the level of narcotics provided for long.  A physician who 
states, ―This suffering must stop‖ and who writes for Midazolam 5mg to start and then to 
be administered until the patient appears to be resting comfortably and to continue 
current dosage of Morphine or increase only until patient shows no signs of discomfort 
has a different agenda.  Those attempting to evaluate the differences in these situations 
admittedly must gain new skills, not merely asking the hard questions of intent, but also 
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evaluating prescribing methods.  This will require also learning the particular patient‘s 
past narcotic usage and tolerance. The drugs and dosage become part of the morally 
important facts that need to be evaluated.  This need for closer evaluation does not in any 
way indicate that a standard dosage for either narcotics or sedatives could or ought to be 
established.   
The unique patient differences remain important and each person‘s past narcotic 
use and length of time using narcotics establish differing levels of tolerance, as does the 
type of pain that they are experiencing. At times, what appears to be a huge dose of 
narcotics may still allow some individuals to remain alert and conversant.   This is 
admittedly a complex situation even to attempt to evaluate. A dosage that could be easily 
used to euthanize one patient with little or no narcotic tolerance could be routinely 
prescribed to another patient who has been taking it for many months and allow her to be 
up and walking about.  The important point to evaluate is not merely the dosage but the 
history of drug prescription dosage in specific patients.  What was ―normal‖ for them?  
What extra dosage was routinely used for breakthrough pain in addition to the usual 
narcotics ordered?   How long had increasing doses been required to obtain the same 
results?  How long had even increasing dosage been ineffective?  These issues also 
highlight the need for the practice of TS to be directed by well educated physicians.   
Given that it has only been in recent years that physicians have begun to 
aggressively treat pain
110
 and that many still fear litigation or federal investigation due to 
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prescribing practices for pain medications,
111
 it is little wonder that this remains an area 
of high emotions and conservative treatment at times. The effort to differentiate between 
what may be high dosages required to eliminate suffering, versus excessive dosage meant 
to hasten death, will be a complicated call to make at times.  Yet, I do not believe that it 
will always, or even usually, be an impossible distinction to make.  Orders that specify 
titration only to patient comfort and that require ongoing patient monitoring for signs and 
symptoms of both apparent comfort (an indication to hold levels of medication) or 
distress (an indication to continue to titrate up medication) thereby allow an objective 
indication of physician intent.  Physicians need to remain available to monitor that the 
patient is not getting over- or under-medicated and because adjustments to dosage may be 
expected during any individual‘s treatment.  
In TS the goal is to alleviate the patient‘s perception of her suffering by provision 
of unconsciousness, not to eliminate suffering by intentionally hastening the death of the 
patient. Grey areas will remain and the evaluation will likely always be difficult.  
Admittedly, there may not always be a clear cut and precise method to identify the 
differences in ‗real life‘ practice between intent for TS versus euthanasia.  Still, this sort 
of evaluation (looking at medication history and dosage), when included in protocols, 
will assist in clarification and be an applicable method in many situations. Having set 
practice protocols for TS would contribute to the establishment of routine guidelines and 
physician norms for enacting a treatment that, although rarely considered necessary, 
provides additional options for compassionate care at the end-of-life. 
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Alternate Evaluations  
 
 The use of the DDE is the most referenced tool or guideline for the moral 
allowability of providing TS, but it is not the only evaluative framework available. Roger 
S. Magnusson, from the United Kingdom, added a perspective to the debate utilizing 
what he calls ―the devil‘s choice‖.  Magnusson cites the torment depicted in the film 
Sophie’s Choice.112 He relates Sophie‘s forced choice, to decide which of her two 
children to send to the Auschwitz ovens, to ―the devil‘s choice‖.   
A choice coerced by circumstances beyond one‘s control, and made all the more terrible by the 
conviction that tragedy will follow, whichever option is taken.  In so far as morality and ethics are 
useful when facing the devil‘s choice, it cannot be to point out the ―right choice‖, because 
circumstantial constraints mean that all the options are perverse. …..The benefit of applying the 
devil‘s choice to palliative care is that it permits empathy with the dilemmas physicians‘ face, 
while still acknowledging the extraordinary power that physicians have over the lives of patients at 
what is perhaps the most vulnerable time of their lives. 
113
 
 
 This evaluation does seem to hold in many cases where the physician is faced 
with either providing medications to relieve intractable pain or other distressing clinical 
symptoms that will also eliminate any consciousness and has at least a slight risk of hasten 
death or allowing the patient to continue to suffer intolerably until death occurs.  The 
physician, by sanction of position, is forced to choose between alternatives that are not of 
the chooser‘s making and are both perverse.  Further, it is not possible not to choose since 
the physician is morally and legally charged with the care of the patient.  The beneficence 
of providing adequate relief from suffering with the foresight of possibly hastening death, 
versus the concerns of non-maleficence in allowing one‘s patient to continue to suffer in 
unremitting torture, traps the physician in the devil‘s choice.  Both choices are prima 
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facie binding and may only be overridden for compelling moral reasons. Magnusson 
states admitting to a noxious choice among poor options is a more transparent and honest 
position than reliance on the DDE.  He states, ―Whatever else it achieves, the 
foresight/intention distinction can be manipulated at will in a way that permits euthanasia 
to blend, seamlessly, into the spectrum of conventional palliative practices.‖114  
Magnusson promotes new legislation be adopted to allow a defense of ―necessity‖ when 
patient situations force a physician into the circumstances of a devil‘s choice.  Whether 
these circumstances apply or not, Magnusson argues, could then be evaluated by the 
doctor‘s choice in sedatives and analgesics (those routinely used in TS, versus potassium 
chloride) and that their administration appears to be proportional to the degree of 
suffering the patient was enduring.  
While most religious moral views do not encourage the hastening of death, many 
also do not support the prolongation of dying.  One moral framework that is often used in 
evaluation of ethical decision making in medicine is Principlism.  Recall that the 
traditional concepts of Principlism
115
 uses four primary values (beneficence, 
nonmaleficence, autonomy and justice) weighed and balanced against each other to 
provide moral guidance.   This view would promote ethical decisions to be reached by 
competent patients (or their surrogates) and physicians by effectively evaluating the 
benefits and burdens involved in accepting TS and making an autonomous decision in 
light of  personal values. The values of beneficence versus nonmaleficence are evaluated 
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from the particular patient‘s perspective and value system with a strong preference placed 
upon the patient‘s autonomy in weighing the former two principles.  
The fact that we all live our lives intertwined with families and others that we care 
about is inescapable.  Quite often we make decisions in our lives based upon not only our 
own concerns but on how our decisions will affect others.  This fact promotes the closer 
evaluation of the potential effects of TS on not only the patient but others involved with 
patient care and provision of TS services.  Those who favor Care Ethics will also evaluate 
the effects of TS on those family members and others who are in close relationships with 
the patient.  In all moral frameworks there will be difficult decisions to make and those 
which involve the death of one we love will always be the hardest. There are many other 
situations in medical treatment in which patients must make personal evaluations 
concerning their quality of life verses a potential hastening of death.  These decisions are 
routinely involved in acceptance of cancer treatments, undergoing risky (or potentially 
any major) surgery or choosing non-treatment in many situations.   
If one were merely concerned with the legal allowability of the practice of TS, the 
Supreme Court ruled in 1997 on two decisions
116
 which clearly showed support for 
allowing terminal sedation with withdrawal of nutrition and hydration as two separate 
and allowable actions. The Supreme Court decision supports the provision of sedation 
and pain medication as allowable by the physician‘s responsibility to optimize palliative 
care in symptom relief to the dying, supported by the involvement of Doctrine of Double 
Effect (DDE), and the withdrawal of unwanted treatment and refusal of food and water as 
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related to an individual‘s liberty interest. 117  This has not halted the opposition against 
TS and has led some to claim that the Supreme Court has acted in, ―approving terminal 
sedation despite the fact that it amounts to euthanasia at times‖.118 
It should now be apparent that since 1991 when the words ‗terminal sedation‘ first 
appeared in the literature, they have engendered a great deal of moral controversy on 
many fronts.  The ethical battle to declare TS as either synonymous to euthanasia or PAS 
or as distinct from or possibly superior to either continues to dominate the moral 
evaluation of the practice.  My goal is not to settle this ongoing debate. As a secular 
ethicist, I see great value in the determination of each case based upon its individual 
merits and the benefits and burdens as evaluated in each specific case.  Evaluation of the 
patient/family involved combined with close listening to patient/family and staff  
(physician/nursing/ancillary care) and evaluation of the methods (the types and amounts 
of medications) used will provide an evaluation that will vary from case to case.  At times 
this will allow ethical endorsement of TS and at times not. Where TS cannot be ethically 
endorsed as appropriate, the case will need to be investigated further for other options in 
light of the legally allowable options available in the State and moral framework of those 
involved.   
By endorsing TS, in some cases, one must accept that death may be hastened.
119
  
This is an important harm to be considered but there may be other overriding harms, all 
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things considered. Clinical medical ethics often entails individual case evaluation.  TS 
just may be one of the indicators for close ethical evaluation each and every time it is 
considered.  My greater concern is that this intense focus on distinguishing TS from what 
are illegal, and considered by some to be immoral, practices in most of the United States 
has allowed significant evaluation of any other potential harms or benefits to go 
relatively unexamined.   
The purpose of the following chapters will be a detailed examination of other 
potential effects related to TS.  This includes how TS may affect those who choose TS, 
their family members, and those who participate in providing the treatment. We will 
begin this examination of other potential benefits and burdens associated with terminal 
sedation with a close focus upon the one most affected, the patient. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
BENEFITS AND HARMS FOR THE PATIENT 
 
Introduction 
 
Perhaps the most glaring ethical concern relates to the irreversible nature of 
terminal sedation upon the patient.  Like the death penalty, one does not want to enact it 
in error.  It is for this reason that when considering terminal sedation (TS), proper 
palliative care includes multiple attempts to address intractable symptoms with multiple 
methods, recurrent and clear discussion with patients and family members regarding the 
benefits and burdens of this or any treatment, and inclusion of the multidisciplinary team 
in assessing a patient‘s appropriateness to receive TS. This chapter will look at the 
benefits of terminal sedation for the patient as well as several potential harms to the 
patient when this method of ending life is utilized.  
The primary and overriding benefit of TS is clearly the relief of intractable pain or 
other distressing clinical symptoms, causing intolerable suffering for the patient. Another 
major benefit is allowing the patient control in choosing how to face her death. These 
benefits cannot be undervalued when making moral evaluations but may not always be 
overriding, even when considering only the patient‘s concerns. Might there be other 
harms to consider given that relinquishing consciousness until death is the price?  I will 
evaluate potential harms concerning the withholding of nutrition and hydration, the 
potential for questionable informed consent, surrogate consent (especially as it relates to 
the demented), and concerns about the effectiveness of TS. Next, I will briefly address a 
group of concerns related to existential issues that TS may affect. This includes concerns 
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related to religious beliefs concerning the potential for growth and self-actualization 
when dying and how TS may prevent one from achieving these opportunities. Lastly, I 
will look at how some traditional dying roles may be met or may require alteration when 
TS is utilized. I end with some recommendations for evaluation prior to allowing TS.   
  Case Example:  
The patient is 52years old, married, and has 2 young adult children.  Pt. has advanced throat 
cancer with an inoperable tumor that is fast growing and partially blocking the esophagus.  In 
the prior 18 months the patient has undergone two surgeries and radiation therapy to remove 
tumor in back of throat/base of jaw that has also removed most of the tongue and a large portion 
of jaw that has failed to heal and now requires a packed wound dressing. This makes speaking all 
but impossible.  The last surgery was one week ago. The patient is now grossly disfigured from 
the surgery with radiation burns to the face and neck.  Patient is hospitalized for IV pain control 
and anxiety, as swallowing is extremely difficult due to advancing tumor size. The patient is on 
nasal canula oxygen support at this time and aware that nothing further can be done to treat the 
advancing cancer and tumor growth.  Patient has been advised that tube feeding will allow 
nutrition directly into stomach and forego the need for oral intake and it has been refused.  Only 
ice chips have been taken orally for about the last 4 days with a few sips of a supplement shake 
on day 3 following surgery. Patient has also made an advance directive to refuse intubation 
should the tumor grow to impair ability to breathe. The patient wishes to remain comfortable.  
Pain continues to be an issue and anxiety about suffocation due to tumor growth has increased. 
Nausea has become a new prime issue as routine medications have failed to reduce the feeling of 
extreme nausea from tumor secretions flowing into the stomach and patient is fearful of choking 
or aspiration during vomiting due to tumor blockage. Communication is difficult due to inability 
to enunciate following surgery and oral wound/dressing.  The patient has written “please end 
this” and the patient and spouse have been approached about the option of terminal sedation.  
 
In the above case, when evaluated by the standard I have proposed, terminal sedation 
could be granted. I have stated a standard to allow TS for those patients who request and 
have 1) a terminal illness in the final stages; 2) unrelieved, intractable pain or other 
distressing clinical symptoms; and 3) appear to be actively dying (in the last days or 
weeks of life) to be morally allowable to competent patients or by the request of their 
surrogates.  Not everyone agrees with this standard.  There are those who believe that the 
provision of narcotics and benzodiazepines to a patient in this situation, already so 
weakened by disease and lack of nutrition and hydration, would be hastening their death.  
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Further, they believe that this hastening is morally wrong in all cases.  For patients who 
steadfastly believe this, TS would not be an option.  Of course, not requesting TS and 
continuing on until death occurs is a morally allowable option and is not part of this 
current discussion.  For patients who would want to choose TS, what are the potential 
benefits and harms that they may face?  That is the focus of the present chapter.  
To a patient like the one in the case example, the option of allowing sedation until 
death occurs would seem a compassionate action in order to promote a more peaceful 
death.  In many cases, this could also extend to compassion for the family as well as the 
patient.  That death might be hastened, due to medication effects for pain and symptom 
relief which cause respiratory depression, would be, if not a good thing then, at least, not 
a bad thing as evaluated by many.
120
  In fact, a large section of society would rate a death 
in their sleep as one of the most desired.  When polling my undergraduate students in 
medical ethics courses, this was always their number one choice.  
Relief from Suffering  
 
 For those of us who have witnessed anyone in extreme pain it is easy to accept 
that ending pain often becomes the only thing that matters.  In fact, freedom from pain 
was the most highly rated factor in a study done in 1999 looking at factors considered 
important at the end-of-life.
121
  Freedom from pain was the number one concern not only 
with terminal patients, but also with family members, physicians, and other care 
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providers.
122
 Witnessing someone in pain often extends suffering to all those who must 
stand idly by watching, unable to offer solace or to reduce the intensity or duration.  
Those who are suffering with great physical pain while they are dying may also be 
experiencing various other forms of suffering.  In our above case, these concerns are 
likely to be fears of choking, not being able to breathe due to tumor growth, and a 
gruesome final experience of dying by suffocation and/or aspiration.  This may be 
coupled with more existential concerns and common fears of dying alone or facing the 
unknown upon death.
123
  Allowing a patient, who meets the standard I have proposed, to 
undergo TS at the end-of-life could be evaluated as treating the suffering of both the 
dying patient and the family who suffers by watching a loved one‘s suffering go on 
without relief.   
 Often terminal and uncontrollable symptoms arise during the last 24-48 hours of 
life and even those patients who had been receiving hospice homecare are readmitted to 
hospitals for symptom control.
124
  Hospitalization, when required in the final hours of 
life, is not uniformly seen as a less good option than dying at home.  In the Steinhauser 
study, being able to die at home was considered important by fewer than half of the 
participants and of those who felt it was important it was the last rated of the 9 factors 
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considered important by them.
125
  Steinhauser cites a similar study by Fried et al
126
 where 
they reported,  
The notion of dying at home may be romantic among health professionals who want to provide a 
good death.  However, as symptoms accelerate in the last 24 to 48 hours, some patients and 
families may feel overwhelmed by concerns about symptom control or a dead body in the home 
and therefore, prefer a skilled care environment.
127
  
 
To allow the patient to enter a medically induced sedation and to relieve patient and 
family suffering addresses multiple factors considered most important at the end-of-life. 
The provision of terminal sedation in this sort of situation would be evaluated as 
beneficent on most moral frameworks.  
Sedation like Sleep  
 
 The idea of a death that comes during a deep sedation, ‗like sleep‘ has many 
good connotations.  This concept is often used for patients undergoing surgery that are 
medically sedated and told, ―You‘ll be put to sleep and will never feel a thing.‖ And then, 
―When you wake up it will be all over.‖ Most of us, by adulthood,  have had prior 
experiences of being ‗put to sleep‘ and therefore the idea of being ‗put to sleep‘ is a lot 
less scary than facing our own death.  Yes, in surgery we may KNOW (as required by the 
strict intellectual knowledge that demands our informed consent for the procedure) that 
doctors are going to cut our heart out and repair it, then put it back in our bodies, but WE 
(the conscious persons that we hold our most true selves to be) are removed from having 
to have any sort of conscious participation in that process. Similarly, I could imagine, 
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although I may KNOW that I will die and not wake up, I can feel comforted in the 
thought that I will be removed from that conscious experience of my death.
128
  Further, it 
is a sort of calmness in passing that one can easily wish to allow others.  
 If, in fact, terminal sedation can offer such a death, it could easily be imagined as 
a good death by many.  Other good deaths exist and are wished for such as those without 
pain and surrounded by loved ones, but these deaths cannot be assured for everyone. 
Many who have less extreme pain may be satisfied with the provision of pain medication 
which allows, not clear consciousness, but a kind of cloudy or drowsy awareness.  This 
may allow awareness of family presence at the bedside with the edge taken off their pain.  
But, for some whose symptoms become uncontrollable with lesser efforts, total sedation 
can be an option of last resort.  The control currently possible in prescribing a variety of 
medications to relieve pain and produce deep sedation can allow most of us to know that, 
if needed, we can be made unaware of our intolerable pain, anxiety, dyspnea, tremors, 
vomiting or other noxious symptoms until our death occurs.  It may not be the ‗best 
death‘ for us to hope for, but it would be for many a ‗good death‘ when compared to 
suffering until the end.  
Slippery Slope Concerns 
 
If TS did provide such a ‗good death‘ then it would also be easy to imagine many 
persons who would want to claim that sort of death.  The ethical concepts supporting 
patient autonomy and beneficence would endorse the moral allowability of TS for 
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terminal patients who were suffering intolerably at the end-of-life and requested this 
option.
129
  TS is beneficent in serving to relieve the patients‘ experience of suffering. 
Those who favor strong patient autonomy and those of a libertarian bent can support TS.  
Terminal sedation fosters self-direction in allowing one to face death as they choose 
without harming others.  TS ought to only be initiated by the consent of a patient or her 
surrogate, and this policy will help to prevent abusive TS in cases of those who may be 
frail and incompetent.
130
  Further, TS may aid others by reducing unnecessary resource 
use from a lengthy hospitalization at the end-of-life.  With concerns regarding the high 
cost of medical care and overuse of intensive care units for terminal patients, this could 
be seen as a responsible choice. This supports the principle of justice in not taking more 
than what is needed in care.  
Although the option of TS is comforting to many, it also fuels the slippery slope 
concerns of those who fear that doctors would become caught up in orchestrating deaths 
rather than attempting to prevent them.  Or worse, that the elderly, frail, and incompetent 
would receive TS without consent.  Patient or surrogate consent is clearly required and 
failure to obtain such ought to be grounds for legal action as well as professional 
sanction.  A strong vigilance towards ensuring that TS is appropriate for patients (by 
meeting the standard I have proposed) and that appropriate consent is obtained will work 
towards preventing many of the slippery slope concerns.   
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Another slippery slope concern may be that patient self-determination could 
easily run amok.
131
 Imagine if, rather than being limited to the standards I have 
outlined,
132
 upon my initial diagnosis of Alzheimer‘s disease at age 55, I could 
voluntarily stop eating and request TS so as not to suffer the indignity of slowly losing 
my identity and forcing my spouse to care for me when I no longer remember him.
133
 I 
would simply arrange my affairs while competent and say my goodbyes.  Knowing that I 
faced a future slow death that I would find unbearable, I could select a point of my 
choosing to quietly slip into a final slumber with the support and assistance of a medical 
team. If autonomy was the overriding value to be considered when allowing TS then I 
ought not be forced to wait until there are only days left of my natural existence.  It ought 
to be available whenever I autonomously choose to enact that end-of-life treatment. The 
same options would exist for those newly diagnosed with ALS, debilitating strokes, or 
who simply tire of living after many years of slow decline due to multiple co-existing 
illnesses.  
These numbers could be great given our current ability to live much longer lives 
with numerous chronic diseases and the burgeoning expansion of the elderly baby 
boomer population. That immensely increasing numbers of ailing elders will be a fact of 
our future may explain in part why some are fearful to allow TS even following the 
restricted limitations that I have endorsed.  Victor Cellarius has termed the practice of TS 
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in these sorts of situations as early terminal sedation (ETS) because these patients are not 
actively dying.
134
 Without the sedation, coupled with their refusal of nutrition and 
hydration (and sedation preventing oral intake that would otherwise be possible given the 
medical condition), these persons could live many more months or longer.  Physicians 
could then be evaluated as practicing a new form of assisted suicide
135
 for those who 
could have otherwise lived many months or years with a disabling condition.  I believe 
that some restrictions are appropriate and following the standard I have proposed those 
who breech the standard could be identified for sanction.   
There will always be those who argue that it will be impossible to contain a 
practice once allowed and that innocent victims may be harmed. These fears are a mere 
potential whereas the actual persons who are currently suffering intolerably could be 
benefitted by allowing TS.  I believe that the actual beneficence to eliminate suffering in 
those dying persons overrides the fears of potential maleficence to future unknown 
persons when there exists ways (policy guidelines, sanctions to those who do not follow 
practice/policy, legal sanctions)  to limit the potential for such maleficence.  
 A more complete evaluation of whether or not this expansion of patient self-
ending determination would be a help or hindrance to society would be a valuable 
contribution, but is not the primary mission of this work.
136
  Let us continue to evaluate 
what potential benefits or harms allowing TS in the imminently dying might provide for 
the terminal individual and persons connected to a single individual.  This will allow a 
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better determination of when TS is currently a moral treatment in those cases where 
moral quandary still exists.   
Autonomy and Control  
 
 The principle of autonomy is often held paramount in medical ethics.  Efforts to 
obtain some control over what happens when we are dying are a large part of what goes 
into the development of our individual advance directives.  Supporting a patient‘s 
autonomous choice and allowing her to choose TS as the manner of dying if she is 
experiencing intense suffering, offers a measure of control that may offer comfort to 
many. This comfort may extend to many who do not end up requiring TS, but have 
comfort in knowing that TS is available if they come to need it.  Similar comfort has been 
expressed by those in Oregon who have prescriptions for drugs for PAS yet never utilize 
them.  Being able to control what happens to one‘s body is a central factor of being an 
autonomous human being.  Fears of being out of control are one of the things some 
people fear most about dying.  Oddly enough, in the Steinhauser study, ―Respondents 
displayed broad variation in their desire to control time and place of their death.  Those 
with less religiosity were most likely to want control.‖137  
In ancient times we had little control over either time or place of our dying; now, 
with the expansion of the hospice movement, at least the place is generally within our 
control given a terminal diagnosis. The time of death remains largely out of our control 
unless we are removing life-saving technology and then we have begun ―arranging for 
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discontinuation of treatments‖, which largely does allow us to approximate a time for 
dying. Following this trend, TS is a step to allowing us control over the manner of our 
death, the timing of our death will still be unknown and caused by the underlying disease 
process.  For many persons, control over what happens when they are dying is an 
important factor affirming their autonomy. By allowing TS, we are supporting the 
autonomy of those patients who maintain capacity or who have stated their desires in an 
advance directive.  TS can also support those who have previously selected surrogates act 
on their behalf. 
Nutrition and Hydration 
 
By the time one can be considered as suffering from an end-stage terminal illness 
the person has often already quit the regular consumption of meals.  This may be due to 
physical problems related to the illness, medication side-effects, fatigue or a myriad of 
other reasons.  Commonly, this voluntary stopping of eating and drinking is in itself a 
sign of the patient having reached the point of what is called ‗actively dying.‘ Active 
dying is the final stages of illness when the body begins the slowing and shutting down of 
bodily systems such as stomach motility, the pooling of blood to the lower areas, slowing 
of heartbeat and respirations and other such ending of biological functions.  Whether 
these patients continue to get nutrition or not, they are going to die soon due to 
underlying disease. The refusal of nutrition and especially hydration may in fact shorten 
their lifespan, but not significantly, and often will have no effect.  Regardless, since the 
advent of medical science‘s ability to provide artificial nutrition and hydration the 
stopping of voluntary oral intake has become an ‗issue‘ that must always be addressed.   
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 There are many persons who believe that it is never morally allowable to withhold 
nutrition and hydration from the ill and even dying persons.  The provision of artificial 
nutrition and hydration are considered to be ordinary and non-burdensome treatments and 
a minimal requirement for the continuation and support of life. These beliefs are often, 
but not only, held by those with strong religious (example, Catholic) value systems. 
Despite the Court‘s endorsement of terminal sedation as supported without legal jeopardy 
based on two allowable actions - first, the voluntarily refusal of artificial nutrition and 
hydration and second, the provision of complete sedation to alleviate distressful 
symptoms - there are ethical arguments to oppose both actions.  
 I do not support the concept that one is ―harmed‖ by a competent and informed 
decision to forgo nutrition and hydration at the end-of-life. Not eating or drinking seems 
like part of the natural process of dying (especially if one is already diagnosed with a 
terminal illness) and it is only ―artificial‖ feeding and hydration that might delay death.  
Even if it did constitute harm it may be overridden by the right to so choose or may 
clearly be a lesser harm to one than extended and untreatable pain.  I will address this 
concern though because for some it is always unethical to withhold the provision of 
nutrition and hydration.  Vitalists who believe that life should be supported at all costs 
would reject even an individual‘s right to refuse artificial nutrition and hydration or to 
withhold them from those in a persistent vegetative state.  Additionally, theists who 
believe that it is a sin to attempt to assume control over the manner of one‘s death could 
not endorse refusal of nutrition and hydration.  If one considers any reduction in possible 
life to be harm, then the moral allowability of not having nutrition and hydration apart 
from or in combination with TS will not be a moral option.  
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Moreover, reduction or stopping eating and drinking has always been a harbinger 
of death. Those who have voluntarily stopped taking adequate nutrition and hydration 
further emphasize that their death is approaching and the supplementation of artificial 
food and fluids may not offer any extension to many. Hospice research has indicated that 
the feeling of hunger does not exist for most of those close to death and that the fears 
many family members have concerning ‗starving to death‘ or feelings of uncomfortable 
hunger simply do not manifest in those close to death.
138
 There have long been studies to 
show the converse, that in those who have stopped eating and drinking there may be 
slight dehydration educed euphoria.
139
  In fact, the provision of artificial nutrition and 
hydration may increase patient suffering from edema, mal-absorption or intestinal 
bloating.
140
  Daniel Callahan has stated our belief that we are killing patients by 
discontinuing medical care including artificial nutrition and hydration is based on what he 
calls an artefactual fallacy.
141
  He argues that death which has been artificially delayed by 
medical interventions and then allowed to occur when these technologies are removed is 
not equivalent to killing, and that the killing/letting die distinction maintains a moral 
allowability in these cases. This seems correct, however many in health care still fail to 
endorse this ethical distinction and this will be addressed further under physician harms 
in Chapter 5.  
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When considering those health care professionals who are involved in the 
provision of TS, one may believe that there is harm in the provision of nutrition and 
hydration if it serves to extend another‘s suffering, or in refusing to honor a competent 
request to forgo such treatments. The fact that refusing such treatments is supported 
legally by the Court‘s acceptance of one‘s liberty interest and supported ethically with the 
endorsement of the principle of autonomy allowing an individual‘s right to refuse any 
medical treatment makes the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration ethically less 
controversial for many. Moral justification can be found to allow or disallow both TS and 
artificial nutrition and hydration using a variety of moral frameworks.  The important 
issue to discern is ‗What is the moral framework of the patient, family, and medical staff 
that are involved in this case?‘ Medical ethics has always had primary focus on the 
patient before us that is being considered. Each patient and family and physician will 
bring their own set of values in which the important concepts concerning autonomy and 
control, beneficence and determinations of what is good, nonmaleficence and what is 
considered harm and the ordering of these principles will need to be determined to elicit 
the moral allowability of terminal sedation in a specific case.  
Consent 
 
 In medical care today one must generally give consent prior to any treatment or 
testing being performed.  This is especially true when the procedure has inherent risks or 
side effects that need to be considered such as in surgery or chemotherapy.  Informed 
consent supports the values of both patient autonomy and beneficence in allowing shared 
decision making between patient and physician. The physician provides the medical 
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information regarding various options and the patient applies them to her life in light of 
personal values.  In bioethics we generally hold that informed consent means that the 
patient has been given all pertinent information regarding the medical treatment or test 
and has evaluated both the possible benefits and harms or side-effects and has had the 
opportunity for  her questions to be answered and clarification given prior to indicating a 
desire to proceed.  Certainly, given the significant stakes involved in terminal sedation it 
should only be done with the clearly informed consent of the patient or her surrogate.
142
   
Shared decision making with a fully informed patient is an optimal goal in end-of-
life decision making.  Yet, many believe that it is an illusion and that physicians actually 
remain the primary decision makers.
143
 Sadly, in a study in which elderly patients 
expressed their resuscitation preferences for several hypothetical scenarios and then the 
patients' physicians tried to predict the patients' preferences they were incorrect in a 
quarter to almost half the time.
144
  Even when wrong, physicians believed that they were 
in fact correct over 75% of the time.
145
  Other studies show that physicians tend to predict 
better for patients that are more like themselves in education and social status.
146
  This 
makes sense as they may be more likely to share value sets and preferences.  
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 Nevertheless, a potentially legitimate concern exists regarding the validity of 
patient consent for TS. Illness, medication, and fatigue can all diminish one‘s ability to 
evaluate important information. Since the option for utilization of TS is not available 
until close to death when one‘s ability to process complex evaluations may be 
compromised and medications may muddle thinking, it is possible that true informed 
consent, at that time, is impossible. This concern is supported by research into the 
withholding of forms of life support like ventilators or dialysis in those nearing death.  
―Fewer than half of patients are able to participate in decisions to withhold life-support 
treatments. Even fewer patients (<10%) are able to participate in decisions to withdraw 
life-support treatments because these decisions generally occur within a few days of 
death.‖147 
  In most cases of informed consent for medical care, the patient has the 
responsibility of indicating that she not only understands the hoped-for benefit of 
treatment but also the potential harms and side effects that are likely.  In a case like the 
one provided at the beginning of this chapter, given the extreme pain and anxiety, is it 
likely or even realistic to expect the patient to fully comprehend a discussion of the 
benefits and burdens of TS at the time she asks for help?  We know the patient is 
experiencing extreme fatigue, has been unable to sleep and is suffering from ongoing, 
unendurable pain and inability to communicate effectively.  Most would agree that this is 
not a good situation to be in when be making important decisions, let alone the last 
decision of one‘s conscious life. Might one make a hasty and permanent decision to end 
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their conscious life just to get some much needed rest?  A giant error, similar to the one 
those who use suicide to address a temporary problem, could then be inappropriately 
endorsed if we uncritically accept all patients‘ requests in these situations. Yet, we would 
also shudder at ignoring their pleas for help and solace especially if we have no other 
means to address horrible pain and suffering.  
To allow patients to reflect upon such an important decision with a clear mind, 
these decisions might be made earlier.  This would allow a patient to have her desires 
reflected for end-of-life care and we might trust that her thinking was not unduly altered 
by pain or medications. In fact, this is exactly what we ask patients to do when 
completing advance directives.  But there are problems with this solution, as well, for it 
requires the patient to accurately predict what they believe that they would want in a 
situation (actively dying) where they can have no legitimate knowledge on which to base 
the decision. They may then make unrealistic choices or ones that do not, in the end, 
serve their interests. However, we may assume patient predictions on what they believe 
to be the best course of action based upon their personal values ought to supersede 
others‘ evaluations.  Only when patients are incapacitated and have not left advance 
directives do we turn to surrogates.  
Surrogate Consent 
 
  In a perfect world, one could expect that the patient and primary physician had 
discussions earlier, perhaps on diagnosis of terminal illness, about what sorts of end-of-
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life care the patient would want, allow and disallow.
148
  This is rarely the case, but does 
seem to be increasing with the greater number of palliative care consult teams in acute 
hospitals today.  Alternatively, if no advance directive exists, perhaps the expectation of 
informed consent ought to be disregarded in favor of paternalism or substituted judgment 
from the spouse or significant other. In cases where one might question a patient‘s ability 
to give informed consent yet where it would be compassionate to allow TS if requested, 
physicians must encourage more discussions with the available family member. This is 
needed to assure that they understand fully the TS process and the treatment plan to 
relieve the patient from experiencing suffering by the elimination of their consciousness 
with the use of medications.  
Ought one to allow surrogate consent for treatment which eliminates one‘s 
consciousness and therein the ability to be in the world?  This could be an appropriate 
solution for some, especially those who had both assigned a Power of Attorney for Health 
Care (POA) and discussed in detail what they would and would not want to happen to 
them at the end-of-life with their loved ones.
149
  Unfortunately, the legal assignment of a 
POA is an option not completed by many whom it could usefully serve.  Moreover, even 
when a clear surrogate has been assigned and preferences have been discussed, there is 
evidence that many surrogates, even when they are close relatives, remain uncertain that 
they are doing what their loved one would want or are able to understand the information 
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or options given to them by medical staff.  Often those making medical decisions are 
elderly spouses or elderly adult children making decisions for very old parents.
150
   
In 2002, the journal, Health, Risk, & Society reported a study done with older 
persons regarding their assessments of the risks and benefits of morphine and terminal 
sedation in end-of-life care.  This study was done at a time when none of the participants 
were experiencing any significant health risk and when ample time for questioning and 
discussion was allowed in focus groups.  The study found that most ―understood an 
idealized death to be one in which morphine administration and terminal sedation serve 
to provide dying people with an easy, comfortable and quiet death.‖151  Yet they also 
found that ―the role of medicine in procuring an idealized death is linked to profound 
concerns about new risks that flow from the intermarriage of medical science with the 
basic human obligation of providing compassionate care to those who are dying.‖152  This 
concern about exactly what is being said and done to family members and their role to 
make decisions for ill relatives can at times leave lasting guilt and doubt for the 
surrogate-survivors.
153
  
For example, Fay, who told the story of her mother‘s death….remembered that a doctor tried to 
raise with her the issue of terminal sedation for her mother, but she remains unclear about his 
meaning in so doing and what response was expected from her.  For Fay, this left a profound 
uncertainty about whether she had represented her mother adequately and whether the doctor was 
proposing the best symptom relief available or something that was ‗unnatural‘ and outside of 
accepted medical practice.  She stated, ―I think my doctor tried to broach the subject but because 
he did it in such a non-committal way I couldn‘t grasp what he was trying to say.  I thought is he 
saying he‘s for euthanasia or he‘s not, or is he saying he wouldn‘t do anything, or is he trying to 
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leave it open for me to broach him.  He was very strange and then I just thought, well, let nature 
takes its course in the end- but I know he tried to- he brought the subject up.‖ 154 
 
Although medical professionals at times feel compelled to question a patient‘s 
ability to give informed consent or their capacity to make medical decisions they rarely 
make a stand to question the decisions made by a patient selected surrogate. This is 
especially true when the surrogate is making the decision that the physician believes to be 
the most appropriate. There are few avenues to pursue questioning even when medical 
staff believes that legal surrogates are incapable of making appropriate decisions for their 
assigned patient.  Thus, at times, an advance directive, if it lists your son to be POA and 
he is now demented himself, may not be the solution to assure that what you wanted 
done, or not done, is followed.  Admittedly, as shown by Fay‘s story above, even when 
you have discussed situations in advance with a loved one, at the moment a decision 
needs to be made about terminal sedation, family surrogates may feel unprepared to offer 
any real assistance.
155
 
Advance Directives done prior to the active phase of dying would eliminate some 
of these concerns, but most Americans still do not complete advance treatment forms in 
writing elucidating their wishes for end-of-life care. Physicians caring for those who are 
dying, even actively dying, do not always address with patients what limits to aggressive 
care they would desire or where the patients‘ personal marker would be between comfort 
and lucidity.  Even those of us working in the medical field who loudly proclaim our 
right to mandate our end-of-life  treatment in advance directives and who inform our 
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family at every opportunity of what we would not want done often end up resuscitated 
and dependent on extreme forms of life support.  Sometimes this is because family 
members give the go ahead in emergency situations and sometimes it is because we never 
thought that what seemed like a simple procedure with high chances of success could 
slide down through technological brinkmanship so swiftly.  Studies show that there are 
variances in family members‘ concurrence with patient choices for end-of-life decision 
making, yet most patients would still choose to have family members make decisions if 
they are unable to participate.
156
 Family members who have had prior conversations with 
patients about what they would like to have done and what they would like to forgo in 
end-of-life care state a greater confidence that they believe that they have ―done the right 
thing.‖157   
When patients are unable to make their own decisions, even important end-of-life  
care, it remains appropriate and important for physicians and other medical staff to 
involve the POA, surrogate or whatever family
158
 is available to discuss issues such as TS 
and how such treatment may accord to patient values and advance directives (if available) 
prior to any initiation of treatment.  There are patients who do not have family available 
and who have not assigned any proxy decision makers.  Many states (including 
Tennessee), have then allowed physicians to assign a surrogate to make decisions for 
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hospitalized patients. Often this may be a friend or neighbor who agrees to accept this 
responsibility. In cases where there are no options for even physician assigned surrogates, 
I would recommend evaluation by the hospital ethics committee.  
 There are real problems at times with surrogates determining the true intentions 
of patients in advance directive documents and in assuring that one has obtained valid 
informed consent.  However, these problems do not have sufficient weight to override the 
intent to follow patient wishes for end-of-life care (as best as we can determine what their 
wishes would be), nor the intended beneficence in ending intractable pain or other 
distressing clinical symptoms causing the intolerable suffering of the dying.   
Unproven Effectiveness  
 
 It is a common goal to ―die in my sleep‖ and TS serves to approximate this goal 
through medications, but we do not know for certain that it succeeds. A potential harm to 
patients is that we do not know for certain whether or not TS actually treats a patient‘s 
suffering or merely makes the patient incapable of further complaints. Admittedly, this is 
an extremely difficult, if not impossible, issue to evaluate, and it is equally difficult to 
confirm and validate any findings. Fortunately, medical science has been expanding 
rapidly in understanding brain waves and the complex workings of intricate parts of the 
human brain.  Recent studies have looked at trying to understand what sedated patients 
perceive. Many of them have focused on anesthetized patients in surgery who have had 
perceptions during sedation. Having perceptions during a surgery when one is expected 
to be deeply sedated is often called awareness during anesthesia.  
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Research into awareness during anesthesia has provided information about what 
patients who have received narcotics and sedatives are able to feel and perceive.
159
  One 
Swedish study looked at ICU patients who were sedated while critically ill but were 
expected to recover.
160
  This study is relevant to TS because the type of deep sedation 
used to keep patients from recognizing the distress of being on a mechanical ventilator or 
experiencing extensive post surgical pain from treatments, such as surgical debridement 
or trauma surgery, are meant to prevent the patient from suffering as well. One of the 
common medications that is used to sedate patients for surgery or ICU care, as well as for 
TS, is midazolam.  It serves to offer a deep sedation, has multiple routes of administration 
and is relatively inexpensive.  Yet, there are concerns about its use, as one physician 
using it stated, ―We do not know much about how midazolam works even though it is 
widely used, at least it is a useful tool to induce what we think is a kind of sleep.  But we 
do not know if it is a good kind of sleep.‖161  There are reports from those patients who 
have been intentionally medically sedated and then recovered of having hallucinations, 
nightmares, and discomfort.
162
 The study concludes, ―On the whole, the epistemic 
situation is not satisfactory. We lack large systematic studies of how patients feel during 
sedation, even though we do know that many experience nightmares as a problem.‖163 
Surely, sending one to one‘s death and doing so knowing they were going to experience 
drug-induced nightmares would not be encouraged. But it is impossible to design a study 
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with those who have utilized TS to then provide us with data on their perceptions of the 
final sedation for feedback.  As a next best option, we need more studies on anesthetized 
patients to further our knowledge in this area in attempts to assure that their sedation is a 
peaceful one.  
There have also been recent studies looking at the possible perceptions or ability 
to suffer in those who are permanently unconscious by persistent vegetative states (PVS) 
which suggest that they may still be able to suffer.
164
  This may be relevant information 
due to the concerns that we do not clearly understand what is going on in the brains of 
those who cannot communicate with us to share their experiences. These studies suggest 
that the ability to experience pain is in the more primitive parts of the brain and thus, 
―after extensive neocortical damage but preservation of brain stem structures, pain is 
more likely to persist than consciousness.‖165  
If those with even grave brain injury may still be able to experience pain and 
suffering, then it would call into question whether or not those whom we intentionally 
sedate (but who retain normal brain functioning) may be only losing the outward 
expression of their pain.  Thus, it is not an unreasonable concern to fear that those who 
have been medically rendered unconscious by TS and are, therefore, unable to 
communicate may also still retain the ability to experience pain and, therefore, suffer 
while being unable to express this experience to anyone. This would be a harm that 
would be ethically troubling if it were found to be the case.  As things stand, when 
terminal sedation and narcotic pain relief is used for those suffering at the end-of-life, it 
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appears that their suffering is relieved and patients are more calmly able to slip beyond 
the realm of human experience.  Again, notably, this perception is gathered from the 
experiences of those who have witnessed a death with TS and has been supplemented by 
signs of reduced blood pressures, heart rates, and facial grimacing. Data is not able to be 
gathered and empirically validated by those undergoing TS.
166
  I have little hope that 
confirmation from the beyond will be available any time soon. Yet, it remains beneficent 
to reduce suffering when it is apparent to us and possible to do so and endorsed by patient 
or surrogate consent.  
Limiting End-of-Life Potential and Role Fulfillment 
A completely different harm may exist for patients involving what opportunities 
they may be forgoing by choosing TS as the manner of their death. It is a limiting factor 
of Western secular thought that it views a person‘s death focusing upon the end of the 
physical and biological existence only. Western medicine is also focused on the scientific 
technology we have to avert death and promote cure and thus, is especially narrowed to 
the physical.  Yet, it would be a philosophical error not to investigate what possible 
harms may exist in prematurely ending one‘s consciousness as their death approaches. 
Potential psychic or existential harms must also be evaluated. There are many who 
believe that human suffering at the end-of-life holds great meaning and potential for 
growth and actualization.
167
 Are we limiting this potential by allowing or even 
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encouraging elimination of the conscious awareness of one‘s death with TS?168  Even if 
shortened by only a few hours or days, could those hours hold important meaning that it 
would be an error to eliminate?  Research into this area would be especially important if 
an expanded practice of TS allowing persons with chronic disease such as ALS to request 
TS prior to the final days is being considered.  I mention those with slower progressive 
disease here, as they may be experiencing more of the existential suffering and have less 
acute pain as they approach their death.  These sorts of dying experiences – as opposed to 
those in the throes of final cancer pain – may lend to better evaluation of the potential for 
benefits of growth in those facing death.  
Existential Concerns 
 
Buddhism is one practice that teaches there is always meaning in our suffering.  
Suffering
169
 is related to the dignity and aesthetics of a unified life with death as the final 
chapter. Fears of dependency and loss of control that are focused on during life may need 
to be adjusted to allow dignity in dying through the acceptance of these losses. For many 
in contemporary society, this is a new role to consider for suffering.  But if sedation 
becomes the treatment of choice for those facing the end of their life, we may be 
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eliminating the opportunity for growth or meaning for those dying or forcing that work to 
be done much earlier.  
Facing the end of our existence allows one the opportunity to reflect on what we 
have been able to achieve and the legacies we will leave behind. There exists, for all but 
true nihilists, the idea that our lives can have meaning, and for some, that our deaths also 
can have meaning and help shape our communal human existence. The idea that the 
‗work of dying‘ is in part to come to accept what you have accomplished and what you 
have left undone and to prepare others to continue on has a long history.  
This requires admitting that our death is in fact coming! This is the part that has 
become so hard to do.  Perhaps it is due to the progress in life-prolonging technology that 
we have lost the ability to admit that we are dying even when we have been living with 
terminal illness for many years. Acceptance of death was the completion of the Kubler-
Ross
170
 levels for working through the dying process. This work, done with the 
knowledge that one is dying, has been shown to have benefits for both the patient and 
family.  A recent study, Perceived Benefits and Psychosocial Outcomes of a Brief 
Existential Family Intervention for Cancer Patients/Survivors, has shown an improved 
sense of well-being and quality of life for those involved in completing a video-taped 
interview and life legacy that was designed to address some of these existential issues.
171
 
Admittedly, if you are suffering intolerably, having any conversation, let alone one 
concerning your final existential concerns, may not be a priority or even a possibility for 
some.  Yet, if these types of conversations occur they reduce some of the suffering that 
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occurs at the end-of-life such as death anxiety, fears of being a burden and concerns 
about knowing that your life mattered.   
Existential concerns are considered to be the source of psychosocial suffering for 
many who are facing their death.  Extreme fears related to the process of dying and 
facing the beyond produce great anxiety in many.  The concept of being sedated ‗like 
sleep‘ may allow those with great death anxiety to then escape facing this particular fear. 
However, there are those who endorse TS only for physical pain and will disallow TS for 
psychosocial or existential suffering. This may be an appropriate denial for some patients, 
based upon concerns that those suffering from some forms of mental illness will then not 
receive appropriate treatment.   
Refusal to allow TS for existential suffering would perhaps be appropriate for 
some patients with mental illness.  But this refusal also risks not allowing it for the 
patient at the start of this chapter who has grave, realistic fears of suffocation and choking 
to death. Often, as in the case I presented, pain and existential fears coexist in the dying.  
But if TS is disallowed for psychological suffering, one is then faced with attempting to 
develop a method to discern what exactly would differentiate physical suffering from the 
psychological.  Eric Cassel
172
 has written extensively on suffering and is convinced that 
they are deeply intertwined and may not be properly separated. Further, many others who 
investigated suffering have found that with the advent of scientific medicine and the 
separation of mind and body, medicine has become less capable of adequately meeting 
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the joint needs of a person (made up of both psychological and physical elements) as one 
who is suffering with a medical illness.
173
  
The debate among those who endorse TS on whether or not it ought to be allowed 
for those who suffer with only or primarily psychosocial or existential suffering is a 
worthy area of study but regrettably not the primary work of this paper.  I have endorsed 
an initial standard which does not allow TS for only existential suffering when it can be 
reliably determined that this is the only suffering that a patient is experiencing.  I accept 
that this may force many with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) and other horribly 
debilitating diseases to suffer the existential pain of considering how their disease will 
slowly progress for many months prior to reaching the phase of ―actively dying‖ which I 
state to be the period when it is accepted that death will occur within a few hours to a 
couple of weeks.  I believe that those patients may still benefit from other forms of 
treatment (including assistance in counseling or intermittent sedation) to work on some 
level of acceptance in their dependence and reduction in fears as well as the ability to 
advise others on their wishes in advance directives, including the desire for TS.   
Further, I could imagine my standard to be amended in the future once TS has 
become a more accepted medical practice for end-of-life care.  I would not categorically 
rule out TS for primarily psychological/existential suffering in the future but would 
encourage caution and propose trials of intermittent sedation to allow respite from 
existential suffering with hope to then face the existential concerns anew.  Additional 
safeguards, including qualified psychological evaluation, would also need to be added to 
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any protocol that could allow TS for primarily existential suffering.  I will closely follow 
this area of research in the future.  
  Suffering & Religion 
 
 Religions disagree about what occurs upon our death and also about the role and 
value of suffering in human life.  This concern may be relevant to those who believe that 
suffering at the end-of-life is meaningful or ought to be meaningful.  Since TS may 
disallow this meaningful human experience, it ought to be evaluated in this light as a 
possible harm. If suffering is the primary concern and the goal is its elimination, then TS 
would not be evaluated as harm and TS ought to be endorsed.  But, what if what is 
important to the patient in the dying process is what is to be shared and learned through 
suffering?  In that case, TS and elimination of one‘s conscious ability to process her own 
suffering would be a grave harm.
174
 The religious views of the patient concerning death 
and suffering are factors that ought to be evaluated prior to the initiation of TS whenever 
possible.  
Are we perhaps responsible for our own suffering?  Is one required to suffer?  
Certainly suffering is one factor which unites us and some (though varying) meaning is 
attached to one‘s suffering in all religions.  The suffering of one who is dying has special 
significance in some but not all religions. If in TS we are eliminating one‘s ability to 
suffer and that suffering has value, then we are harming one‘s ability to gain what is to be 
valued there. ―The value of suffering in our own development is a component of all major 
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religions, but its significance seems to have faded in the late twentieth century.‖175  This 
is apparent in many Western societies but neither in all of that society nor all religions.  
The Buddhist religion has strong emphasis on the meaning in suffering.  Buddhist 
beliefs include that Karma is a defense against suffering because suffering is seen to 
result from behaviors of the individual in a previous incarnation.  For Buddhists, 
suffering is, in part, ―the discontent, the negativity or dissatisfaction that we often feel, 
sometimes in relation to pain or loss but also in response to ordinary hassles in life.‖176   
Judaism also values suffering and the belief that, ―Acting virtuously necessarily entails 
suffering.‖177 Christian beliefs often hold that suffering may bring the sufferer closer to 
Christ.
178
  Suffering may have important purpose and value even in secular society in 
moving us to a higher level of emotional and intellectual transcendence without religious 
meaning.  In The Gifts of Suffering, Polly Young-Eisendrath reports,  
Suffering is useful, and not merely a waste of time, when it awakens us to our 
responsibility for our own attitudes and thoughts and actions.  Within suffering are the 
gifts of self-awareness and compassion.
179
   
 
Transcendence is possible in many, if not all, religions and this locates the person in a far 
larger landscape. This may allow one who is suffering to see their suffering as only part 
of something bigger than their current experience.  If through suffering one is able to 
finally accept her own death and the emergent need to beg forgiveness (from a person or 
God), it would be important to allow this to occur.  If this is true, then physicians could 
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be harming or eliminating our opportunities for transcendence by masking or eliminating 
our ability to suffer at the end-of-life.  I would argue that even if this was the case, this 
could be a lesser harm than ignoring pain or other distressing clinical symptoms causing 
intolerable suffering especially when relief from suffering is requested by a patient or 
surrogate. Patient autonomy in choosing TS could even override concerns about 
transcendence or karma, given a person‘s value and belief system.180  
 The question of whether or not there is value in suffering at the end-of-life is valid 
but I believe it cannot be decided by philosophers, medical ethicists or physicians.  
Rather, this question is to be answered by those individuals who believe it holds value as 
they come to face their death.  As has been the tradition in medical ethics, I propose that 
the question of the meaning of suffering at the end-of-life is just one of the important 
questions that ought to be addressed in an evaluation of utilizing TS with each individual 
patient prior to the initiation of TS treatment.  For each person who suffers must 
determine if their experience of it is valuable or not.   
Special Concern for the Demented 
 
 Up to this point, I have been primarily discussing TS for competent, autonomous 
adults. Additional consideration is needed to evaluate how or if TS ought to be a 
treatment for the increasing numbers of persons facing the end-of-life with significant 
dementia.  How we are most appropriately to assess the suffering of those with severe 
dementia, those who have lost the ability to express many, if not most, of their own 
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needs?  Although some needs can be intuited or guessed, such as the need to avoid 
intense pain, we know that both understanding and expressive abilities are destroyed over 
time due to dementing illnesses.  We can assume that those with severe dementia or 
Alzheimer‘s disease are no longer capable of growth or experiencing significant meaning 
in their deaths.  But what of their ability to suffer?  
 If they do not overtly appear to be suffering, ought TS to be disallowed? I believe 
that this is the case.  My standard allows TS for those who are suffering intolerably at the 
end-of-life. If one does not appear to be suffering, then they do not meet the requirements 
for appropriate TS. If a severely demented patient who is not able to express verbally 
their distress does appear to be suffering greatly, however, then the decision for TS 
should be permitted with surrogate consent.  
  If demented patients are denied TS, are we unduly requiring them to suffer just 
because they have left no prior directive?  No, I do not believe that this will be the case. 
They will be denied because there is no evidence of their suffering (from facial 
expressions, sounds of distress, or grievous disease or injury known to produce great or 
excessive pain) or they have expressed prior value sentiments to those close to them that 
would not endorse such an action.  
The more pressing concerns relate to assuring that appropriate decisions are made 
for the demented by the appropriate others in their lives.  Are the demented likely to be 
disproportionally harmed by overuse of TS as elected by their families and surrogates?  
Who is most benefited by their sedation?  Is it actually the demented patient or is it the 
family who is worn down and financially overburdened who gain the benefit? This issue 
is difficult on both sides. Both sedation and suffering are options appropriate for selection 
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by the competent patient, but they ought to be closely evaluated when chosen for one by 
another.  The ramifications affecting families when TS is utilized in the demented require 
additional ethical evaluation for potential harm.  
Within this concern of potential harm is the possibility that ―because the final 
actors are clinicians, terminal sedation could be ―carried out without explicit 
discussions.‖181  This is not an unfounded concern, as a recent study, Physician Reports 
of Terminal Sedation without Hydration or Nutrition for Patients Nearing Death in the 
Netherlands, reports the use of deep sedation was not discussed with all patients (over 
40%) for numerous reasons such as incompetence, dementia, ‗discussion would have 
done more harm than good‘, or other reasons.182  TS may have been discussed with other 
relatives, nurses, physicians or palliative care specialists according to the study:   
The major reasons for using terminal sedation were to alleviate severe pain, agitation, dyspnea and 
anxiety.  [But, ] in a review of 17 studies that addressed the use of sedatives in the care of patients 
with cancer who were in the final stages of life, a syndrome of delirium and agitation was the most 
frequently mentioned indication for sedative use; pain was a much less common reason for 
sedation.
183
   
 
Thus, it appears that the patient‘s explicit consent for the use of TS is not always obtained 
in The Netherlands and this may allow some of the ethical concerns to remain 
unresolved.
184
 This report also highlights one of the major issues contained within the 
scope of ‗intolerable suffering,‘ the suffering which accompanies a final delirium.  This 
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sort of agitated delirium leaves one distraught, confused, and unable to be calmed, or to 
understand the predicament that one is in.  It is especially difficult to treat in those with 
an underlying dementia.  As our population of the elderly and therein the demented 
elderly continues to expand, all of these problems and more, such as authorized 
surrogates also being demented will increase.   
 In cases of dementia (a long standing mental disorder, which may or may not be 
distressing to the patient) or delirium (an acute onset event of mental distress often 
causing intense distress, confusion, mistrust, paranoia and agitation) it is imperative that 
specialist care, often from palliative care specialists, be sought to ensure that there is not 
a reversible cause for the patient‘s dementia or delirium.  Then, if no realistic hope is 
available for the return of competence to the patient, discussion with appropriate 
surrogates and family members may proceed. Since often these patients are nonverbal or 
unable to maintain conversation, close evaluation will be required to assess 
appropriateness of TS as an end-of-life treatment. There should be indications that the 
patient appears to be suffering from an intolerable symptom.  These symptoms may be 
anything that would require restraints, produce wailing or crying out, wincing in pain, 
elevated blood pressure, quickened breathing, or clearly deviated behaviors from her 
norm that are unable to be resolved by other medical or behavioral methods.  Clear 
documentation in the medical record of consults and attempts at alleviation of distressing 
symptoms is always required, but is more essential when there is no documentation of 
prior patient wishes, no clearly assigned prior POA or surrogate, a questionable family 
dynamic, or dissension within the family.  
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 TS ought not to be disallowed for demented patients for greater harms could 
easily befall them if forced to endure intolerable suffering merely because they cannot 
autonomously request assistance.  Demented patients who are appropriate for TS do 
require a close ethical evaluation and the involvement of a surrogate who can provide 
consent.  
Responsibility in Dying & Death Roles 
 
 Since antiquity, physicians have had a responsibility to treat suffering. I started 
this chapter with a focus on a patient‘s suffering, mostly physical but, in part, existential 
or psychological suffering from anxiety due to fears of dying by air hunger due to tumor 
growth.  Terminal sedation is now available to treat a patient‘s suffering. I have stated 
that it ought to be provided when a terminal patient‘s suffering is intolerable at the end-
of-life and requests such treatment. We soundly value respecting a patient‘s autonomy 
and right to make decisions for herself.  Could this dedication to following patients‘ 
autonomous request for TS inadvertently allow a greater harm to befall them or others 
even when it follows the standards I have proposed?  
 Although autonomy reigns supreme as a value directing ethical actions in 
medical care, other values such as beneficence, nonmaleficence, justice, responsibility, 
fidelity and care remain important.  Does responsibility perhaps become more or less 
important as we face death?  As persons, we fulfill many roles in our lives, each with 
incumbent responsibilities. As a spouse, we are responsible to love and support our 
spouse, to be faithful and present in their lives.  As parents we are responsible for 
teaching our children values and skills to enable their eventual independence in the 
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world. Even as patients we have responsibilities to follow treatment orders, and honestly 
confer to our caretakers our symptoms, pains, and improvements. Each role has varied 
expectations attached, both for our own internal measure of fulfilling the role and for 
societal or external evaluation of our role performance.  One may have earlier and 
additional responsibilities to their families if they would want to choose TS for end-of-
life care.  Although I address family issues more fully in the next chapter, I want to 
briefly look at what some of the potential issues a patient may have to address related to 
his family if TS is selected.   
In many bygone eras, the dying were responsible for alerting others of their 
approaching death and then for imparting forgiveness to those who requested it and to 
request forgiveness from those whom they had harmed. The concerns and responsibility 
of the dying person was to right all earthly affairs before passing on.  What are the new 
responsibilities of the dying, and what duties are to be performed? The following are 
some responsibilities I can imagine as pertaining to the dying which may then be affected 
if TS becomes a more routine method of death.  If one has decided that they would 
choose TS if needed for end-of-life care, then it may be that they should also address 
much earlier their responsibilities associated with dying.  This means that they must 
accept sooner and in a real way that they are going to die.  They also must accept that TS, 
if utilized, will not permit any final words to accompany their last breaths and they 
should have all needed conversations well before their final few days or weeks.  The 
accomplishment of this process, or death work, may become yet another benefit for those 
patients who undergo TS.  
 99 
Teaching Compassion for the Dying 
 
 If we judge by how little the dying today actually admit or verbalize the fact that 
they are dying, we may assume one social role for the dying is to hide, deny, or reduce 
the acknowledgement and suffering they experience as it is seen by others. Admittedly, it 
makes everyone horrendously uncomfortable to hear someone wailing out in pain or to 
see someone tearfully suffering or crying out for help. But, is the most moral response 
merely to silence the one hurting? Perhaps our society needs to increase in our ability to 
show compassion to those suffering and allow their expression of suffering to be better 
shared.  In essence, compassion is to suffer with another and eliminate their isolation.  
 Obviously, an increasing compassion for the dying is a good that ought to be 
increased in our society.  But, putting the responsibility for teaching this compassion on 
the dying seems too great a charge upon them. This is true regardless of the use of TS in 
reducing intractable pain or other distressing clinical symptoms causing intolerable 
suffering.  I view compassion for the dying as, in large part, accepting that there are many 
different versions of a ‗good death‘ that may occur and helping each dying person to 
articulate and achieve a version of a good death that is acceptable to them.  TS may allow 
a good death for many with terminal illness and great suffering.  
Dignity 
One often-stated goal in the role of the dying is to maintain their dignity.  What 
this means varies among persons.  Whether it means not having their suffering exposed, 
eliminating their experience of suffering, not requiring advanced personal or 
technological support, or retaining their mental faculties varies with each person.  In 
considering TS, one must question if we must trade in consciousness in order to have the 
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perception of dignity.  If so, what prompts us to make this trade off?  Perhaps we need to 
work more diligently to alter our perception of dignity so as to allow even great amounts 
of personal assistance from others or to permit sharing our concerns of loss of both our 
personhood and our abilities when we are dying.  This sharing by the dying is often made 
more difficult due to the discomfort of those to whom they would speak.  Often, it 
remains that the dying are brushed off or their words discounted. In Tolstoy‘s story of 
Ivan Illich, Ivan was tormented by being told he would soon be on the mend when he 
knew he was dying.  Palliative care teams offering interdisciplinary services with 
chaplains and social workers are now helping patients and families have meaningful 
conversations when someone is facing death.  
Offering an example of facing death with dignity has long been a role for the 
dying. If dying and having one‘s choices respected allows one dignity in dying, then TS 
can be evaluated as approaching a dignified death. Many would evaluate being seen as 
crying out in pain as an undignified way to die.  These patients would see dignity as 
being maintained by TS, since one would appear to be sleeping or resting and suffering 
would be either eliminated or not apparent. This is admittedly somewhat paradoxical 
because dignity also commonly includes not being dependent on others and by 
undergoing TS one becomes completely dependent upon others for all care. Yet, your 
final decision to be rendered permanently unconscious will have been respected.  
Unburdening Others 
 
Another often sought after goal, which may then confer a responsibility or role for 
the dying is to not be a burden.  ―Previous surveys of physicians who have received 
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requests for euthanasia or physician assisted suicide indicate that patients‘ fear of being a 
burden is a primary motivation for such inquires.‖185  It is not unreasonable to assume 
that similar fears would also lead to requests for TS. These fears of being a burden may 
extend to family, society or the medical system.  Interestingly, in a study looking at the 
economic and other burdens of terminal illness, Emanuel and Fairclough found that 
burdens of caregivers were significantly lessened when they reported having physicians 
who listened to their needs.
186
  The amount of time spent listening to patient and family 
concerns is only one of many losses in medical care overtaken by HMOs and evidence 
based medicine.
187
 TS could reduce the financial burden to family and society caring for 
someone who is dying.
188
  The time required for death to occur would be under a month 
at most without nutrition and hydration, but it is usually only a matter of a few days.  
Patients will require total care as they are sedated, but these care needs will be minimal 
and include the usual comfort care (turning, mouth care, medication monitoring, bathing) 
and not extensive staffing.  Often, family is able to assist in this basic comfort care for 
patients in the hospital.  
This is merely a partial listing of what some of the role responsibilities for those 
who are dying and is not meant to be inclusive.  The focus of this paper prevents a fuller 
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exposition of possible future roles for the dying and how these roles may be impacted by 
a greater incidence of TS utilization.
189
     
Conclusion 
 
 I will conclude this chapter with some thoughts on the safeguards for the patient 
that need to be in place for TS to be utilized.  In every case, frequent, clear and consistent 
communication between physicians, caregivers, patient (or surrogate) and family (if 
available) is to be encouraged.  In optimal situations a thorough and open ended 
conversation with the patient prior to the final weeks of life should take place with the 
physician, patient and involved family members.  The content of this discussion should 
address clearly and directly potential death scenarios that this particular patient may face.   
Also, they must inform the patient of the options available for treatments, placements and 
level of professional care during dying. They must specifically ask what the patient‘s 
preferences are for some specific end-of-life procedures such as CPR, ventilator support, 
dialysis, and TS in the face of intractable pain or other distressing clinical symptoms.    
Discussion of the patient‘s advance directive (if any) ought to be addressed and 
the document amended if necessary to make it correspond to the current discussion with 
physician and family.  The physician needs to document the content of discussion in the 
patient‘s record. If possible, this record should be co-signed by patient and family to note 
concurrence and understanding between all parties of the patient‘s desires for end-of-life 
care. In best case scenarios, the patient would make attempts during this period to address 
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her end-of-life concerns, make amends, allow forgiveness, and direct others on final 
wishes.   
For physicians, when facing a patient who is dying and is enduring intractable 
pain or other distressing symptoms causing intolerable suffering that has been refractive 
to prior efforts for alleviation of that distress, and when TS appears to be a possible 
treatment, the following factors ought to be evaluated or reevaluated: 
- Is the patient able to understand and consent to TS at this time? 
- Has the patient made a prior request for TS if such a situation arose? 
- Is distress truly refractory? Has any specialty care been consulted for 
additional input on treatments other than TS, such as pain service or palliative 
care?  
- Is patient close to death with a terminal illness, death expected in hours or 
days? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 104 
CHAPTER 4 
 
  ETHICAL BENEFITS AND HARMS FOR THE FAMILY 
 
Introduction 
 
The family carries the legacy of the way a person dies. They are the ones who 
must carry the memories of the death with them and pass down the story in family 
history. Does promoting death with TS increase or reduce the burdens of a death in the 
family for the families? Concerns have developed which lead some to believe that while 
it may in some cases be ―morally justifiable and psychologically rational (for suffering 
patients to decide to end their lives by TS), it does not automatically follow that such 
decisions are good for their children and family…‖190  These are concerns which have 
been falling through the cracks in the ethics literature and which I address in this chapter.  
Increasingly, in our society family members are forced by physicians into making 
final decisions on the time and manner of loved ones deaths.  These decisions place 
heavy moral burdens on families that never previously existed.  Prior to the demise of 
rampant paternalism, families were not faced with deciding how long to keep gravely ill 
loved ones balanced someplace indefinable between mere existence and death, and 
dependent upon advanced medical technology.  With medical progress, there are now 
many types of intensive care that allow patients to linger, too sick to participate in their 
own decision making and with little chance of improvement.  Decisions to continue 
possibly futile treatment, to terminate care, or to initiate TS and end the possibility of 
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consciousness are then thrust upon the family. There is little with empirical validity 
published in the United States on the burdens on families when TS is a final treatment.  In 
fact, a PubMed search completed on June 17, 2011, provided only 134 total listings 
related to ―family reactions + hospitalization + death‖ and many of these were from 
earlier than 1995.   I will speculate on several potential harms, such as decision maker 
burden, guilt and complicated bereavement, which I believe ought to be evaluated prior 
to wholehearted endorsement of TS.  
It is morally important to be concerned with the impressions and possible harms 
that are left to the surviving families of those who die under our care and in our hospitals.  
Although tradition may state that physicians are only responsible to those who become 
their patients, when families are forced into the medical/ethical arena (especially when 
forced to make crucial patient decisions) we are obligated to consider how those families 
will be affected.  This is often, if not always, in difficult balance with the considerations 
of what is in the best interests of the patient. 
 Families have been a focus of treatment in other areas of healthcare such as 
cancer treatment and hospice where support groups, counseling and respite are now 
routinely offered to the families. Families are the ones who most often provide the patient 
with care for months or years when dealing with terminal illness.  Often families bear 
immense burdens and subject themselves to great harms in efforts to support the patient‘s 
autonomy and interests.  Terminal sedation is a final treatment and while it may serve the 
values of autonomy and beneficence for the patient, we must now also consider the 
family. In this chapter I will investigate the potential harms and benefits that may be 
incurred by families when the death of their loved one is accompanied by terminal 
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sedation.  Although every death affects the remaining family members, we must look 
more closely at deaths with TS.  This is because even though death is due to underlying 
terminal disease, terminal sedation alters the final perceptions and ability to interact with 
a loved one prior to their death.  
Case example: 
Betty- is an 88 year old widow, who now lives in her son’s home with his family to assist in her 
care.  Betty attends dialysis 3 times/week, she has advanced Alzheimer’s type dementia, diabetes, 
and resulting decubitus on her buttocks.  Betty has been declining recently and eating less (she 
must be hand fed by family) and sometimes simply refuses to eat. She had previously refused a 
feeding tube when it was suggested by physician to improve intake. Her poor nutrition has 
increased the problems with skin breakdown on her bottom and now has open bedsores/decubitus 
that are very painful and require dressings.  Her family reports that she has become less alert and 
verbal and now screams in pain when moved.  She does not have an advance directive and has 
been brought to the hospital by family for a fever. The fever is likely due to sepsis, UTI or 
pneumonia for which ER physician has ordered IVAB.  The family requests that Betty be made 
DNR, dialysis be stopped and TS be employed.      
 
 
Why Families?  
 
In stark divergence from the initial ethical directives of Beauchamp and 
Childress,
191
 where benefits and burdens were evaluated strictly from the patient‘s 
perspective, those in palliative care have realized that the entire family must be 
considered. The reality is that families bear both benefits and burdens of decisions made 
by and for patients. Nowhere is this more apparent and complicated than in decisions 
relating to end-of-life care.  These families have come up against what is possible to 
attempt with our advanced technology versus what ethically ought to be done. 
Increasingly, families must make excruciatingly difficult decisions when the patient is 
unable to speak for herself. Sharon Kaufman, in evaluating the SUPPORT study, states 
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that the study could not reveal some important facts. The first is ―that patients and 
families, when faced with health crises and the surrounding plethora of medical options, 
do not know what to want, other than recovery or an end to suffering in a general 
sense.‖192 
Families are often given massive doses of medical information concerning their 
loved one in language that is barely intelligible to them.  Then they are burdened with 
trying to make sense of it all and directing the more aggressive, continued treatment or 
discontinuation of treatment for the one they love.  For many, this comes after months or 
years of living with a loved one who ―is terminal‖ and having potentially faced other 
―this is it‖ situations where the patient has ultimately returned home.  Others may have 
had no or little contact with their family member in the years prior to being required to 
make important medical decisions. Overwhelming, tiring, confusing and simply 
frustrating are only a few of the reactions that are often expressed by these families.   
Tschann et al found that, ―Fewer than half of patients are able to participate in 
decisions to withhold life-support treatments. Even fewer (<10%) are able to participate 
in decisions to withdraw life support treatments, because these decisions generally occur 
within a few days of death.‖193  Under a quarter of these patients had discussed their life 
sustaining preferences with physicians and half or less had discussions with family 
members prior to hospital admissions.
194
 Given that most deaths (50-70%) are from such 
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conditions as cancer, heart disease or lung disease and have a lengthy prodrome,
195
 one 
would question how such conversations could have failed to occur.  Difficulties in 
making end-of-life decisions occur due to a multiplicity of causes including clinical 
ambiguity about medical goals, difficulty in prognosis, and confusion about patient 
preferences. Since it is families that end up making these important end-of-life decisions, 
I believe it is imperative that we improve the communication of medical professionals 
with families. This improvement will require many other changes, including training, 
time for extensive discussions, and potential changes in reimbursements.  
 
What about Confidentiality? 
  
 At this point some may be wondering what happened to patient confidentiality? 
Physicians and other health care professionals have made many adjustments in how they 
provide patient care in recent years.  An important change came related to maintaining 
patient privacy.  The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA) was 
developed due to concerns about electronic transfer of medical records. It also made 
important changes to how health care information is allowed to be shared and incidental 
disclosure of health related conditions. It mandates that health care information must be 
held confidential unless certain conditions apply.  
The Department recognizes that there may be times when individuals are legally or otherwise 
incapable of exercising their rights, or simply choose to designate another to act on their behalf 
with respect to these rights. Under the Rule, a person authorized (under State or other applicable 
law, e.g., tribal or military law) to act on behalf of the individual in making health care related 
decisions is the individual‘s ―personal representative.‖ Section 164.502(g) 196 
 
                                                 
195
 Tilden, V. P., Tolle, S. W., Nelson, C. A., & Eggman, S. C. (1999`). Family Decision Making in 
Forgoing Life-Extending Treatments. Journal of Family Nursing, 5(4), 426-442. 
196
  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Understanding HIPPA Privacy 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/personalreps.html  (accessed June 17, 
2011.)    
 109 
 This prompted many to have concerns whether health care professionals could share 
medical information to multiple family members or only the ―designated other.‖ Dr. 
Michael W. Rabow, et al., addressed this issue in The Journal of American Medical 
Association and reported,  
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA) has generated significant 
concern among physicians with regard to privacy regulations, but the impact of HIPPA on 
physician-family communication is not yet known…..The Office of Civil Rights Privacy Rule, as 
well as interpretation from the Web site of the Department of Health and Human Services, 
suggests that unless individuals have indicated that they do not want information shared with 
family members, HIPPA regulations allow it.
197
 
 
Rabow et al. further suggest that physicians and health care professionals should discuss, 
with patients who are able, their willingness to have their care discussed with family 
members.  Equally important to discuss with patients is who, if anyone in their family, 
the patient would not like to have their care information.   
 
Problems with Family Decision Making 
Health care professionals often request patients or families designate one decision 
maker to assist in communication with the health care institution.  This gives doctors and 
nurses one authoritative decision maker to go to, but it endlessly complicates the 
dynamics within the patient‘s family.  Perhaps as a consequence of considering the 
ramifications of designating just one family member as their surrogate, patients routinely 
identify ―my family‖ to make decisions rather than any one individual.  This factor has 
many cultural components that health care professionals must adapt to when providing 
end-of-life care.  
Patients develop treatment preferences, consider truth-telling and undertake decision making 
within a cultural and ethnic heritage.  In a study of 200 elderly people from 4 ethnic groups, 57% 
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of Korean Americans and 45% of Mexican Americans believed that the family should be the 
primary decision maker, compared with 24% of African Americans and 20% of European 
Americans.
198
 
 
 To make things more complex, families have changed to include many variations in 
addition to the nuclear family unit composed of husband, wife, and their children.  In 
1998, already over a quarter of families were non-traditional families.
199
 ―Almost on third 
of the families in the United States are composed of members who are not biologically or 
legally related.‖200    
Families also have many different ways of reacting to stress which will affect 
their abilities to make decisions.  The psychodynamics of families are affected by factors 
in addition to the patient‘s health crisis, including their history of working together, the 
emotional and physical status of members, socioeconomic status, individual and family 
resources, and other simultaneously occurring events.
201
  Families will vary in how they 
adjust to the burdens of decision making and coping with the death of a member. Not all 
of their reactions will be favorable.  
―Even in cases where the patient has advance directives, family members may 
have conflicts of interest or disagree with one another.‖202  Conflicts can develop over 
attempts to interpret patient wishes or bring up deeper religious or value conflicts 
between patients and their families.  Often, the final hospitalization of a family member 
will bring together relatives who have had little contact for many years. These situations 
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may offer comfort or bring up past disagreements.  The issue for health care professionals 
then becomes attempting to obtain family consensus in making medical decisions.   
 
Strategies for achieving consensus among disagreeing family members include focusing on the 
known medical facts of the patient‘s conditions and continually refocusing on what is known 
about the patient‘s values and preferences. Directing the family through the precept of substituted 
judgment, physicians can encourage each family member (both appointed surrogates and others) 
to imagine and discuss what the patient would want done for himself or herself, which is not 
always equivalent to what the family member would want done for the patient.
203
  
 
In situations where TS is an appropriate treatment this would require health care 
professionals to assist family members in understanding and accepting the patient‘s death 
in the near future (less than two weeks in all cases and maybe in mere hours or days). 
Health care professionals must also clearly convey the failure of other methods to 
successfully relieve the patient‘s pain or other distressing clinical symptoms, in addition 
to providing clear information on the practice of TS.  It is important to return the focus to 
what the patient would want in this situation and the goal of working together to 
accomplish that goal. Understandably, accepting death and the methods involved in TS 
could be overwhelming for families to absorb.  Empathetic responses can go far to offer 
support and respect for the difficult situation that faces families making end-of-life 
decisions for loved ones.  
Research on the Burdens of Surrogate Decision Makers  
 
   Some research has focused on how families cope with difficult hospitalizations 
and their responsibilities towards dying family members. Sharon Kaufman, an 
anthropologist, observed the course of over 100 critically ill patients who died (and many 
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more who did not), over a course of two years in three California hospitals.
204
 Her 
perspective is insightful in ways that strictly medical research has not been.  As an 
anthropologist ethnographer, she was both witness (to all that was going on) and scientist 
(able to ask questions and for clarification) to both families and staff.  An example of her 
view is seen in her understanding of how the hospital is differently viewed by 
professional staff and patients and families.  
 
For staff, the hospital is a fixed, permanent place and patients are transitional objects that must be 
moved along… For patients and families, the hospital is a transitional thing - a stressful limbo - 
and being there heightens their sense of physical and emotional vulnerability and lack of 
control.
205
  
 
She states that ―patients and families are the real stakeholders - in how death is made and 
how the hospital makes death.‖206  I believe this is true and why it is important that 
family interests be evaluated.  Kaufman found that when patients could not articulate 
their wishes, physicians usually left final decisions about withholding or withdrawing 
life-sustaining therapy in the hands of families.  She found that often, as is common 
practice in most hospitals, this decision is requested following one or more family 
conferences.  I have participated in many family meetings and echo Kaufuman‘s findings 
that:  
What is spoken by medical staff and what is heard by patients and families are not the same thing, 
as we have seen in family interpretations of unlikely and never to mean ―maybe.‖ …Patients and 
families look to doctors for direction, yet doctors do not usually know how to speak to them about 
death. On the other hand, doctors look to patients and families to learn what they are ready to hear 
and to know, but what patients and families express is not always helpful for what medical staff 
want, and feel they need to do.  The twin difficulties of speaking and being heard are perhaps most 
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poignant around the issue I call doublespeak – the contradictory directives and explanations that 
physicians offer, however unwittingly.
207
 
 
An example of the doublespeak Kaufman mentions is when following the important 
family meeting, physicians request, ―Take your time, but make a decision (hopefully one 
that moves things along) now.‖208  In cases that would involve TS, this would almost 
always be true since the goal would be to provide the patient with the most immediate 
relief from pain and suffering possible. There is little that effectively captures how 
difficult it is for families, thrust into a foreign hospital environment, to suddenly make 
these life or death decisions for loved ones.  Kaufman writes:  
….I observed a striking inability to cope with making ―choices‖ about procedures. Many families 
demonstrated this inability, regardless of education level or any other sociodemographic feature. 
….Families rarely want to shoulder medical decision-making responsibility, and they view 
procedural choices not as options for managing death but as assuming responsibility for ―killing‖ 
the patient. 
209
 
 
 It also seems that once physicians reach a point of accepting that the patient will 
not survive, they may pressure the family to ―make a decision‖ to withdraw treatment and 
allow comfort care only.
210
 Luce and White completed a small study looking specifically 
at cases where professional staff and family disagreed, often where the family wished to 
continue life-sustaining therapy.
211
 They found, ―Physicians and nurses may not be aware 
of the pressure some of them exert or appreciate how strong it can seem to family 
members.‖212  Their conclusions stress improved communication, beginning family 
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meetings early in the admission and discussing the possibility of death from the outset as 
well as allowing family members more time to speak and addressing their emotional 
issues.
213
 Even when patients may have had discussions with their specialist concerning 
disease progression and end-of-life wishes earlier, these desires are often not shared with 
the family members who will be making their final decisions, or passed by their personal 
doctor to the hospital physician in charge during their final admission.  
 Although the death of a loved one is known to be one of the greatest stressors one 
can face, few studies have looked at those making the decisions to forgo or discontinue 
life-prolonging treatments.  One study did examine families making those decisions at 
both a one-month post death and six-month post death evaluation point.
214
 Tilden, et al., 
found a significant core set of phases families went through as they experienced the 
process of arriving at the decision to withdraw treatment: recognition of futility, coming 
to terms, shouldering the surrogate role and facing the question. The first phase is the 
dawning of the understanding that the patient is unlikely to leave the hospital. This 
understanding may come following a family meeting with physicians.  Tilden, et al., also 
mention in this phase the problems families may have in ―really hearing‖ what is being 
said to them.  ―As the recognition of futility unfolded and the need for a decision became 
apparent, the family process shifted toward resignation to an unfavorable outcome, which 
we labeled coming to terms.‖215  
 Even when advance directives were there to assist families, shouldering the 
surrogate role was reported as tremendously difficult.   
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With a great deal of spontaneous emphasis, most respondents described accepting this 
responsibility as the hardest thing family members ever have to do.  Again and again, respondents 
used such terms as ‗difficult‘, intense‘, ‗painful‘, overwhelming‘, ‗devastating‘, and ‗traumatic.‘  
They often said that words failed to communicate the difficulty.  In their words, ―Who wants to 
say to someone you love, it‘s time to go?‖; ―I hope I never do anything that hard in my life 
again.‖; ―It left me feeling like I was telling him life or death…like I was pronouncing his death.‖; 
―I didn‘t want to pull those life supports and I kept thinking every day: maybe, maybe, maybe…‖ 
216
 
 
 Although some respondents reported fulfilling the role of decision maker was 
done in a sense of duty and somewhat of an honor, many used the term ―work‖ and had 
statements concerning the stress and pressures it puts on the surrogate.
217
 At the six-
month evaluation most families focused on accessing more information or combining 
multiple pieces of information to increase certainty in their decision. Reflections then 
were generally positive with some feeling guilty if they believed they had prolonged 
patient suffering.
218
  
Reducing Decision-Maker Burden through Shared Decision Making 
 The Tilden, et al., study also supports increasing clear physician communication 
to families, when patients are unable to participate, and specifically using language that 
implies shared decision making.
219
  That means physicians need to practice using 
language that combines their medical knowledge (‗In my best medical judgment there is 
no possibility…..‘) with family reported patient values (‗of George returning to be able to 
walk his dog or achieve any level of independence‘).  These are counseling skills that are 
routinely taught to therapists and social workers but that do not often make it on the 
medical school skills list.  The neutral stating of medical information and statistics and 
then telling the family that they need to decide leaves the family with greater burdens 
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they need to face.  Physicians are trained to make difficult medical decisions; families 
have no such preparation. Offering families reassurances and summary statements 
provides those families with support for their decisions (‗It sounds like you are focused 
on keeping George pain free, and I agree that is important right now since he doesn‘t 
have long left. I believe that TS will best allow that for him‘). Moreover, as the above 
research shows, families want more and more clear communication from physicians 
concerning end-of-life decisions for their dying family members.  
At times it will remain impossible to reach family consensus on appropriate 
patient decisions due to family discord.  Even with multiple family meetings and attempts 
at providing additional information or efforts to identify an agreed upon decision maker 
for the patient, some situations are simply not able to be resolved within the limited time 
available.  I would recommend a much greater reliance upon the hospital ethics 
committees to offer physicians assistance when concerns regarding surrogate decisions 
occur. Ethics committees have the benefit of a wide interdisciplinary knowledge base. 
Each patient situation is invariably unique and must be evaluated on individual merits.    
 Benefits of TS for Families 
  
  Once TS is initiated, the patient is no longer aware, no longer suffering, and no 
longer capable of experiencing.  All the remaining experience is that of the family.  One 
may then hope that they too experience some relief, brought by the knowledge that their 
loved one is no longer suffering. Yet, there is no way to ensure that this is their 
experience. Next, we need to look at how a death by TS may offer similar or different 
harms and benefits for remaining family members.  
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Since a patient who is unconscious due to TS would have few demanding care 
needs staff, TS may permit the staff to direct attention to families. Allowing death to 
occur with TS could allow staff time to talk with family members, assess their 
experiences, reassure them that patient needs are taken care of, and allow them to vent 
feelings and concerns. These sorts of emotional supports provided to families could 
provide important benefits towards easing their bereavement. In order to accomplish this 
effectively, staff would require training in providing emotional support and identification 
of signs in those who need referrals for ongoing professional counseling and support.  
Short term training goals would be to provide clarification of the medical situation and 
TS procedure, reassurance that the patient was no longer suffering, and reduction of 
family guilt/burden over decision making by allowing them to express their feelings. We 
will now evaluate what I believe may be some other potential benefits of allowing death 
to occur with TS.   
Indirect and Direct Family Benefits 
 
Families are deeply affected by the dying and death of loved ones.  Families who 
are experiencing reciprocal suffering with a patient who has refractory symptoms at the 
end-of-life may find solace in having the patients suffering eliminated by terminal 
sedation. By allowing the patient relief, even at the cost of consciousness, an indirect 
relief of suffering is also extended to the family who has become enmeshed in the 
patient‘s experience.  A direct benefit is that patients who choose TS can exit the ICU‘s 
and eliminate excess monitoring. This allows full family attendance around their bedside 
and enables families to witness their family member dying peacefully, in a controlled 
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fashion, with medical care and with a minimum of distancing medical machinery.  If TS 
can provide families an opportunity to see their loved one calmly sedated prior to death 
rather than suffering in agony, then it can be evaluated as a beneficent action.   
Further TS may allow families to be present with their dying relatively 
undistracted by the burden(s) of providing taxing physical care.   By remaining with the 
patient, even when she is unconscious, families may be able to feel that they are still 
participating in caregiving by providing emotional presence and caring touch.  Often 
family members spend time talking to sedated or unconscious patients currently in ICU 
or on ventilators, and they report feeling better in talking to their loved one, even when 
they know they will get no response.
220
 These benefits would exist for those whose loved 
one receives TS as well.  Families can also take time to sleep and rest knowing that 
twenty-four hour care is provided by the hospital staff.  A direct benefit for families 
comes from having a professional medical staff to take over direct caregiving in a 
medical situation to provide families with much needed physical and mental respite.   
Harms to Families from TS 
  
 We will next consider harms families may experience when TS is utilized as a 
final treatment for a family member.  These harms may vary depending on whether TS 
was utilized as requested by the patient (either during the final admission or in a prior 
advance directive) or was authorized or requested by a family member acting as patient 
proxy. Although the patient‘s burdens and distress will end upon her death, the families 
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who have sacrificed, jobs, savings and their own health to provide care may never 
recover.
 221
   Even in the best of situations, families may also suffer from complex 
emotions following the patient‘s death.  ―After the patient‘s death, the family member 
may struggle with intense suffering to do with feelings of loss, loneliness, anger, guilt, 
and doubts about whether they had done enough for the patient.‖222  We cannot hope to 
eliminate the grief a family will experience following the death of a family member but 
we ought to attempt to limit additional harms when possible.  
Harms similar to suicide in the family & guilt  
 
We know that suicide can leave lasting scars upon the surviving family members. 
Are there any similarities in choosing TS?  Suicide in terminal patients is far from rare 
and is often viewed positively as a death by choice.  This choice has been promoted by 
groups such as Compassion & Choices
223
 and books such as Final Exit
224
 which give 
detailed instructions on how to independently end your life. Both terminal sedation and 
some forms of suicide allow the patient to eliminate her conscious participation in the 
final dying process.  TS may be a type of ‗good death‘ for the patient in that both TS and 
suicide support patient autonomy and allow the patient some control over their death.  
But what about those who live on?   We do know that those who have to live with the 
suicide of a family member often suffer from emotional problems such as anger, guilt, 
and confusion.  They often have tremendous frustration and grief over the lack of closure 
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that the manner of death prevented and they may not receive social support due to the 
taboo nature of death by suicide.   
If TS is provided before families are prepared (i.e., before they have had final and 
meaningful conversations with their dying relative and/or before they have had a chance 
to question medical staff), they may also suffer due to lack of closure, unresolved guilt, 
and confusion.  It seems plausible then that a possible harm of TS is the potential for 
complicated bereavement for the remaining family members. How families react and 
respond to a death with TS may be dependent partly on the ability of the medical staff to 
provide adequate explanations and an atmosphere of open communication for families to 
enter into.  
It may also be that this concern can be mitigated or is merely irrelevant to many 
families. Conversations may have been plentiful and TS discussed often and well in 
advance of any potential to utilize this final treatment.  Medical staff can also encourage 
patients and families to initiate these sorts of meaningful final conversations to allow 
closure prior to a need for TS. Also, if desired, TS can be delayed by patient consent to 
allow some final words to be spoken to a family member.  Lastly, appropriate sedative 
medications and pain relievers may be lightened up once started if it is felt imperative to 
do so by family members or if a less burdensome method to successfully palliate 
distressing symptom is found.
225
  Although lightening up of medication is not the usual 
course or plan for TS, it is done when sedation is used to allow seriously ill patients 
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respite from their symptoms with the intention of checking back in to see if symptoms 
have resolved or become more tolerable for the patient.  
The situations where I can imagine TS subjecting remaining family members to 
similar harms as a death by suicide would be:  if there had been a prior estrangement, if a 
relative arrived at a hospital only to find out the patient has already been sedated, if there 
had been a poor relationship already and once the patient is sedated the family member 
begins to regret not speaking up earlier, or finally, situations when relatives had not been 
aware of patient illness or severity of illness until sedation is underway.  In those sorts of 
cases, the patient would have had to be competent to choose to undergo TS.  In these 
cases, the family may not have suffered any caregiver burden prior to the patient‘s death 
and the burden of decision making concerning TS has been borne by the patient.  
A concern specific to TS is related to the possible guilt or confused emotions that 
a family member may experience from the days or weeks of simply watching a relative 
undergoing TS waste away until death.  The ‗waiting it out‘ without the ability to interact 
with loved ones may be torturous to many.  Although clearly not the same, imagine the 
indignation if one took a beloved pet to be euthanized and were then told, the pet will be 
sedated so as to not suffer and we will just wait for death to occur from underlying 
disease in a few days or weeks.  We would expect this sort of death to be deeply 
troubling to pet owners, especially to the most caring owners.
226
  The deep sharing that 
occurs between pets and owners is all non-verbal so it is not merely the lack of 
conversation that is so troubling.  One would surmise it has more to do with simple 
interaction.  Those owners who have had to euthanize a pet have often reported some 
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measure of comfort from believing that they had ‗prevented needless suffering‘ in their 
companion.  All two-way interaction is absent in TS, although the one living may still 
offer kind words and touch, there is no response from the one dying.  This may be simply 
too difficult for some to cope with.   
Families who suffer from guilt due to believing that they should have found a way 
to dissuade the patient from choosing TS would also have been harmed.  They may 
believe that moral harm will come to the patient from choosing this manner of dying. 
This would be especially true if they believe that significant value comes from enduring 
suffering.  If they have not been involved prior to the patient‘s decision for TS or have 
not been able to ―hear‖ what the medical staff have been saying, the family may believe 
TS is just another form of suicide or PAS.  
 There are other end-of-life situations which prevent final conversations from 
occurring. This includes but is not limited to: sudden death, being dependent on a 
ventilator or in intensive care, being on other medications which cloud consciousness and 
clear thinking, delirium, dementia, metabolic disorders, and strokes or other types of end-
of-life comas.  In any of the above situations meaningful end-of-life conversations would 
also likely be impossible. Family members could still be encouraged to sit bedside and 
say their final goodbyes to their loved one despite lack of response.  This one-sided 
goodbye could still provide some solace to a family member who arrived too late.  
Confusions 
 
Some families could be harmed by confusing a death by TS with a less moral or 
legal option such as suicide, physician assisted suicide, or euthanasia.  Despite the fact 
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that there are clear differences in the methods and intent involved, those who are not 
medical professionals may have difficulty distinguishing among these options.  
Confusions may arise unless time is spent with the family to assure that they understand 
exactly the intent and methods involved in providing terminal sedation.  Since families 
are under great stress – perhaps even distress – especially if they were thrust in to the 
decision maker role, they may not have asked all the questions that they have during their 
initial ―family conference‖ with the doctor.  Even though physicians are not reimbursed 
for time spent in family conferences, it is this time spent (often repeatedly) answering 
questions, providing reassurances and allowing open communication that remains 
essential. Reinforcement and reiteration that the goal of TS is titration of medication just 
until cessation of distressing symptoms occurs and the patient is calmly sedated ought to 
provide clarification and reassurance. Secondly, to reinforce the point that the providing 
artificial nutrition and hydration would only serve to unnecessarily prolong the dying 
process.   
It would clearly be a harm to allow family members to believe that they had given 
consent for a family member to be euthanized and is NOT what terminal sedation 
provides in end-of-life care.  Physicians vary widely in their ability to converse clearly 
and openly with families in a language that families can understand.  Families may also 
suffer from decreased ability to clearly process information when highly stressed and 
they may need to hear the same information repeatedly or have the same questions 
answered again and again to enable the information to sink in. Increased efforts towards 
effective communication to ensure that all parties are clear on the goals of TS treatment 
prior to sedation are essential to reduce these harms.   
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Fears of mercy killings 
 
Although relatively few in number, there are occasionally those in the medical 
profession – both physicians and nursing staff – who intentionally kill their patients.  
These persons usually are able to go undetected while taking many lives before they are 
discovered and stopped.  The incidence of medical serial killers reported has continued to 
increase.  
According to the USA Today, cases of medical serial killers were almost unheard of until the 
1970‘s, when four incidents were reported.  The number jumped to a dozen in the 1980‘s and 
fourteen in the following decade.  A 1990 book called Nurses Who Kill cites twenty-four nurses 
and nurse‘s aides charged with serial murder.
227
   
 
Despite the tremendous media attention these cases inspire, the fears they fuel in 
the public are wildly out of proportion to the incidences or likelihood it will happen.  A 
frank discussion of these fears is unlikely to occur as I would suspect families that hold 
these fears would also be afraid that to voice them.  I have personally witnessed countless 
times when families admit to concerns or complaints only after their patient‘s death.  
When questioned as to why they didn‘t voice the concern earlier, the reply was often that 
they were afraid if they complained it could encourage staff to abuse or ignore their 
family member.  Perhaps the best way to address a concern such as this is to openly state 
that some people may hold this concern and then reassure families that it is not going to 
be the case in providing appropriate relief for the suffering of their family member 
utilizing terminal sedation.  Reinforcing the differences in the amounts and types of 
medications used for euthanasia with the amounts and types of medications used for TS 
might provide clarification and reassurance.  Families must also trust that patients are 
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being sedated to offer patients, not care givers, relief.  As above, open and clear 
communication done on a consistent basis is essential to an appropriate hospital 
procedure for allowing TS in patients with refractory end-of-life suffering.  
Admittedly, there are a few who act against patient and family wishes and against 
the law in intentionally terminating the lives of the seriously ill.  Their actions are outside 
of any moral or professional behavior. In order to help to differentiate their acts from that 
of appropriate TS, proper documentation from physicians and patient/family consent is 
required prior to initiation of TS.  
Complicated Bereavement 
 
 Although most persons are able to adapt and make life adjustments following the 
death of a loved one with the assistance of those around them, some do not.  Kramer, et 
al., did a recent in-depth study of factors contributing to complicated grief in caregivers 
of persons with lung cancer.
228
  Understanding what leads to complicated bereavement 
will allow us to attempt to limit these factors for those families who are affected by TS.  
Kramer, et al., found that, in general, ―complicated grief symptoms were higher among 
caregivers with less education, among families with lower prior conflict but higher 
conflict at the end of life, who had family members who had difficulty accepting the 
illness, and who were caring for patients with greater fear of death.‖229  
We may foresee that if a patient suffering at the end-of-life cannot be adequately 
treated with traditional measures then it may increase the family conflict and lead to 
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higher rates of complicated grief.  In this situation perhaps TS would be able to address 
the intolerable suffering and offer the patient and family a more peaceful end-of-life 
scenario.  However, the provision of terminal sedation may increase the likelihood of 
complicated bereavement for the surviving family members, especially if there is family 
conflict concerning TS.  Kramer also cites evidence that communication and ―end-of-life 
discussions may have cascading benefits for patients and their caregivers including better 
caregiver bereavement adjustment.‖230  Encouraging or even assisting family members to 
talk openly with their dying relative would then be beneficial to both parties.
231
   
Moral objections 
 
There will be families who object to TS on the vitalist and theist moral grounds 
we have previously mentioned.  As Terri Schiavo‘s parents did, they may view any 
discontinuation of any available medical treatment as a form of killing.  Those with very 
strong religious views may also deny any form of withholding or withdrawal of medical 
treatment, especially artificial nutrition and hydration, as taking the decisions for life and 
death out of God‘s hands and therefore unacceptable.  If the patient holds the same belief 
system as the family, this patient would not be likely to choose TS and there will be no 
family conflict.   
But if the patient and family have differing belief systems then these differences 
must be addressed and the issue of patient advance directive or surrogate decision making 
will need to be decided upon.  Often where value conflict does exist, health care 
                                                 
230
 Ibid. pg. 205.  
231
 This may not be an option for many due to the increasing preponderance of those who also have 
severely dementing illness.   
 127 
professionals can achieve family support by stating the need to direct family focus on the 
patient‘s values and preferences rather than what they themselves would want done.  
Even when families do not share patient values they may be able to separate out what 
they would want done from what they believe the patient would choose if able to do so. 
Using what the patient‘s viewpoint would have been, if she could have participated in the 
decision, will help to determine the most ethical action.  Again, it is appropriate to offer 
empathy to families about just how difficult it is to be in these end-of-life situations.  If 
no agreement can be obtained, Ethics Committee consultation should be requested by the 
physician in charge to allow full discussion and attempts to understand all viewpoints in 
an effort to reach a treatment plan agreeable to all.  This is undeniably a difficult situation 
and one that can sometimes be avoided by early and clear communication of wishes by 
the terminally ill patient to her family.
232
   
Need for Additional TS Specific Research  
 
 The good intention and benefit of TS that one would like for families is the 
impression of a peaceful, calm death of their loved one.  Unfortunately, little empirical 
research on TS has been able to confirm that this does in fact occur, let alone occurs most 
often.  I do not believe that this is because this hoped-for perception of a good death does 
not occur; rather, it is likely due to the lack of focus on the family during TS.  I have 
found no research done on specifically American families who had relatives dying with 
TS.  Of course, even if there are harms to family members when relatives die using TS, 
these harms may not be of sufficient weight to override the benefit that the dying patient 
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may receive.  Yet, they do deserve careful consideration, if for no other reason, to 
identify what these harms are and how we might reduce them if possible.  We would 
thereby strengthen the reasons to allow greater use of TS use for those who are suffering 
intolerably at the end of life.  
Families are ‗caught up‘ in our hospital institutions. That fact cannot be disputed, 
but the nature of its impact upon them is yet to be clearly identified in the ethics 
literature. Most available studies on bereavement have not focused on the method of 
dying or on an individual‘s participation (such as having to make decisions to forgo 
treatment or requesting TS) in the method of a family member‘s death.   
Culture has dramatic impact upon how individuals assign values to important life 
events. The death of a family member is an important event and it is not unreasonable to 
predict differences in the American culture from those of European or Asian cultures. 
Research on terminal sedation, specifically as it relates to families in the United States, is 
still desperately needed.  The research that has been done on how TS affects families has 
been conducted in Japan and The Netherlands.   
In Japan, Tatsuya Morita has done considerable research in the field of palliative 
sedation and has begun to take an investigative look at the potential for distress for 
families.
233
  Although cultural difference may exist, these studies are illuminative. Morita 
found significant concerns:  
Family members reported guilt, helplessness, and physical and emotional exhaustion when 
patients received palliative sedation therapy.  They were concerned about whether sedated patients 
experienced distress, wanted to know that the maximum efforts had been made, wished to prepare 
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for patient death, wished to tell important things to patients before sedation, wished to understand 
patients‘ suffering, and wanted medical professionals to treat patients with dignity.
234
   
 
In a recent study from The Netherlands, looking at concerns of the relatives during the 
continuous palliative sedation of a family member, van Dooren, et al., found that over 
half of the relatives expressed concerns after sedation was started.
235
 The Netherlands 
study found concerns grouped into three primary areas: concerns about the aim of 
continuous sedation (27%), concerns about the well-being of the patient (29%), and 
concerns related to the well-being of the relatives themselves (18%).
236
  
 Of the concerns regarding the aim of continuous sedation, 29% expressed 
concerns about the patient‘s possible continued suffering.237  This concern was increased 
if there was a need to increase the dose of midazolam to control symptoms or a change in 
the patient‘s condition such as breathing or groaning.  This study was done in a country 
where euthanasia is legal but cannot always be initiated (if patient condition worsens 
prior to the ability to meet requirements for euthanasia) and some families were frustrated 
that euthanasia could not be provided for their patient.  This also clarifies one of the 
differences in the appropriate intentions for TS, to provide medication just until 
unconsciousness and the cessation of noxious symptoms.  Therefore, families may retain 
concerns about ongoing patient suffering since the intention in TS is not to hasten or 
deliver immediate death through medication as would be the case when utilizing 
euthanasia or PAS.  
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 Concerns about the well-being of relatives themselves included feelings of great 
burden on themselves, feelings of exhaustion because of sleep deprivation and 
―unbearable feelings of watching their family member die.‖238  Van Dooren, et al., 
conclude that family concerns included: 
 
The fact that the relatives cannot communicate with their ill family members anymore may 
strengthen their possible doubts about the opinion of their family members regarding the decision 
to sedate and the level of symptom relief actually achieved. In fact, some signs that usually occur 
during the dying process, for example groaning or altered breathing, may be interpreted by the 
relative as waking up or the recurrence of symptoms and, therefore, upset them.
239
 
 
To address these concerns, van Dooren, et al., also recommend ―proactively, 
repeating information or providing additional information could effectively resolve the 
expressed concerns.‖240  They also stress allowing the relatives to ventilate regarding 
their own well-being.  Thus, beneficence directed towards the family members while 
loved ones are dying is clearly within the duties of those caring for the dying patients and 
it may reduce their distress.  Van Dooren, et al., endorses ―continuous monitoring of not 
only the patients‘ symptoms, but also the concerns and needs of the relatives.‖241  That 
family members expressed ―doubts about the opinion of family members regarding the 
decision to sedate‖ could indicate that there has not been enough time for full discussion 
or that there are some who are in disagreement with the decision to utilize TS.  This 
would be another important area for further study.  I would hypothesize that when there is 
an increase in staff/family discussions earlier in hospitalizations and more time allowed 
for talking together, that there would be a corresponding decrease in conflict.  
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Morita, et al., completed a follow-up study in Japan that was done over two years 
following the TS of a family member showing that although 78% of families were 
satisfied with the TS treatment, 25% expressed high level of emotional distress.
242
 This 
was a large study looking at 764 patients who had died from cancer in their institutions. 
Of those, 41% received sedation.
243
  This Japanese study does differ: they differentiated 
between those who received intermittent sedation alone (to offer respite from symptoms) 
prior to death (7.9%) and those who received continuous-deep sedation with or without 
intermittent sedation (33%).
244
  Usual statistics report the incidence of TS as occurring in 
between 10-50% of deaths due to terminal cancer.  Some of the variance in reporting is 
due to confusions on reporting intermittent versus continuous sedation.   
Some of the family burdens were related to responsibility for making decisions 
and conflict in the decision making process. ―Conflicts in the opinions were observed 
among family members in 15%, between the patient and family in 7.6%, and between 
family and medical staff in 9.75%.‖245 The families in the study perceived that 69% of 
the patients were considerably or very distressed before sedation.  This may lead one to 
question if there are differences between professional evaluation of ‗intolerable distress‘ 
as required for TS and the family evaluation of distress.  In this study, 55% reported that 
the patient had made an explicit request for sedation.   
Additionally, the timing of starting sedation was evaluated as appropriate in 78% 
of families, too early in 1.6 %, maybe too early in 7.6%, maybe too late in 7.0% and too 
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late in 2.7% and .4 % unsure, of the evaluated cases.
246
  Although patient distress went 
down in a majority of cases (11% still stated observing patient distress following 
sedation), family emotional distress was related to those cases where patients remained 
distressed or it was felt sedation came too late.
247
   
Even when sedation appeared to be meeting patient and family needs, ―half of the 
families reported that they were distressed they could not communicate with the 
patient.‖248 Additionally, ―About one-third of the families reported taking responsibility 
for the decision as a burden and were concerned that sedation might shorten the patient‘s 
life.‖249   
Compared with the family members with low distress, highly distressed families were 
significantly more likely to have concerns that sedation might shorten the patient‘s life, feel there 
might be other ways for symptom relief, feel the burden of responsibility for the decision, feel 
unprepared for changes of patient condition, think the physicians and nurses were not sufficiently 
compassionate, feel they still had something more to do, and have legal concerns; they were less 
likely to have a prior discussion with physicians.
250
 
 
Once again, it appears that many of these concerns could be addressed with adequate or 
additional communication, and that physician communication is especially important to 
reduce family distress.  When evaluating the concerns listed above, one may wonder why 
it is that families remain concerned that TS may shorten relative‘s lives.  Is it perhaps 
because of the issue of not providing artificial feedings?  Harboring the old concerns of 
not wanting to starve the patient to death?  Or that TS really is a form of euthanasia?  
 I am coming to believe that regardless of how many times families are told some 
well accepted medical and ethical precepts - such as ―the dying do not feel hunger the 
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same as you and I‖ or ―it is just as ethical to withdraw care as it is to withholding care in 
most situations‖ or ―there is difference in intent and medications between TS and 
euthanasia‖ - they don‘t buy it.  There are things in life that, as my grandmother would 
say, ―Just don‘t sit right‖ even when they have been explained to you again and again.251  
These concerns, and the others that Morita has uncovered, deserve more full evaluation 
for the impact that they have upon families. Nonetheless, as ethicists we need to develop 
better ways to educate others on complex moral issues which will result in more 
confidence in making these difficult decisions.  
Given the high preponderance of families who must, in the end, take 
responsibility for making terminal sedation decisions, it is important to retain concern for 
the families and focus on reducing the harm they may incur.  In this study, 89% of the 
families were clearly informed of sedation therapy to be used on their family member.  It 
is reasonable to hope that if 100% were informed prior to sedation that the percentage of 
families who reported being satisfied with the care could then go above the 78% Morita 
found in this study.   
These studies are only just a start; they confirm concerns about family suffering 
are not unfounded.  Further philosophical and empirical study into how families cope 
with the palliative sedation of a loved one could illuminate multiple concerns and the 
harms families may endure which have yet to be identified. The striking conclusion that 
is in virtually every current study on the effects upon families from terminal sedation or 
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other hospital deaths is the need for greater communication between physicians, medical 
staff and families during the dying process.   
Need for Improvement in Communication  
Most deaths now occur in institutions such as hospitals and nursing homes. A 
large study, involving over 1.97 million deaths, completed by Teno, et al., in the year 
2000 showed that 67% of deaths occurred in an institution.
252
 Billings, et al., state, ―We 
would compare the imprinting that occurs between a family and a hospital at the time of a 
birth with a family‘s lasting impression of how the hospital manages a death.‖253  The 
Teno study showed that 76% of family members had contact with the patient all 7 days in 
the last week of life.  Even though most people die in hospitals or other institutions, 
―family members of descendants who received care at home with hospice services were 
more likely to report a favorable dying experience.‖254 Over one third of families with 
institutional deaths reported one or more concerns with family emotional support.
255
  
The Teno, et al., study ―Family Perspectives on End-of-Life care at the Last Place 
of Care‖ showed four of five results for better quality end-of- life care results focused on 
health care professionals‘ attention to families concerns.  This included 1) ensuring 
desired physical comfort and emotional support, 2) promoting shared decision making, 3) 
treating the dying person with respect, 4) providing information and emotional support to 
family members.  With this in mind, health care professionals can work towards 
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providing better care for the family members who die with TS. TS has the ability to work 
towards achieving these measures. The first, (1) ensuring the physical comfort of 
patients, is done in TS by elimination of their suffering.  I have earlier detailed some 
ways that physicians and health care professionals can address families to work towards 
(2), more shared decision making, and included a template for ―Conducting Family 
Meetings When the Patient is Unable to Participate‖ in Appendix 3.  I have addressed in 
Chapter 3 how TS can be evaluated as achieving (3) in respecting the autonomy of the 
dying patient.  Lastly, I list several suggestions below to offer measures to meet (4), 
offering families of patients undergoing TS with additional information and emotional 
support.  
Conclusion 
 
Increased communication is paramount in mitigating many of the potential harms 
to the families.  While the value of communication cannot be underrated, prior to having 
these discussions, physicians need to be educated about talking about death and talking 
about death to families.  Society also needs to be open to talking about death.  
Discussions about dying preferences among family members ought to begin prior to any 
illness, this open forum of discussions can allow one to then return to talking about what 
one ―really wants‖ if a terminal diagnosis is received.256 I believe having greater 
openness in discussions of death and dying issues generally will allow families to have 
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greater comfort that they are allowing a good death for loved ones if they are called to 
authorize TS to alleviate intolerable suffering.  
TS deaths are events that come with at least some advanced warning: we plan the 
sedations, and medication orders are first written and then carried out.  I believe that 
much harm to families could be mitigated by not only increasing the communication by 
physicians to families and nursing staff to families but by including protocols which 
mandate the inclusion of additional team members (chaplains and social workers) to 
specifically address the psychosocial and bereavement needs of the family.  
A good protocol would include a family-team meeting to discuss the process, or 
possibility of utilizing TS prior to the actual need. When discussions of TS as a possible 
treatment are brought up by hospital staff or physicians early in the course of terminal 
illness,
257
 it will allow patients and families to plan in advance for the occasion and 
address needed conversations – about dying, forgiveness, thankfulness and permission – 
to happen earlier in the dying process.  In the case that started this chapter, a family 
meeting held even in the emergency ward could begin to alert the son that even if current 
infection cleared, his mother would likely not have any great improvements due to her 
wishes to refuse artificial feedings.  A meeting could also assure family that all efforts 
were being made to keep the patient pain free and comfortable.  Words of compassion for 
her sad situation could go a long way towards supporting the family. It would also begin 
to open a path for future communication between the family and hospital staff providers.   
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Another option to reduce emotional harms would be a hospital sponsored support 
group for the family members.  This group (similar to other hospital support groups for 
stroke survivors, parents of fetal demise, or widow/widower groups) would encourage 
ventilating feelings and provision of education on the medical techniques involved and 
the grieving process. It seems intuitively right that encouraging discussion of feelings, 
fears and concerns about the patient‘s upcoming death would be beneficial and not only 
for patients. This communication would aid in establishing trust with the professional 
care team to allow the family to relinquish provision of burdensome direct care and focus 
their own emotional needs, saying goodbye and preparing for living without their loved 
one.  
It is appropriate to show concern for the harms others may suffer and attempt to 
reduce them where possible. Since families may suffer harms related to having a loved 
one die while undergoing TS treatment for intolerable suffering the medical professionals 
ought to act to reduce their burdens where possible.  This may be done in part by  
-increasing physician and nursing counseling skills to work with families; 
- increasing staff time to allow family and staff discussions regarding the patient, 
the process of TS, and to encourage family questions; 
 
- ensuring family support if possible, via social worker and chaplain services;  
 
-allowing increased family participation in deaths and education on dying; and   
 
- offering hospital support groups to allow families to share with others who have 
been in similar situations and ventilate emotions related to the family stress 
involved in enduring a relative death by TS. 
 
 
In summary, although there are some significant potential burdens for families 
when TS is utilized at the end of patient life, many of these burdens may be mitigated or 
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eliminated by increased focus on ensuring clear communication between medical staff 
and family prior to and during the process of terminal sedation.
258
  Beneficence towards 
families, even when it came in the last few days of the patient‘s life, would be a result of 
allowing TS in the current standard I have proposed.  This beneficence would be 
extended to more families if the TS standard were augmented in the future to encompass 
those with other progressively debilitating diseases. The benefits to families of knowing 
that the patient‘s suffering has been eliminated and the potential to witness a calm death 
may be considered, by many if not most, to be overriding benefits.   
Case Resolution:  
Allowable TS with family acting as appropriate surrogate decision maker for patient and family is 
in agreement.  Son confirms a close relationship with mother and reports similar shared religious 
views and values.  He believes that his mother would not want to continue dialysis were she able 
to evaluate her current situation and wants to relieve her obvious pain and suffering.  
 
1- Hemodialysis is life prolonging technology and may be terminated upon patient or 
appropriate surrogate request.  Betty appears to be reaching end-stage dementia illness.  
Pt. refused feeding tube when she had more capacity. Pt. appears to be suffering due to 
ongoing moaning, wincing with any movement and has obviously painful decubitus.  
2-  Pt. appears to be suffering from painful decubitus ulcers, and has high care burden to 
endure from dialysis.  Has little to no ability to interact with family members nor to 
provide input as to her current desires.  Pt. had earlier independently refused artificial 
feeding and will surely die from malnutrition without additional nutrition.   
3- Current fever could be harbinger of death. Would be ethical to discontinue IVAB if family 
desires, or to provide if short course to see if improvement is possible or may have been 
already completed.  Regardless, would anticipate death in 10-14 days after withdrawal of 
dialysis, death could be sooner due to poor nutritional state and if no IVAB are provided 
for the infection.   
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 CHAPTER 5 
 
 ETHICAL BENEFITS AND HARMS TO HEALTHCARE 
PROFESSIONALS 
 
 Case example:  
 
  Donald is a 88yo retired attorney, he is married, Catholic and has severe cardiomyopathy, CHF, 
and COPD. He is currently hospitalized in ICU on a dopamine drip to keep blood pressure stable and Bi-
Pap for positive lung pressure and oxygen. He will need to go on the ventilator soon if things do not 
improve.  He previously made an advance directive stating that he did not want life prolonging treatments 
or CPR if it was known he was terminally ill.  Prior to admission he was on home oxygen, but independent 
and still driving. Pt. entered hospital 3 weeks ago with a pneumonia and has failed to improve despite 
aggressive antibiotics resolving the pneumonia. Lung condition has deteriorated and CHF has worsened. 
His wife is his POA, she has some dementia and does worse outside of their home environment.  The 
couple’s son died several years ago in an automobile accident.  Conversation with patient is difficult 
concerning his condition due to pain medication, anxiety medication and his difficulty breathing.  The 
patient is currently too ill to determine if he is competent to either refuse the ventilator or request TS, but 
he clearly appears to be suffering at this point. If he were to go on the vent and continue aggressive care, 
he could survive this assault of illness but it will likely be many weeks if not months before he would be 
able to wean from the vent, and nursing home placement would be likely.  The wife is crying and confused, 
stating she doesn’t know what to do, or what her husband would “really want” and states, “Doctor, do 
what you think is best”.   The doctor is Catholic and believes that everything should be done, including 
putting the patient on the ventilator. A nurse who had cared for him last year strongly disagrees and has 
been sharing her thoughts with the other nurses in the unit.  
Introduction 
 
It is appropriate that my primary concern about harm related to TS is focused on 
those most directly involved, the patient and her family, but they are not alone. Those 
attending the death - nurses, physicians, and other staff members - also deserve close 
evaluation for potential harm. Terminal sedation may provide a good death to patients 
and this knowledge can be seen as a benefit to physicians and nurses who are obligated, 
due to beneficence and compassion, to provide care to the dying.  Those who best attend 
to the sick and dying must surely do so not merely out of need for financial gain, but also 
as part of a larger calling to provide care and compassion towards others.  They witness 
firsthand what most of us seek to ignore: that we all must face our death.  When, in the 
call of a physician‘s duty, it becomes apparent that cure is no longer possible, it remains a 
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moral call for physicians to prolong life where possible (and is what the patient desires) 
and to reduce suffering. These duties are often in difficult balance with the competing 
duty of nonmaleficence, to do no harm.  
 There is little discussion of the coping skills utilized and emotional burdens borne 
by the healthcare profession when faced with patient death.  Often we hear the clichés: 
―there was nothing more we could do‖; ―it was just time‖; or ―we all have to die 
sometime‖ that healthcare professionals repeat to explain to themselves and others the 
dying of patients.  Doctors are educated early that having patients die ―is just part of if‖ 
and ―happens all the time‖. They are even told, ―You‘ll get used to it.‖ This is true in 
some aspects; the human condition is a temporary one and we all must die sometime, 
someplace, and in some way. It is easier to do your job in a hospital if you don‘t take 
every death personally; it might be impossible to do your job if you did.  Yet, having 
spent a large part of over twenty-five years working closely with physicians and nurses in 
acute care hospitals, I know that it does affect you.  I‘ve witnessed and at times joined in 
the tears when patients have died, either expectedly or unexpectedly.   
 How someone dies matters, at least sometimes and these memories often affect 
those who are providing care. This is why it is important that we attempt to evaluate what 
affect death with TS may have, not just upon the patients and families but also, upon 
health care professionals.  To do this I will first establish the lack training most 
physicians obtain in death and dying skill sets, share physician attitudes specifically 
concerning withholding and withdrawal of treatment and explain how Mark Bilton has 
attempted to evaluate the cognitive disjuncture between the logic and emotions of 
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physicians when removing life support from patients.
259
  Next, I will explore physician 
attitudes towards various end-of-life treatments, including TS.  The emotional burden of 
nurses who participate in TS, and their special concerns, will be iterated as well since 
they are the ones most closely caring for those who die. I will next evaluate concerns 
related to litigation.  Then I will  make the argument that the way care is currently 
provided in hospitals with the dual mandates of managed care and evidence based 
practice have changed the milieu of healthcare in the last 20 years and may impact the 
provision of TS in either positive or negative ways.  Lastly I will address issues of 
personal conscience.       
Problem Number One….Lack of Training in Care of the Dying 
 
 The SUPPORT study was completed almost 20 years ago and clearly showed that 
American healthcare was not doing a great job of caring for the dying, with pain in dying 
identified as a primary concern.
260
  Since then the specialty of palliative care has 
developed and these specialists have made strides to address this deficit in providing 
specialized care to those with terminal illness. Although palliative care specialists exist, 
they remain a relatively new specialty area of medical practice and they are not available 
in all hospitals, or even all metropolitan areas.  Even when available, they are a consult 
service that many physicians do not refer to or, like hospice, the referrals may come too 
late to be of optimal benefit for anyone involved.  
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 One might believe that since death has always been a part of life and medicine, 
all physicians are trained in providing care to those who are dying.  Alternatively, one 
may have hoped that since there were numerous studies done in the mid-to-late 1990‘s 
following the SUPPORT study looking at various issues surrounding care of the dying 
that it would have prompted immense changes in our care of the dying.
261
 Sadly, neither 
has come true with the notable exception of the burgeoning of hospice organizations. As 
of 2000, only 5 of 126 medical schools in the United States offered a separate, required 
course in the care of dying patients.
262
  A study done in 1998 with a primary investigator 
from the Center to Improve Care of the Dying found that oncologist, pulmonologist or 
critical care physicians had the most frequent contact with death but that ―most 
physicians have little experience with dying, and physicians‘ experience with death has 
little effect on patient outcomes.‖263  Another study done with housestaff (medical 
residents and interns providing hospital in-patient care) found that, ―About half the 
residents described themselves as poorly prepared or not at all prepared for dealing with 
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the tasks of care after a death when they entered internship.‖264 In the same study 
researchers also found that: 
Residents recalled deaths that occurred after starting opioids and worried that they had hastened 
dying or might be blamed for contributing to the death.  Several housestaff mentioned difficulties 
with their own grief, particularly when the patients were young or when life supports were 
withdrawn.
265
 
 
 The above finding would help to explain why so many physicians would be 
hesitant to provide TS to those suffering during their dying experience. Physicians are 
like the rest of us and feel better when they are confident about the treatments and 
services and have knowledge that they are providing good medical care. The current lack 
of hospital protocols and policies to support and establish appropriate provision of 
terminal sedation restricts the ability of new residents to become trained and more 
comfortable providing this treatment.  
There exists a values conflict for physicians in end-of-life care that is difficult to 
both clearly articulate and to negotiate.  It involves in part, the difficulty in accurately 
predicting when death will occur, even given a terminal prognosis, and when to stop 
using medicine to aggressively battle death and also the emotional component with 
concerns about ―giving up‖ on your patient.  As mentioned above, almost all medical 
training is addressed to teaching how to diagnose and treat illness and very little on how 
to treat the dying.  In addressing the moral distress in palliative care, David E. Weissman, 
MD, states the values conflict includes concerns of patient comfort, autonomy, quality, 
and dignity versus perceived professional duty to preserve life, emotional impact, ethical 
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propriety, and potential malpractice risk of withholding or withdrawing life sustaining 
treatments.
266
  When the topic of TS is not one that is openly discussed and appropriate 
protocols advanced it can leave too many questions unanswered.  The option of providing 
appropriate TS may then fall into the category of ―not worth the risk‖ for a physician to 
attempt to provide this specialized treatment for those with exceptional suffering at the 
end-of-life.   
 Of course, some value conflicts might be lessened if the physician were certain 
that she was following patient wishes for end-of-life care. But, early studies show that 
patient wishes were charted less than one-third of the time in the medical record (29%) 
and that medical professionals believed treatments such as mechanical ventilation (67%), 
CPR (64%), artificial nutrition and hydration (54%), dialysis (51%), antibiotics (42%) 
and pain medication (35%) are used inappropriately at the end-of-life.
 267
  Physicians may 
not be aware of your preferences and, therefore, go with over treatments even when they 
believe such treatments may be inappropriate. This overtreatment is consistent with the 
overarching medical goal of preserving life and appropriate when one is unaware of 
patient preferences and/or the outcome is unknown.  It is also consistent with most ethical 
evaluations as being in the patient‘s best interests (to preserve life) and the most 
beneficent action when the patient and therefore the patient interests and values are 
unknown. 
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         What if you do have an advance directive? A much more recent study shows 
little improvement and that end-of-life care still depends more on the doctor you have 
than your stated desires.
268
  A recent National Institute of Health (NIH) study done in 
Pennsylvania found that variations between physicians ―attributed to intrinsic 
characteristics - such as religious beliefs, beliefs about when a patient is ‗dying,‘ beliefs 
about quality of life, and tendency to personalize patients‘ deaths - and extrinsic forces - 
such as training, role norms, experience and incentives‖269 - often determined the end-of-
life care one received.  They showed concern that:  
If the use of life-sustaining treatments depends on the doctor, then they do not - as they ought - 
depend on patient and family preferences.  The hypothesis that patients select doctors whose 
substituted judgment they endorse is tenuous given that hospital-based physicians are often 
complete strangers. 
270
 
Further,  
The literature on practice variations hypothesizes that greater uncertainty about the ―right‖ 
treatment allows physician beliefs and prevailing social norms to dictate care.  With the exception 
of brain death, there are no guidelines for the use of life-sustaining treatments for patients who 
may be near the end-of-life.
271
 
 
This can add to the confusion for physicians on when to appropriately utilize treatments 
like terminal sedation, especially when most of them have had little or no training in the 
appropriate methods for providing this treatment.  If physician practices are developed 
over time based upon hospital and community norms and beliefs on what is the ―right‖ 
thing to do then it becomes important to attempt to ascertain what those beliefs and 
attitudes are concerning end-of-life care, particularly treatments for the imminently dying 
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such as withholding and withdrawal of life sustaining treatments and terminal sedation.  
Why would physician beliefs about other end-of-life treatments affect the potential for 
harms or benefits related to TS?  Because TS involves, in part, the acceptance of death as 
imminent and the refusal or discontinuation of other life sustaining measures.  Looking at 
the research on physician attitudes concerns withholding and withdrawal of other end-of-
life treatments will allow us a baseline for assessing the effects on TS.  
Health Care Professionals Attitudes and Beliefs about End-of-Life Care  
 
 As evidenced above, while technical skills and knowledge about medicine cannot 
be underrated in health care, it is often physicians‘ beliefs that drive the care you receive 
(or do not receive) when you are dying.  The beliefs and values that physicians and 
nurses hold affect your care and are also affected by what underlying ethical beliefs they 
hold.  I will refer again to an older study done in 1993, Decisions Near the End-of-life: 
Professional Views on Life Sustaining Treatments,
272
 because I believe it highlights one 
of the primary concerns that has yet to be addressed in healthcare.  This concern is the 
disjunction between nationally accepted ethical precepts, often developed by academic 
ethicists and the ethical beliefs used in practice by doctors and nurses.  This study 
surveyed 687 physicians and 759 nurses on their views concerning end-of-life care.  
Almost half (47%) stated that they had acted against their conscience in providing care to 
the terminally ill, this included 70% of housestaff, 50% of nurses and over a third of 
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medical and surgical attending (38%, 34%).
273
  Most believed that they provided 
treatments that were overly burdensome to their patients.   
The researchers also investigated medical caregivers‘ views on key ethical issues 
such as patient rights to refuse treatment and found 87% in agreement with patient refusal 
rights and similar (87%) agreement that ―to allow patients to die by forgoing or stopping 
treatment is ethically different from assisting in their suicide.‖274  That is reassuring but 
other findings give reason for concern.  Virtually all practicing ethicists are aware of the 
shift towards moral evaluation of specific treatments based upon determinations of the 
burdens or benefits of proposed treatment as perceived from the viewpoint of the patient 
or surrogate.  Surprisingly, ―No one in (the) subsample explicitly used the benefits and 
burdens formulation advanced in the literature.‖275 For those working in hospital care and 
included in the survey, ―with few professional differences (between nurses, housestaff, 
medical and surgical attending), 74% reported that (it is) the distinction between 
extraordinary measures and ordinary treatments‖ that is helpful in making termination of 
treatment decisions.
276
 This proportion had dropped to only 69% in a similar study 
looking at the same issue in 2000.
277
  This belief can have marked affect on decisions 
related to the provision of nutrition and hydration.  It was apparent in the related item 
where 42% believed that ―even if life supports such as mechanical ventilation and 
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dialysis are stopped, food and water should always be continued.‖278  If one believes that 
food and water should always be given, it would then include those who elected TS. This 
belief could prompt the use of more artificial nutrition and hydration being given to those 
who would utilize TS thus artificially prolonging their death.   
 Similarly concerning was the finding that only 34% overall, agreed that, ―there is 
no ethical [emphasis in the original] difference between forgoing (not starting) a life 
support measure and stopping it once it has been started.‖279  This means most 
respondents believed that withdrawing treatment is ethically different than deciding not to 
start a treatment.  This erroneous belief was unchanged in a 2000 study.
280
  Potential 
results could be some patients not getting ―trial periods‖ for treatments that may be 
beneficial to them as well as allowing some patients to be ―stuck‖ on medical treatments 
that they may not have wanted.  It could also result in appropriate patients being 
prohibited from obtaining TS because it may involve the withdrawal of various life 
supporting treatments, including nutrition and hydration.  Follow-up interviews with a 
small subset of respondents identified some reasons for believing withdrawal of treatment 
was ethically worse included uncertainty about what the law, ethics, and respective 
professional standards were, as well as:  
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psychological discomfort with actively stopping a life-sustaining intervention; discomfort with the 
public nature of the act, which might occasion a lawsuit from disapproving witnesses even if the 
decision were legally correct; and fear of sanction by peer review boards.  Moreover, some of the 
physicians expressed discomfort about openly soliciting patients‘ views on what would constitute 
an acceptable quality of life
281
 
 
The early Solomon, et al., study recommended bioethicists increase education to 
practitioners about national ethics guidelines. Unfortunately, as was apparent in the 2000 
Dickenson study, there was little change in the attitudes and beliefs of health care 
professionals concerning how to evaluate end-of-life care options or on differences 
between withholding or withdrawing care at the end-of-life.  I suspect a new study would 
still show little movement in practitioners‘ ethical beliefs.  This leads Dickenson to 
conclude, ―We need to know more about why practitioners differ from bioethicists, and 
from each other, in their attitudes towards decisions near the end-of-life.‖282   
Cognitive Dissonance in Withdrawal of Care  
 
 In efforts to better understand the differences between practitioners and 
bioethicists, Mark Bilton and Stuart Finder undertook a closer philosophical investigation 
of the moral experience of physicians when withdrawing ventilator care and the 
―boundary between the cognitive and the performative as experienced in the acts of 
withdrawing medical interventions.‖283 This is a crucial component to attempt to 
understand since many who undergo, or would be appropriate to undergo TS, do so prior 
to or concurrent with removal from ventilator support.  In attempting to define the 
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conflicting emotions between what one may know is the ―right thing‖ to do and how it 
feels to do it, Bilton & Finder write:  
Inescapable ambiguity often characterizes the acts associated with end-of-life decisions. For 
example, in the attempt to distinguish between treating pain and killing, the appeal to the rule of 
double effect-while an attempt to chose the ‗right‘ words, or identify an appropriate rationale- 
does not transform, nor alleviate the moral ambiguity contained in these situations.  Caught in the 
transition between treating illness and caring for the dying, and confronted with feelings that one 
might be killing, the anguish of caregivers - in particular, nurses, physicians, and others - can 
become especially acute in large part because such ambiguity cannot be easily dismissed or 
avoided.
284
  
 
 
This may illuminate why even though bioethicists may claim that there is moral 
equivalence in the withholding and withdrawal of care to those actually doing the work, it 
feels worse to withdraw.   
Bilton and Finder correctly identify these feelings as an appropriate moral issue 
for further ethical study but admit difficulty in attempts to truly understand the 
differences for others between the moral experiences of withholding or withdrawing. The 
moral anguish regarding concerns about how one feels about being the one  responsible to 
withdraw certain treatments is, I believed, shared with concerns that many health 
professionals have concerning the provision of terminal sedation. ―Involvement in 
situations of dying and death are reflexive for all involved, reverberating to and with the 
moral experience of each participant, in distinctive ways quite as much as each 
participant‘s experience has its own kind of effect on the other clinical participants.‖285   
Part of this experience is an attempt to understand that it is the patient who will face and 
directly experience death and we cannot be objective about that for them.   
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What does it mean to be the one responsible for saying, ―We need to stop medical 
treatments‖ or in the case of TS, ―We are going to sedate your family member until death 
occurs?‖  In terms of the boundaries of relationships and changes, this is a unique 
situation, to say the least.  Deciding upon TS would have the same outcome as 
withdrawal of ventilator support with the important outcome, as Bilton and Finder note 
―that among the possible futures for that individual - right there in front of you - he or she 
has no future other than death (whether that occurs immediately after withdrawal, a few 
minutes or hours later, or the next day; death is the result).‖286  In the case of TS, the 
physician could feel like the one responsible for elimination of a patient‘s consciousness 
and ability to interact with other humans ever again once TS was initiated.  This feeling 
may persist even when doctors have the intellectual knowledge that they are following 
patient wishes and even though death would result as a consequence of the underlying 
disease process and withdrawal of nutrition and hydration. The biographical interaction 
and participation in communicating with others would end for the patient as soon as 
sedation started with the physician‘s orders.  
Bilton and Finder attempt to unpack the cognitive dissonance in these situations 
as having to do with when you recognize that the role you are in (such as physician and 
healer) leads you to a role experience (futile care situations or intolerable suffering) that 
exceeds your usual role (being unable to heal or required to act to allow death).  These 
difficult situations do not have easy solutions. Bilton and Finder recommend, rather than 
cutting off discussion of the difficulty that exists both in actions and feelings that one 
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find, ―a vocabulary, some way to talk about and acknowledge the astonishment, even 
awe, in this sort of experience‖.287    
This finding, ―a vocabulary‖, seems an intuitively right solution yet one that 
Bilton and Finder leave for others to resolve.  Once again, it seems that it is the 
communication about death, allowing, assisting, easing or removing one‘s direct 
consciousness of it happing to them, that is too often left too little discussed with those 
most closely involved. Family members often seem unaware that the option of ‗not doing 
everything‘ is even available or suffer guilt for being the ones to suggest such an option 
to the doctors in charge.  TS allows death to occur, it is not intended to hasten this 
occurrence, merely to relieve the patient of her conscious suffering as death occurs.  
Society is currently very open about discussing the many problems in healthcare today 
and it tops many political agendas. Yet, openly discussing the possibility of perhaps not 
extending someone‘s dying experience still seems taboo.288  
There are many options for progress; I believe more open discussion of limiting 
or removing treatments to allow death to occur for terminal patients in a compassionate 
manner ought to be encouraged. Even among health care professionals these discussions 
are sheltered, whispered with an almost secretive air, and an almost palpable hesitance to 
be ‗the one‘ to bring up allowing death to occur, as if talking too loudly about death 
might bring it about much more often.  I doubt that this is the case.  Allowing open 
discussion for physicians and nurses on how it feels to participate in TS could demystify 
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the practice and works towards congruence between what ethicists promote as moral and 
what practitioners believe is true by allowing airing of concerns and debriefing. The 
inclusion of ethics committee members in this discussion would further approach this 
goal.   
For both the general public and hospital staff, open discussion of what exactly 
constitutes TS is needed.  Fear and myths commonly accompany new and rarely used 
practices, open discussion about the ethical differences in intention and methods will go 
far to limit the current fears (of promoting euthanasia or hastening death) associated with 
TS. Open discussion about death and dying issues will help to reduce the taboo character 
and restore death and discussion of death back towards its essential nature - a natural 
event we all must face.  
Attitudes towards TS Specifically and Emotional Burdens of Healthcare Workers 
 
If open discussion is not promoted in healthcare practice when TS is utilized, 
other harms may increase for those workers involved. One of the possible harms that may 
increase due to TS is that it may increase the emotional burdens that our healthcare 
professionals carry.  A study published in 2004 found that although 93% of physicians 
polled said that there were conditions under which they would use TS, almost 45% 
reported that there were conditions where it would violate the physician‘s personal 
religious beliefs, professional ethics, or believed it was inconsistent with a physician‘s 
role of preserving life.
 289
 Although this was a small, single-state study (fewer than 600 
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polled in New Jersey), it highlights the issue that some physicians are experiencing 
conflict between acceptance of TS as a legitimate method for treating intractable end-of-
life suffering and their personal and professional belief systems.  In the same study, ―Of 
those who used terminal sedation, 64% agreed it can be used as covert euthanasia, as 
compared to 71% of those who had not used terminal sedation.‖290  This fairly recent 
study can also be interpreted to illuminate that there still does not exist many (if any) 
clear policies or protocols for physicians to follow to justify their orders and actions as 
patient directed beneficence authorized by the patient or appropriate surrogate.  The lack 
thereof may leave them open to the misinterpretation of their actions by fellow 
professionals or others.  These conflicts can lead to moral distress and burnout, two 
factors which can negatively affect patient care and lead to reduction in qualified 
healthcare workers.  Concerns about potential harm to healthcare workers and burnout 
are not restricted to physicians.  In fact these potential harms may be greater for nursing 
staff that have less decision making control and often must carry out the medication 
orders involved in decisions to allow terminal sedation.  
In our hospitals and many others, nurses often are the ones carrying out the TS 
mediation orders.  They often follow orders for TS even when they may not understand 
or support the decision, and this can lead to emotional harm.
291
 The pressures of 
providing quality end-of-life care in a pluralistic society is a challenging aspect of 
nursing care and moral distress is becoming an issue of notice in nursing practice.  Moral 
distress does not only affect those providing TS, but the effects may be accentuated in 
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those providing TS. In the case example to start this chapter one can easily imagine 
heated discussions amongst nurses at the station.  Nurses are affected by the care 
decisions physicians make and have definite perceptions on whether or not they agree 
with a physician order as being towards optimal patient benefit.  
 In one of the largest studies in Japan done by Morita, ―Emotional Burden of 
Nurses in Palliative Sedation Therapy”, one of the factors associated with high emotional 
burden was nurse-perceived insufficient time for caring for patients.
292
 Other notable 
factors which may indicate emotional harms to caregivers associated with TS include 
nurse-perceived inadequate coping with their own grief, belief that sedation would hasten 
death, and personal values contradictory to sedation therapy.
293
  Often their input on end-
of-life decisions and education about TS policies is lacking and may not only be harmful 
to them but also to their ability to provide compassionate end-of-life care to those dying. 
Cynda Rushton addresses the ethics of caregiver suffering and states, ―Enforcing rules 
and policies that discount the role of nurses or other health professionals in decision-
making processes renders them powerless, suppresses their values, and undermines their 
capacity for compassion.‖294  
An extensive literature search did not discover any specific research on American 
nurses‘ experiences with utilizing terminal sedation.  But, several countries who allow 
practices of euthanasia, physician assisted suicide and/or terminal sedation offered 
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nursing perspectives on these end-of-life care options. Once again, a Morita et al. study in 
Japan was one of the first large investigations into how TS affects nursing staff in a 
survey of over 3000 nurses who care for the dying. In Emotional Burden of Nurses in 
Palliative Sedation Therapy, she found a significant number of nurses felt serious 
emotional burden.
295
  ―Thirty percent reported that they wanted to leave their current 
work situation due to sedation-related burden (answering occasionally, often, or 
always).‖296  Some of the other factors Morita found that contribute to feelings of burden 
related to TS were shorter clinical experience, perceived lack of time to care for patients, 
lack of understanding about TS between physicians and nurses, and lack of team 
conferencing opportunities, as well as conflicts with personal values.  
A study in 2007, in The Netherlands found conflicting beliefs of nursing staff as 
to whether TS accelerated death or was close to the practice of euthanasia, even when 
they also believed that TS contributed positively to the quality of the patient‘s dying.297 
Nurses are also concerned that physicians are not prepared to listen to their opinions 
about terminally ill patients. This concern was found in 50% of the nurses who completed 
a Belgian study on nurses‘ attitudes towards end-of-life care (which included dying with 
terminal sedation) in 2009.
298
 As I have stated earlier, it is of utmost importance that any 
decision for TS be supported by all team members (this includes other interdisciplinary 
members such as social workers and therapists) prior to initiation.  Nurses emotional 
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distress would be greatly increased if they are not in agreement with the provision of TS, 
yet they are often not included in full in the discussions between patients/families and 
physicians on direction of care.  This may be because it happens ―on the fly‖ during 
physician rounding or due to nursing turnover and at shift rotation times.   
 Regardless of precipitating reasoning, it will be important to reduce the 
emotional distress of nursing staff and to include them more fully in creating hospital 
policy regarding TS initiation. Hospitals may also allow those nurses (and other team 
members) who hold objections to providing TS to be reassigned to other patients, similar 
to what is done when nurses object to assisting with pregnancy terminations. The 
incidence of TS occurring on a particular ward will likely remain low, since there are 
usually only a few deaths a week on any particular floor and I would not anticipate a 
reassignment to be unduly difficult.  This difficulty in reassignment could likely be offset 
by increased employee satisfaction when their values or feelings are respected by the 
organization.  
A small, descriptive, exploratory study about TS was completed in Canada with a 
sample of palliative care nurses.
299
  This study focused on nurses‘ perceptions on the 
utilization of terminal sedation.  ―Nurses emphasized that their comfort level with 
implementing [terminal] sedation depended on their personal knowledge of the patient.  
The essence of knowing the patient as a person is a central aspect of nursing practice.‖300  
This is a key concept to which I will return later in this chapter when discussing how the 
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current changes in hospital care may affect the harms to workers when providing terminal 
sedation.  
Overall, in the surveys looking at nurse perceptions when involved with provision 
of terminal sedation, it appears that, although most nurses believe TS allows patients a 
‗good death‘, they are often involved in conflicts or experience emotional distress when 
there is a lack of clear communication or involvement of the interdisciplinary team in the 
decision making process to initiate TS.
301
  Therefore, again, one must emphasize that 
extensive and clear communication is essential to the provision of TS, not only for 
patients and families, but also for the healthcare workers involved.   
Fear of Litigation 
Despite the best intentions of many physicians and nurses to provide 
compassionate care to those who are dying in accordance with the principles of 
beneficence, nonmaleficence and the autonomy of patient‘s wishes, careers have been 
destroyed by claims of wrongdoing related to end-of-life care.  This is a realistic potential 
harm to be incurred by healthcare workers involved in TS.  It is of little matter that rarely 
do the claims of wrong-doing ever prove successful in court.  Once charges have been 
leveled and the litigation begins, it is often the beginning of the end for either nurses or 
physicians involved in the dispute.  The court of public opinion can be swayed by the 
mere hint of scandal and caregivers are labeled with a scarlet letter warning others that 
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they are not to be trusted.  Frequently charges are not even brought by those most closely 
involved with the case in question, but rather come from others who may be on the edges 
of the case or not even involved.   
Registered nurses, such as Sharon LaDuke, from Ogdensburg, NY, have been 
prosecuted when acting in accordance to MD order, with family support and following a 
patient‘s advance directive.302  Sharon was an intensive care nurse who was following 
physician orders to provide narcotic pain medication to keep a patient comfortable 
following removal of the ventilator.  The patient had an advance directive stating she did 
not want to remain on a ventilator; family was aware and supportive of her wishes and 
authorized the removal with the caveat that ―she be kept comfortable and free of pain‖.  
Sharon was formally accused of euthanasia by a hospital nursing administrator and fired 
from her job.  Although she was eventually vindicated, it was only following a lengthy 
and prolonged civil lawsuit.
303
  
The television show 60 Minutes also highlighted a case in March 2002, where Dr.  
Robert Weitzel was also accused of murdering terminally ill patients.
304
 He, too, was 
eventually acquitted but in the mêlée lost his career, savings, and reputation.  Dr. Lloyd 
Stanley Naramore faced similar accusation related to ending life support and was 
convicted in 1992.
305
  His case has been documented on an A&E cable show and 
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highlights a juror stating that he determined that Dr. Naramore was guilty because he 
didn‘t like his personality and didn‘t want him practicing medicine.306  This physician 
was sent to a maximum security prison in Kansas where he remained until a 1998 court 
of appeals reviewed the case and reversed his conviction.  Further, the justices expressed 
their indignation and stated  
…With no direct evidence of criminal intent, it is highly disturbing that testimony by such an 
impressive array of apparently objective medical experts, who found  the defendant‘s actions to be 
not only noncriminal , but medically appropriate, can be dismissed as ‗unbelievable‘ and not even 
capable of generating reasonable doubt.
307
  
 
These are true harms to medical practitioners that come from false or untrue 
accusations. Most accusations are unfounded but vindication is little salve to a shattered 
career and life.  It is of little wonder that those who work with the dying tread so 
carefully and would want to eliminate any and all concerns or appearances of hastening a 
dying patient‘s death.  Although there will always be the ill-advised family member, 
rogue staff member or religious zealot out to make wild accusations, it seems to happen 
more often in cases where patients are dying.  
 One approach to rectification is to again ensure a clear hospital policy on TS, 
adequate communication and education on all end-of-life care, including withdrawal of 
aggressive treatments and terminal sedation with medication.  These discussions need to 
include all family members and all staff involved in patient care whenever possible.  This 
will allow more opportunity to answer questions, discuss possible alternatives, and when 
necessary to delay making any actions.  The inescapable potential harm in this tactic is 
that it may increase patient suffering through the delays required to follow the above 
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recommendations and the time involved in seeking consensus.  Or worse, the lack of 
consensus may prevent patients who ought to be eligible for TS from receiving it.
308
 This 
may be a case of conflicting principles between what is most beneficent for the patient 
verses what is least maleficent for the physician and care providers.    
 Other countries have included these factors in their protocols and policy. The 
formal policy developed in Belgium demands both a waiting period and interdisciplinary 
involvement. Claessens, et al., state that, ―A 24-hour period between the request for 
terminal sedation and its final execution [is needed]. This period gives the patient and 
family the opportunity to consider fully the treatment, perhaps make certain [final] 
arrangements, and part from loved ones.‖309  
And regarding the interdisciplinary requirement,  
The decision to initiate palliative sedation is always taken at a multidisciplinary level. It can never 
be an individual decision taken by one member of the team alone.  The patient and entire team 
must agree once all attempts to treat the refractory symptoms have been made.  The family must 
be closely involved or at least be fully informed of the decision process.
310
  
 
 
It may be possible to shorten the time period between patient request and TS if that 
patient has made his desire for TS known in advance to his family and physician should a 
situation develop where the treatment would be appropriate. Interdisciplinary team 
meetings as a routine morning staffing update could encourage early identification of TS 
as a possibility and allow discussion of concerns early in the hospitalization. The 
inclusion of desire for TS, if appropriate, could be added into an advance directive form 
as requested treatment, similar to a patient refusal of other treatments such as ventilator 
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support or dialysis.  One may consider TS as assumed to be requested if the patient has 
checked the option for ―all care related to pain control and comfort measures to be 
continued‖ but given concerns of clarity and since TS removes a patient‘s consciousness, 
I would endorse an additional statement of patient desire for TS be added to her advance 
directive.  
Physicians may be left in a most difficult situation when attempting to discern 
what is in the patient‘s best interest.  Consider for example, the physician in the case at 
the beginning of this chapter where the patient values are unable to be discerned from 
neither the patient himself nor the family present.  
Systems-Based Practice  
 
Contemporary medical practice in a hospital environment is a complex situation 
to examine.  I will argue that the current focus on systems-based practice may negatively 
affect physicians‘ ability to provide optimal end-of-life care; this includes the option of 
TS, unless explicit steps are taken to prevent this from occurring.  Reduction in the ability 
to provide quality end-of-life care may result in additional harms to physicians‘ 
emotional role fulfillment. Role fulfillment is the sense of accomplishment one obtains 
from doing their job and believing they are doing it well and for good reasons. Positive 
role fulfillment combats burnout and emotional distress while negative role fulfillment 
contributes to burnout and emotional distress.  
Since the 1950‘s modern medical care has made a dramatic shift.  In times past, 
the family doctor handled almost all of his patient‘s care needs, and trusting relationships 
developed over years of learning about one‘s health conditions.  Currently, if you have 
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any ―conditions‖ at all you likely see a specialist to manage that disease and often one 
may have many specialists to see each year in addition to a family doctor.  If 
hospitalization is required then you may not see any of your personal specialists nor your 
family doctor but rather, a hospitalist who only sees current hospital inpatients.  This 
allows both primary care doctors and specialists to see more chronic care patients in their 
offices and the hospitalists who specialize in acute health care to focus on the more 
urgent needs of those patients who are hospitalized.  
Where physicians used to be in private practice and had individual focus on the 
treatment of those persons and families who were under her care, nowadays many, if not 
most, work in practice groups, or are employees of large health care organizations. This 
is what is termed Systems-Based practice (SBP).  Systems-based practice focuses on 
looking at the interrelationship of the complex systems of individuals, systems and 
networks and the conflicting goals involved in meeting healthcare needs.
311
  
Physicians work as part of larger healthcare systems and may interact with others 
who are part of the same or different larger systems at times.  The physician, employed 
by the hospital or HMO, now has a primary focus on the organizational mission to 
provide healthcare to the community rather than the individual patient‘s benefit.312  
Physicians‘ groups are responsible for groups of enrollees. This often translates into 
doctors ‗on call‘ for the day seeing whomever comes in rather than allowing individual 
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practice relationships to develop by allowing patients access to the same physician 
routinely.  
Patient records are mostly electronic and allow data to be transferred easily. This 
allows each successive physician to add to patient progress notes or read past history.  
This change in methods has, as predicted, reduced insurance costs and allowed physicians 
paid in capitated HMO arrangements to see more patients and thus increase their income 
and spend fewer hours on call.  However, it has left some physicians feeling more 
dissatisfied and less like patient advocates.
313
  Importantly, this shift in physician practice 
(seeing more patients and spending less time per patient) was motivated not by 
physicians and surely not by patients, but by the large group insurance providers to 
reduce costs.   
The Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) began the 
Outcome Project in 1999 to launch six general areas of expertise or core competencies 
that resident training programs needed to ensure physicians were prepared to practice in 
this new environment.  Many were the expected competencies in patient care, medical 
knowledge, practice based learning, and interpersonal communication that we have all 
come to expect from our doctors.  Two new competencies were added, that of 
professionalism which includes ―a commitment to ethical principles pertaining 
to…business practices‖314 and systems-based practice.  Business practices includes things 
like cost containment as well as methods to serve the uninsured and knowledge about 
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how prescribing and ordering practices affect the larger system; these responsibilities are 
new additions to the physician role. Many now believe that these changes will affect the 
patient-physician relationship. ―Taken together, these two competencies move 
professionalism from its traditional focus on the individual physician to focus on how the 
individual physician interacts with, and is influenced by and through, the systems that 
deliver healthcare.‖315 These competencies now require the physician to assume some 
responsibility for the appropriate functioning of the system as well.   
Physicians are now routinely hired by hospital systems to work solely within the 
hospital inpatient environment.  These hospitalist doctors are employees of the hospital 
and charged with providing care for those patients admitted to their service only during 
the acute care hospital stay.  Often, these are recently graduated medical school residents 
who are well aware of the requirements of systems-based practice.  They do not expect to 
develop a lingering relationship with the patients that they serve; the goal is effective 
treatment and discharge from the hospital.  
"Increasingly in healthcare, relationships are formed at the point of illness."
316
  
For those dying this means they may not meet the physician directing their death until 
their last hospital admission. What sorts of potential harms may occur due to this new 
method of healthcare practice? I can foresee potential harm to the physician-patient 
relationship and also harms to the physician providing care. If upon meeting a patient it is 
apparent that this patient will not survive and you will be the last doctor to care for her, 
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one can easily imagine that, even if only for emotional self-protection, it would be easier 
to distance oneself from developing a meaningful relationship with that patient.   
What effects may this have to those in medicine over time?  Some may fear that it 
could result in overuse of TS due to the lack of personal relationships between patients 
and hospitalists and because hospitalists are more used to having their patients die.  I do 
not see this as the likely outcome, as it has been well-documented there is a much greater 
tendency towards the overtreatment of those in the last days and weeks of life.  I will 
argue that this may affect physicians in ways that could limit TS being utilized as an 
appropriate option for some as end-of-life care.   
  A focus on atomization, begun with the advancement of medical science and 
diagnostics, has lessened in some ways; the ancient art of healing that began with 
listening to your patient. It has also allowed many physicians to escape actually being 
with patients at the time of their death. Where in days past, physicians knew death well; 
they now have a much more distant and often adversarial relationship. How has this 
manifested itself in to the patient-physician relationship?  Part of the requirement on 
Systems-Based Practice includes the use of Evidence Based Medicine (EBM) which 
supports using treatments that have been proven by empirical evidence to be most 
effective in treating the ailment you are addressing.  This has lead to great advances in 
treatment of things such as heart attack, heart cauterizations, stroke and GI bleeding, to 
name just a few.  EBM and critical care pathways lead physicians and nursing staff to 
precision care that has been empirically validated to reduce both cost and waste while 
allowing the best potential for good medical outcomes.  It works well for specific 
identifiable disease processes or treatments.  Most of these pathways are built into the 
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Medicare Diagnostic Related Groups (DRG‘s) that control hospital and physician 
payment for caring for those who are admitted under each diagnosis.  Hospitals attempt 
to reach the JACHO standards to become a ―center of excellence‖ verifying outstanding 
compliance to specific illness pathways and meeting patient care and payment goals.  
This can be a major marketing tool for the hospital system since patients who can choose 
would want to go to the ―Center for excellence in heart surgery‖, for example, over 
merely the ―other hospital.‖   
Those working in hospital environments now routinely accept that a hip 
replacement is a three-day DRG.  With EBM one expects patients to be up in the 
afternoon following surgery, in the hall on day 2 and out the door on day 3 going home. 
If a patient is not moving along fast enough and passes their DRG days, then they are 
usually transferred to a lower level of care such as a nursing home.  There are books and 
logs listing the time and payment allowed for each diagnosis and no one is paid if a 
patient stays longer without appropriate and verified complication codes.
317
  There are 
physician review boards for exceptional cases but the time and effort involved to reach a 
review level make it a path less taken in many cases. It‘s easier to follow the EBM 
pathways and move forward and move the patients through the system. Physicians are 
rated as to how well they can follow prescribed EBM pathways and keep down in-patient 
hospital days. Moreover, if they fail to keep within the guidelines they may be released 
from the insurance companies covered physicians list if they are too much of an ―outlier‖ 
in costs or inpatient days.   
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Sadly, dying has a much less predictable pathway.  Dying remains a unique and 
individual trail that one must meander along. I have yet to hear of any hospital vying to 
become a ―center of excellence for dying‖.  Obviously all EBM has failed when your 
patient dies. Another problem is that there is no DRG for dying and this complicates the 
process when physicians are attempting to get a patient admitted for end-of-life care. 
While there is one for uncontrollable symptoms, if your symptom (dyspnea, pain, 
bleeding, or vomiting, etc.) can be controlled, unless there is another new problem, once 
under control, a patient is expected to be discharged.  No matter that one is actively 
dying.  If there is nothing that can be specifically coded and fixed, there is ―a problem 
with the admission.‖  If the patient is admitted for symptom control and it comes under 
control but the patient is actively dying or too weak to be moved the doctor may be 
informed by the insurance company or case manager that her patient ―fails to meet 
criteria‖ for continuing stay.318  Thus, the doctor is caught between doing what is best for 
their specific patient and what is best for the business of the hospital. The new ACGME 
competencies require that they be committed to both.  It may come down to where the 
closest relationship is established between the doctor and patient or doctor and hospital. 
Or, it may be decided upon by physician practice group norms, or how strongly the case 
manager pushes for discharge, or what sort of bed crunch the floor is having that day.  
The ancient priority of physician-patient relationship now has a great deal of competition.  
  Has the era of the specialists, who compartmentalize patient illness into specific 
fixable or non-fixable ailments eliminated or reduced the function of caring?  When your 
                                                 
318
 There is coding for patients who are unstable for transfer but even then one is expected to be 
documenting what is being done to attempt to stabilize those patients.  For many dying, there may be 
nothing more, medically, to be done to counter the march towards death, or those efforts may not be the 
wishes or appropriate for the patient.  
 169 
pulmonologist is concerned only about listening to your lungs and your oncologist about 
beating your cancer who is there to listen to your heart? Not the beating in your chest, but 
the aching of your soul when facing death, a pain that is only cured with compassion. 
Multiple studies show that residents receive little training on caring for the dying patient 
or coping with death.
319
 They have advanced skills as medical technicians but may lack 
the simple compassion required to sit silently beside a dying patient.  How has this lack 
of training in coping with death affected the satisfaction of care providers? One can 
surmise that it might be decreased and further, this increased their ethical burdens as, 
Residents recalled deaths that occurred after starting opioids and worried that they had hastened 
dying or might be blamed for contributing to the death.  Several housestaff mentioned difficulties 
coping with their own grief, particularly when the patient was young or when life supports were 
withdrawn.
320   
 
 There is reason to believe that harms do occur as stated by Stanley Pantilat, et al.,  
Thus, the technology of healthcare, by fragmenting its delivery among a spectrum of specialists 
and codifying its view of illness in the form of ciphers and graphs, created as an unintended by-
product the patient as stranger.  Such detachment of the life from the illness of the patient has as 
its effect suffering.
321  
 
 Harms to the ancient physician-patient relationship seem apparent due to systems based 
practice and the advancement of specialist care. The primary harm being the lack of 
―relationship‖ when relationship infers a mutual caring that has developed over time.  
This is not possible in many situations today when patients are assigned to whatever 
hospitalist happens to be ―on‖ when they are admitted.   
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These harms may result in increased emotional burdens for both sides (primary 
care physicians and hospitalists) of physicians practicing in SBP.  Further, it may also 
affect the appropriate provision of end-of-life treatments such as TS to the persons for 
whom it would be appropriate. The hospitalist forced to care for dying patients that they 
have had no prior relationship with may be reluctant to allow TS due to fears of litigation 
if there is any misunderstanding of orders by any family members or hospital staff.  They 
may also feel a need to try additional treatments to reduce patient suffering since they 
have not been involved in the past attempts to resolve intolerable symptoms, thereby 
potentially lengthening the time that the patient is forced to suffer the intolerable 
symptoms. Or, if they do allow TS to relieve patient suffering they may have lingering 
concerns about either giving up too soon or hastening death with the use of opiates if the 
patient dies quickly.  Either way, they may have to face case managers, hospital 
administrators, and insurance companies who will require justification for inpatient 
hospitalization for patients who are not undergoing any diagnostic procedures and are not 
meeting acuity of care needs (utilizing only one IV medication)  and once the patient has 
been ‗stabilized‘ they will press for discharge regardless of nearness of death.  
If patients linger prior to dying there may be the dreaded ―unreimbursed days‖ the 
hospital system must absorb for those undergoing TS and physicians may be asked to 
―justify‖ the additional days by utilization review boards. Prior to the 1980‘s there was 
not such an intense focus on the number of hospitalized days and physicians were given 
great leeway in keeping patients in the hospital. With the advent of DRG‘s patients must 
now meet in-patient acuity to have each hospital day reimbursed. Since close monitoring 
of IV medications is required during TS to ensure that the patient remains adequately 
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sedated without breakthrough of noxious symptoms, I believe that continued physician 
monitoring is appropriate in a hospital setting and that reimbursement ought to be 
allowed for terminal care to the dying.  
  Finally, on the other side of the systems based care issue is the primary care 
physician who loses the opportunity to provide end-of-life care to the very patients that 
they have been following in their practice with a terminal illness. They may suffer from 
feelings of having abandoned their duty or failing to complete final care for their patients 
and families.  Alternatively, those primary care physicians who are unprepared to cope 
with the death of their patients will be relieved from providing TS and other end-of-life 
care.  
 Especially for the hospitalist assigned, the final hospitalization for a terminal 
patient with intolerable suffering, it appears the current use of TS is fraught with potential 
problems. This may encourage them to not utilize TS even when appropriate.
322
 Given 
that hospitalist can expect to care for more dying patients, advanced training in hospice 
and comfort care would be appropriate. Would all of these issues be resolved if the 
primary care physician were following or involved during the last hospitalization?  Surely 
not, TS is still a treatment for refractory suffering and not to be used as routine end-of-
life care.  Intentionally medicating a patient to unconsciousness while knowing they will 
die soon from underlying illness will and ought to prompt moral hesitancy.  
There are times when the primary care physician, although not the admitting 
hospital physician, can be involved. They are able to offer counsel to both the hospitalist 
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about the patient‘s history and wishes and also to provide that compassionate relationship 
interaction to offer closure to families, reassuring them that TS was an appropriate 
method to allow a peaceful death for the patient.  The point is merely that the current 
focus on SBP does not encourage the sorts of relationships that would easily support the 
provision of TS since physicians may not have a good understanding of patients‘ or 
families‘ desires for end-of-life care or how to provide TS treatment.  
 EBM will also be complicated by attempting to develop a specific empirically 
validated formula for TS.  This task, although difficult, would be possible since most 
protocols currently state a starting dose of Midazolam of 10mg, and then increasing by 
1.5 to 2mg./hr. titrations until patient appears to be resting comfortably.  This dosage can 
then be adjusted by physician orders until the patient is resting comfortably and showing 
no outward signs of distress.  This ongoing titration is best done in the hospital since it is 
not uncommon for patients to require ongoing adjustments of medications due to 
breakthrough distress and dosage requires direct physician involvement so as to not over-
medicate the patient and inadvertently hasten death.  The time until death will continue to 
be variable as it is always dependent on the multiple variables of patient condition and 
disease process.   
 The potential harms from SBP and EBM will require additional work from 
physicians to resolve successfully the competing responsibilities assigned by ACGME 
regarding professionalism and SBP when utilizing TS.  I believe that it will be possible 
but will require physicians to acknowledge their coexisting priority to excellent patient 
care. This includes treating intolerable suffering at the end-of-life, and utilizing advocacy 
for those dying who require careful monitoring of medication to assure that suffering 
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does not return until they succumb from their disease.
323
  This process may not be able to 
fit into an easily codeable DRG
324
 but one would hope that it could be assessed on a daily 
basis as an exception and allowed as a billable day.  Having the clear daily assessment 
included in hospital policy and protocols for TS would assist in education of insurers to 
become aware of TS as a valid treatment for a minority of patients who experience 
intolerable suffering at the end-of-life.
325
  This process will not be an easy one to address 
and will take considerable time and effort yet the steps can be envisioned as beneficial to 
the insurance companies and the goal is worthy.  
Palliative Sedation as a Practice against Personal Conscience   
 
A final harm for physicians and nurses involved in TS is the emotional distress 
that comes from acting against one‘s personal conscience for those who do not support 
the treatment.  At times physicians may be supporting patient autonomy in providing TS 
but suffering personal distress from acting against their conscience.
326
 A recent study 
shows that factors such as religious affiliation and ethnicity may affect the end-of-life 
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decisional support one receives from physicians.
327
 The fact remains that patient 
autonomy and family pressuring may force the physician at times to go against his own 
beliefs and choose reluctantly to participate in actions to which they object. There is also 
the concern of some that medicine is designed to treat illness and promote health and 
healing and not to aid or abet the process of death. For some even the practice of 
withdrawal of medical treatments goes against the personal morals of physicians. This 
appears to be the case with the physician in our case example for this chapter.  One would 
not expect him to be forced to go against his personal religious or other moral convictions 
towards promotion of life at all costs.  His provision of care could be endorsed by the 
wife‘s request that he do what he believes is ‗best‘.  What if an Ethics Committee consult 
was called by nursing staff and the Committee endorsed withholding of ventilator care 
and TS?  
 These issues of moral distress and harm are only now beginning to be evaluated 
in health care practice.  To those physicians and nurses who have significant moral 
prohibitions against participation in TS, further education on the practice and its moral 
allowability may not change their sensibilities. They ought to be allowed to remove 
themselves from the case and find other caregivers to support patient and family wishes 
when a patient meets the requirements for allowing TS as end-of-life care.  In the case 
example for this chapter, the physician could request a second physician opinion or 
review of the case, that an Ethics Committee consult review the case for 
recommendations or that another physician take over the case.   
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A final concern relates to the perception of physicians as healers and that 
participation in TS may afford some public misperception of their identity or harm to 
their professional status or lead to litigation.  The answer to this concern is clear 
communication to all those involved and clear policies. Public education of any new 
medical treatment requires considerable time and effort to assure an accurate 
understanding of both the potential benefits and harms involved.  This process is assisted 
by the stories told by the families who have undergone the procedure or treatment and 
shared their experiences with others in the communities in which they live.  TS can 
provide valuable solace to families who have been watching a loved one suffer.  The 
decision to utilize TS is one which must be made carefully and with the support of both 
the health care professionals and families involved with appropriate education provided 
to allow clear understanding of the treatment.   
Conclusion  
 
The benefits of endorsing TS would be to allow health care professionals a sense 
of being able to offer their patients and families a peaceful and quiet death.  The skills 
required in administering sedatives and continuing to provide comfort care could endorse 
their personal satisfaction in a much needed skill set to aid those facing death.  It could 
also ease the harms of those who have been suffering moral distress due to believing they 
are torturing patients by prolonging suffering and dependence on advanced technology 
when no cure is possible. These concerns may be those similar to the nurses in the case 
example.  
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As in other areas, many of the harms can be addressed by insisting on frequent 
and clear communication amongst all involved parties.  The hospital systems and 
administration as well as insurance companies and their advocates must be somehow 
included and this will at times complicate the process of providing TS to patients.
328
  This 
fact in no way deters the beneficence of the outcome.  The new ACGME standards 
requiring physician competency in ethical business practices may even be interpreted to 
demand that physicians become better advocates at a systems level to allow dying 
patients greater access to inpatient hospitalization and care in dying.   
It is moral to show concern for the harms others may suffer and attempt to reduce 
them where possible. Since caregivers (physicians, nurses, social workers, and other 
hospital staff) may suffer harms related to providing TS treatment for intolerable 
suffering the health care professionals ought to act to reduce their burdens where 
possible.  This may be done in part by:  
-increasing professional staff (especially physician) education on working with 
those actively dying and coping with death, 
 
- increasing staff time to allow interdisciplinary discussions regarding the patient, 
the process of TS, and to encourage questions, 
 
- working to develop relationships with insurers to educate them on the practice 
and develop appropriate reimbursement, and 
 
-creation of a clear hospital policy for TS that will be followed by physicians and 
staff, This policy is to mandate interdisciplinary support for TS treatment and 
allow reassignment for those who have a conscientious objection to providing TS 
care.  
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In summary, although there are some significant potential burdens for 
professional caregivers when TS is utilized at the end of patient life, many of these 
burdens may be mitigated or eliminated by increased focus on ensuring clear 
communication and development of clear protocols.  
To resolve the case at the start of this chapter:  
Allowable TS - patient would not currently be surviving without significant medical assistance 
with 2 major organ systems involved in shut-down and prior advanced illness from 2 severe 
chronic and progressive diseases (cardiomyopathy, COPD).   
 
1) Assess if any other family or potential surrogates are available to assist this patient 
2) Hold interdisciplinary team meeting with RN, and other care providers to gather input and 
consensus on options 
3) Request Ethics Consult if no consensus is obtained and/or no additional surrogate is located* 
4) Pt. appears to be suffering from severe dyspnea 
5) Current attack of illness would be fatal without intensive medical intervention including soon 
ventilator which pt. stated he did not want.  Ethical to withdraw dopamine and withhold vent.  
6) Death would occur within hours to days without treatment 
 
* Additionally, as family is not clearly able to show competent support, I would involve the 
hospital ethics committee or an ad-hoc consultation to confirm appropriateness of withdrawal 
of aggressive measures and intensive comfort to sedation.  Physician should document wife’s 
request in quotes, also have ethics committee consult attempt to talk with her. Document and 
assure all team members are aware of treatment plan and ethics support.  Would request SW 
to work with wife to identify who her support network is and that they will be responsible for 
assisting her once husband dies.  This may all require that patient be maintained on blood 
pressure support drips and Bi-pap longer (a day or two), it also may not be possible if lung 
condition deteriorates so that he would require full vent support.   
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  CHAPTER 6 
 
 POLICY GUIDELINES AND FUTURE NEEDS  
Introduction 
 
 All medical progress deserves careful consideration of both the benefits we hope 
to obtain and the harms which may accompany this progress.  Terminal sedation is a 
medical treatment for those patients who are actively dying and whose pain and suffering 
are intractable to traditional treatments.  I have attempted to identify relevant benefits and 
harms for patients, families, and medical professionals to consider related to the practice 
of TS.  It must be acknowledged that persons will vary in their acceptance of specific 
factors as being either a benefit or a harm given their personal values and philosophical 
framework.  This allows for the benefits and harms in each situation to be judged within 
their unique circumstances prior to making a decision.  For many, I suspect that the desire 
to eliminate the overwhelming suffering of the patient will be an overriding value and the 
beneficence of allowing TS will balance concerns about the harm in elimination of the 
patient‘s consciousness or harms to others.  Since each case will be evaluated on its own 
particular merit, my inclusion of possible harms and benefits has been meant to allow a 
more complete starting point for this evaluation, and to include others than just the 
patient as possibly affected by TS.  I anticipate that the specifics evaluated in each 
situation will vary and grow as the practice continues.    
 Although terminal sedation has been utilized since the early to mid-1990‘s this 
treatment has remained controversial or misunderstood by many in healthcare and simply 
unknown to most of the general public.  This dissertation has attempted to provide a clear 
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description of the practice (including specifically how it differs from both euthanasia and 
physician assisted suicide) and to identify and clarify where potential harms not 
previously identified may exist. The goal of this effort is to assist in allowing clear 
evaluation for patients, families and medical professionals to make specific case 
determinations and to assist those in health policy development to create clear policy and 
protocol for the practice in healthcare institutions.  
 I will close this dissertation with my thoughts on why policy on TS is important.  
I will then offer two versions of initial guidelines for development of hospital policy. The 
first version will outline minimal guidelines that ought to be utilized to allow TS for 
patients who fit my standard.  The minimal guideline is based upon the recommendations 
of the American Medical Association with some modifications. This guideline is meant 
to offer relief to those who could benefit from TS while remaining clear of the concerns 
brought by those who fear TS is too closely related to PAS or euthanasia.  The guideline 
is admittedly restrictive in hopes of gaining wider societal support for a currently 
controversial practice.  
 Secondly, I will offer more moderate guidelines for policy that I hope could 
become a standard in the future. It will maintain the restrictive focus of the minimal 
guidelines for patients and offer additional education and support to others which has yet 
to be broadly provided. I view these guidelines as benefiting both patients and those 
others who may be affected by TS and importantly, also be accepted by mainstream 
society.  The moderate guidelines would mark an important step forward for allowing 
more choices in dying and offering additional supports to those involved with dying 
patients.  Even the moderate guidelines would entail changes by many parties. Many 
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organizations and entities, such as insurance companies, hospital administrations, and 
even society at large would need to make changes towards facing the denial of death, 
holding open discussions about dying, and a greater commitment towards meeting the 
needs of those who are dying.  Since increasing interest in palliative care shows concern 
about care for the dying is continuing to grow, it is reasonable to believe that my 
guidelines could become future policy. Therefore, I will explain what I believe will be 
important guidelines in development of a TS policy of the future that would better 
support patients, families, and professionals. These guidelines could gain widespread 
acceptance to allow a better death for many persons in the near future.  It is clearly a step 
in the right direction to provide patients compassionate care, beneficent treatment and 
autonomy in their dying.  Lastly, I will share ways that TS policies may progress in the 
future.   
 Why Clear Policy? 
 
It will be important to create transparent hospital policies and protocols for the 
provision of TS.  The need for clear TS policy is not only due to ethical concerns that 
appropriate patients receive the treatment but also practical concerns about the way 
hospitals operate which affect the ability to provide good care to the dying, including TS.  
Hospital staffs are routinely educated on new procedures by learning and following 
carefully written hospital policy. Staff must learn the policy and protocols written by 
doctors in patient orders to properly provide and monitor the treatment. Thus, policies 
need to include appropriate indications for treatment, drugs used, dosage administration, 
and patient monitoring during the provision of TS.  The process of creating policy and 
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staff education to advise them of the accepted protocol, will also aid in legitimizing the 
practice as an accepted end-of-life treatment.  A policy will endorse TS as an approved 
treatment offered by the hospital that has passed through the approval process of the 
various review committees and gained written approval from each level prior to being 
accepted as ‗hospital policy‘. Hospitals that allow the practice of TS without a policy risk 
encouraging the whispers of the uneducated that may suggest TS as a form of PAS and 
continue to keep this treatment controversial.  Further, policy approval will allow for 
physicians the confidence that they have administrative support for providing TS as end-
of-life treatment to their patients. Policy will also assist in limiting potential for litigation 
and clarify instances for determining if the policy was enacted incorrectly for physician 
oversight committees.   
There are, however, also drawbacks to establishing a clearly written policy for 
TS. The primary drawback is that some patients who do not easily fit into the policy 
guidelines (for example those that have a life expectancy slightly exceeding the one 
specified by the policy) will not be allowed TS and forced to endure continued suffering.  
An additional concern is that if the protocol is written too stringently - for example on 
formulary drugs used - then if a patient cannot tolerate those drugs or has allergies, they 
may not be eligible for TS using other drugs, or newer drugs not written into the protocol.  
A final drawback to policy is that due to the necessity for many levels of approval the 
policy making process can often become a lengthy one, especially if the proposed policy 
covers a controversial subject like TS. This could then deny patients access to the 
treatment while awaiting policy development.  
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Nonetheless, I view the benefits of good policy as outweighing the drawbacks and 
believe this is especially true for new treatments.  Policy is especially needed for 
treatments like TS when errors (in medications) could inadvertently lead to a hastened 
patient death.  I will now address what I believe would be a minimal standard for 
hospitals to establish to allow the provision of TS to patients.   
Minimal Policy Guidelines  
  
I have stated that TS is the appropriate and intentional use of medications to 
produce ongoing, deep unconsciousness upon three related conditions: 1) a terminal 
patient‘s (or surrogate‘s) request due to 2) intractable pain or other distressing clinical 
symptoms and  when 3) death is expected within hours or days (less than two weeks) due 
to terminal illness, injury, or disease.  This is an extremely minimal standard for when TS 
ought to be clearly ethically allowable.  In order to translate mere ethical allowability into 
policy one must then work to flesh out guidelines to describe more fully when it would be 
appropriate to enact the treatment of TS and when it is not appropriate to utilize the 
treatment following the policy developed.   
Good policy will clearly delimit who is appropriate for TS treatments and who is 
not. Since TS has been a controversial issue and has not yet gained wide support for end-
of-life care, I support a restrictive initial policy based upon a set of minimal guidelines.  
These initial minimal guidelines have a focus exclusively on the patient. They are 
admittedly conservative in nature.  The goal of the minimal guidelines is to allow TS for 
those patients who clearly meet a minimal set of guidelines to receive TS as an 
appropriate and acceptable treatment for intractable pain and suffering at the end-of-life.  
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Obtaining minimal hospital policy on TS will be important to allow compassionate end-
of-life care to those who have urgent need for relief of pain and suffering.   
These minimal guidelines, once TS is established as an accepted end-of-life 
treatment, can be revised to more moderate guidelines allowing support to others affected 
by TS deaths, the families and healthcare professionals. The next step would be revising 
again towards future guidelines including a larger range of patients who could be 
appropriate for TS. I define where I would limit this ‗larger range of patients‘ in a later 
section on ‗Future TS Policy‘. In the following pages I will address the first two stages, 
the minimal and moderate guidelines for establishing a justifiable balance towards 
allowing TS for those patients whom it would benefit and appropriate safeguards against 
misuse.  
The American Medical Association (AMA) – Council on Ethical and Judicial 
Affairs (CEJA) authored a report on the topic of TS in 2008 entitled, ―Sedation to 
Unconsciousness in End-of-Life Care‖.329  This report is supportive of using TS and 
states, ―The duty to relieve pain and suffering is central to the physician‘s role as healer 
and is an obligation physicians have to their patients.‖330  The AMA–CEJA report 
recommendation ends with a listing of eight ethical guidelines to be considered when 
considering the use of palliative (what I have called terminal) sedation.  This report is an 
initial attempt towards encouraging physicians to adopt more routine standards, if not 
policy, on providing TS.  I applaud their effort.  That their recommendations address only 
the physician‘s role is appropriate given their constituency, but physicians do not practice 
                                                 
329
 Levine, M. A., Chair. (2008). REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS 
CEJA Report 5-A-08 :  Subject: Sedation to Unconsciousness in End-of-Life Care (No. CEJA Report 5-A-
08): American Medical Association  
330
 Ibid.  
 184 
in isolation.  Most who would utilize TS will be doing so within a medical institution 
where policy is mandated for most, if not all, medical treatments and is also required for 
most insurance reimbursement.  Therefore I propose more moderate guidelines in the 
next section.   
I believe that the AMA recommendations are a good initial starting point for a 
minimal TS policy (see Figure 2, next page).  However, I cannot wholeheartedly endorse 
this policy as I believe it is often too vague and also too restrictive in several instances to 
be appropriately helpful.  I have stated throughout that one of the primary methods to 
address potential harm is through clear communication and this must include the policy 
recommendations and guidelines that we endorse.  Still, the AMA-CEJA 
recommendation does provide a huge boost for better care for the dying by the public 
endorsement from the largest physician group on the United States. Or, it would if these 
recommendations were more widely acknowledged and utilized.  I will address my 
concerns starting at the top and moving down from the initial paragraph following the 
introductory sentence. 
 In the first sentence of the initial paragraph, the AMA endorses relief of pain and 
suffering as rightly within the physician role.  Next, they provide their explanation of 
palliative sedation to unconsciousness(PSU), this is what the AMA calls the treatment I 
have called terminal sedation.
331
 I will continue to use TS for purposes of continuity.  In 
the third sentence, they state that PSU is to be used as an ―intervention of last resort to 
reduce severe, refractory pain or other distressing clinical symptoms that do not respond  
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REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS∗ 
CEJA Report 5-A-08       RECOMMENDATION 
 
The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs recommends that the following be adopted and that the 
 remainder of this report be filed. 
 
 The duty to relieve pain and suffering is central to the physician‘s role as healer and is an 
obligation physicians have to their patients. Palliative sedation to unconsciousness is the 
administration of sedative medication to the point of unconsciousness in a terminally ill patient. 
It is an intervention of last resort to reduce severe, refractory pain or other distressing clinical 
symptoms that do not respond to aggressive symptom-specific palliation. It is an accepted and 
appropriate component of end-of-life care under specific, relatively rare circumstances. When 
symptoms cannot be diminished through all other means of palliation, including symptom- 
specific treatments, it is the ethical obligation of a physician to offer palliative sedation to 
unconsciousness as an option for the relief of intractable symptoms. When considering the use 
of palliative sedation, the following ethical guidelines are recommended: 
 
 (1) Patients may be offered palliative sedation when they are in the final stages of terminal 
illness. The rationale for all palliative care measures should be documented in the medical 
record. 
(2) Palliative sedation to unconsciousness may be considered for those terminally ill patients 
whose clinical symptoms have been unresponsive to aggressive, symptom-specific 
treatments. 
(3) Physicians should ensure that the patient and/or the patient‘s surrogate have given informed 
consent for palliative sedation to unconsciousness. 
(4) Physicians should consult with a multidisciplinary team, including an expert in the field of 
palliative care, to ensure that symptom-specific treatments have been sufficiently employed 
and that palliative sedation to unconsciousness is now the most appropriate course of 
treatment. 
(5) Physicians should discuss with their patients considering palliative sedation the care plan 
relative to degree and length (intermittent or constant) of sedation, and the specific 
expectations for continuing, withdrawing or withholding future life-sustaining treatments. 
(6) Once palliative sedation is begun, a process must be implemented to monitor for 
appropriate care. 
(7) Palliative sedation is not an appropriate response to suffering that is primarily existential, 
defined as the experience of agony and distress that may arise from such issues as death 
anxiety, isolation and loss of control. Existential suffering is better addressed by other 
interventions. For example, palliative sedation is not the way to address suffering created by 
social isolation and loneliness; such suffering should be addressed by providing the patient 
with needed social support. 
(8) Palliative sedation must never be used to intentionally cause a patient‘s death. 
 (New HOD/CEJA Policy) 
Figure 2. AMA-CEJA Policy 
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to aggressive symptom-specific palliation.‖332  I admit that inevitable vagueness is 
required when attempting to cover an amazingly large array of potentially intolerable and 
distressing symptoms from which dying patients may suffer.  One may never know what 
sorts of individual or combinations of pain and distress may be suffered or how refractive 
to treatment any one individual may be. In this instance, I endorse the intentionally vague 
wording.   
It is the ―intervention of last resort‖ that has a more troubling prospective for me 
to accept.  Does this mean that the directing physician has tried all the medications and 
treatments to resolve the distressing symptom that she usually uses to treat end-of-life 
distress?  Or, perhaps, all that she has heard about or read about from texts and 
colleagues before resorting to TS?  Or even, all treatments that are known, including a 
pub-med search and internet query world-wide?  This may have the potential to do more 
than just delay a patient‘s relief from suffering, by lending potential for patients to be 
forced to suffer needless attempts of useless medications or treatments that turn out to fail 
when a known treatment (TS) is and ought to be used.   
Admittedly, one does not want to enact the treatment of TS hastily. But I would 
argue that a more ethical standard for the use of TS would be one that has a focus on the 
patient‘s autonomy and willingness to endure additional attempts at other methods of 
palliation.
333
 Some patients may tolerate multiple attempts of various other, less sedating 
medications or periods allowing intermittent rather than total sedation while others will 
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be less tolerant.  Utilizing a patient focused measure for stating an ―inability to tolerate 
additional attempts at symptom palliation‖ would both support the principle of autonomy 
and more direct beneficence.  We allow patients to choose when to stop aggressive 
treatment in terminal disease routinely in the name of autonomy and patient rights.  
Allowing them to have self-determination in choosing when to resort to TS (especially 
when relief is possible via TS) seems a more appropriate measure of offering respect to 
individuals than requiring them to endure an imprecise number of failed attempts by their 
doctors.  
The next two sentences in the initial paragraph offer similar vague, yet overly 
demanding restrictions on TS.  
It is an accepted and appropriate component of end-of-life care under specific, 
relatively rare circumstances. When symptoms cannot be diminished through all 
other means of palliation, including symptom-specific treatments, it is the ethical 
obligation of a physician to offer palliative sedation to unconsciousness as an 
option for the relief of intractable symptoms.
334
 
 
I would hope that TS does remain a treatment choice that is not often required, for this 
will mean that more persons are dying without great suffering.  Further I both hope and 
expect that medical science will develop better symptom-relieving pharmaceuticals and 
that this will allow a reduction in the need for TS to occur in the future.  Yet if we now 
are not routinely offering this end-of-life care to those who are suffering intolerably, how 
do we know what to expect in terms of the appropriate frequency of use?  The SUPPORT 
study indicated clearly that too many patients were dying with unresolved pain.  I agree 
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that TS, as is the case with all other treatments, should only be used in ‗specific‘ 
circumstances. These are circumstances in which suffering has been unable to be 
otherwise relieved to the patient‘s satisfaction.  But, I do not believe we currently have 
the empirical data to verify how frequently those circumstances obtain.  Recall that the 
data found TS occurring with great variance:  from 5% to 52% of deaths.
335
  It is 
imperative that we continue to develop research on the use of TS to better define the 
appropriate parameters for use.  Let us now move on to the eight specific AMA-CEJA 
guidelines. 
(1) Patients may be offered palliative sedation when they are in the final 
stages of terminal illness.  The rational for all palliative care measures 
should be documented in the medical record. 
 
My concern here is about the vague phrase ―final stages of terminal illness.‖  It is well 
known that persons today are surviving not only months but years with terminal illness.  I 
have a general understanding of ‗final stages‘ as being anytime during the anticipated last 
six months of a terminal illness.  That is the period during which one is eligible for 
insurance hospice care benefits.  But others may judge ‗final stages‘ differently.  There is 
no widely-accepted standard for this phrase, so using ‗final stages‘ may allow patients to 
undergo TS who have several months left of life. This would include what I have called 
ETS (Early Terminal Sedation) in the category of TS and would have the potential to 
allow patients to die due to lack of nutrition and hydration rather than due to their 
underlying disease process.  I would rather endorse using the phrase ―actively dying‖ to 
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delimit the time period when the use of TS in a minimal guideline would be appropriate.  
Although the phrase ―actively dying‖ is also imprecise, it is generally understood as a 
period when specific biological changes (lower urine output, respirations, and blood 
pressures for example) can be identified as precursors to death and is usually limited to a 
period of hours or days before death occurs.  
 (2) Palliative sedation to unconsciousness may be considered for those 
terminally ill patients whose clinical symptoms have been unresponsive to aggressive, 
symptom-specific treatments.  
 (3) Physician should ensure that the patient and/or the patient’s surrogate 
have given informed consent for palliative sedation to unconsciousness.  
 
Regarding the second and third guidelines I have no major changes although I might offer 
a couple of clarifications.  In the second, ―unresponsive to aggressive, symptom-specific 
treatments‖ could be clarified to state treatments that have failed to be ameliorated to the 
patient‘s perception of comfort. It is appropriate that TS not be considered as a first line 
of action since there are less burdensome treatments available that may have success in 
providing the patient with relief. In the third guideline I would clarify that the patient 
consent is required if the patient has capacity and that surrogate consent is only 
appropriate if the patient lacks capacity.  The current AMA-CEJA guideline could lead to 
instances of confusion, or worse circumstances where patients and surrogates may not 
agree and the ―and‖ could become contentious. Respect for patient autonomy allows for 
her consent to suffice for all medical treatments when capacity is established.  For the 
minimal guidelines I endorse retaining this standard along with the surrogate to act only 
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in absence of patient capacity. In a more moderate policy the ―and‖ would acknowledge 
that TS may have effects upon family members that ought to be considered.  
(4)  Physicians should consult with a multidisciplinary team, including an 
expert in the field of palliative care, to ensure that symptom-specific treatments have 
been sufficiently employed and that palliative sedation to unconsciousness is now the 
most appropriate course of treatment. 
 
Although I endorse this statement for my moderate guideline
336
 for TS, I believe that it is 
unduly restrictive for the minimal guideline and will disallow TS treatment from too 
many who could otherwise benefit.  What defines acceptability as a multidisciplinary 
team?  Does the inclusion of a single additional discipline, such as nursing, count? Or 
does multidisciplinary require nursing, social workers and pastoral care as well?  I agree 
that in the best of situations it would be in the patient‘s best interest to have the full 
endorsement of all team members but admittedly this may not always be possible. The 
same is true for the expert in palliative care.  Although this medical specialty is 
increasing, those certified as a specialist in palliative care are not yet available in all 
communities or in all hospitals and home-care hospices.  I also have concerns about the 
vagueness of exactly how to determine if other treatments have been sufficiently 
employed and in difficult end-of-life situations how to know for certain that TS is the 
most appropriate course to take.  As above, I would endorse using a patient-centered 
guide for these determinations.  
(5) Physicians should discuss with their patients considering palliative 
sedation the care plan relative to degree and length (intermittent or constant) of 
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sedation, and the specific expectations for continuing, withdrawing or withholding 
future life-sustaining treatments.  
 
To this my initial reply would be, ―Isn‘t this the usual standard for care involved in any 
treatment?‖  But, I would also make changes to include this discussion to occur with a 
patient‘s surrogate if the patient lacks capacity to engage in such discussions since, as we 
know, many patients are unable to participate in their final end-of-life decision making.  
For clarity‘s sake I would also alter specific expectations for continuing, withdrawing or 
withholding future life-sustaining treatments to end-of-life wishes or advance directives 
for life-sustaining treatments.  That would clarify that the focus is on the patient‘s 
specific expectations rather than the physician‘s or family‘s. This would include patient 
directives on artificial nutrition and hydration as an important factor to discuss prior to 
TS.  
 (6) Once palliative sedation is begun, a process must be implemented to 
monitor for appropriate care.  
 
I would encourage a specialized monitoring system for assessing patient response to 
treatment such as the Critical-Care Pain Observation Tool (CCPT - in Appendix 1).  A 
clearly written TS protocol will establish TS as a medical treatment that follows 
physician orders for medications to be administered and carefully monitored to allow full 
relief of patient symptoms and complete unconscious sedation.  It should include 
medications authorized by the hospital formulary for medications to be utilized in TS 
treatments.  The policy should include initial medication dosages as well as a range for 
hourly increases in administration and ‗push‘ orders for breakthrough pain.  The goal to 
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provide the minimal effective dose to offer relief of symptoms is consistent with good 
medical practice and minimizes the risks of respiratory complications.   
 (7) Palliative sedation is not an appropriate response to suffering that is 
primarily existential, defined as the experience of agony and distress that may arise 
from such issues as death anxiety, isolation and loss of control.  Existential suffering 
is better addressed by other interventions.  For example, palliative sedation is not 
the way to address suffering created by social isolation and loneliness; such 
suffering should be addressed by providing the patient with needed social support.  
 
I find it interesting, yet appropriate that this guideline in the AMA-CEJA is both the 
longest and offers the most clarity. I support both their definition of existential suffering 
and the specification that suffering is not primarily existential.  This guideline accepts 
that for many patients who are suffering, such as the patient I describe in the start of 
Chapter 3, there may be components of both great physical and mental anguish. Now, 
some may want to argue that the term ―primarily‖ is also too vague to be effectively 
utilized.  This may be true and I would agree that further clarification could be made by 
changing primarily existential suffering to only existential suffering.  This restriction 
would in no way diminishes the reality of those whose suffering is primarily existential 
but states TS is not the most appropriate method for treating that primary form of 
suffering.   
 (8) Palliative sedation must never be used to intentionally cause a patient’s 
death.  
To this final guideline I endorse the brevity and clarity in a minimal guideline for 
maintaining the physician‘s role for relief of suffering while maintaining an oath of 
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nonmaleficence in not intentionally causing death. The policy ought to clearly state intent 
as elimination of suffering and consciousness with the minimal effective dose and not to 
hasten death.  But, for the sake of clarity, I would not oppose adding to the phrase by 
stating ―never be used to intentionally cause or hasten a patient‘s death.‖ Having a 
transparent policy with protocol stating a minimal starting dosage of medication and 
carefully monitored administration only until symptoms are eliminated establishes the 
intent to relieve suffering.  This sentiment is echoed by the AMA in their preface to the 
CEJA recommendations:  
Although intent cannot be observed directly, it can be gauged in part by examining the medical 
record. Repeated doses or continuous infusions are indicators of proportionate palliative sedation, 
whereas one large dose or rapidly accelerating doses out of proportion to the level of immediate 
patient suffering may signify lack of knowledge or an inappropriate intention to hasten death. 
These questions about intent demonstrate the importance of careful documentation in the medical 
record of purpose and strategy for patients receiving any palliative care including palliative 
sedation to unconsciousness.
337
 
Moderate Policy Guidelines  
 
I have defined the above guidelines as "minimal guidelines" primarily because 
they address only the physician and the patient and establish some minimal safeguards 
for the appropriate use of TS. These safeguards are admittedly minimal in order to allow 
TS to provide relief to dying patients.  The minimal guidelines have only a few 
restrictions: that the patient have a terminal illness, be actively dying and that traditional 
palliative measures have failed.  I could not justify requiring those who are close to death 
and are suffering to be forced to endure additional time in intolerable pain to meet 
additional bureaucratic safeguards such as written request or second opinions.  I agree 
and support patient‘s thinking about what their dying needs may be and including written 
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requests for TS should it become appropriate in their advance directives. I also support 
requesting the assistance of palliative care specialists in treating refractive pain when they 
are available to consult.  These are both recommendations in my moderate guideline, but 
requiring them in a minimal guideline would unduly force many patients to suffer. 
Denying patients who could be effectively relieved of their pain and suffering using TS 
would be maleficent since it could be prevented following the minimal guidelines for TS 
I presented above.  
  Throughout this dissertation I have maintained that when medical treatments 
have important effects upon others, and specifically potential to cause harm, it is both 
ethical and important to attempt to reduce this harm where possible. It is not the usual 
practice of those in medicine to incorporate policy to include persons other than patients, 
and even less usual to include any reference to care of the medical professionals. I believe 
that inclusion of these "others" will push institutional policy towards a new level of more 
ethical practice.   
I have termed this section "Moderate Policy Guidelines" in an attempt to 
distinguish the minimal policy above to one that, while still maintaining rather strict 
parameters for allowable TS, does include a significant addition towards efforts to reduce 
harm to others and further to attempt to provide others benefits.  I have three sets of 
guidelines listed below.  The first retains focus upon the patient.  This is appropriate since 
TS is for the patient and remains as the primary focus for the moderate guideline. The 
first moderate guideline incorporates most of the minimal guidelines above and expands 
them for clarification.  The second and third guidelines offer ethical guidance in the 
provision of TS with an enlarged focus to include families and professional caregivers. 
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1.  It is within the physician’s role to reduce the suffering of those who are 
dying and TS allows this beneficent action.  
1. (a) Thoroughly assess requests for TS to ensure that they meet the 
Standard for TS. 
 i)  a terminal patient’s (or surrogates) request due to 
 ii) suffering intractable pain or other distressing clinical symptoms 
intolerable to the patient when 
iii) death is expected within hours or days
338
 (less than two weeks) due to 
the terminal illness, injury, or disease. 
   
If they do not meet the above standard, then it may be appropriate to offer intermittent 
sedation to allow periods of symptom relief and respite while continuing to pursue other 
aggressive treatment options for the patient.   
  I focus explicitly on symptoms being intolerable to the specific patient involved.  
This perception of the patient‘s experience shows respect for the patient and is the 
appropriate viewpoint for which to direct our efforts of amelioration. I (as does the 
AMA) will exclude those symptoms which are only existential in nature but accept that 
suffering at the end-of-life often includes suffering that is both physical and existential in 
nature.  Those symptoms that are commonly difficult to treat are cancer pain, dyspnea, 
delirium, myoclonus, or vomiting but may include many others.  As I have previously 
discussed, I also delimit TS to those who are actively dying is defined as a death expected 
to occur in hours to less than two weeks.  This is admittedly an inexact measure but one 
that is commonly understood in medical practice.  
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 The prediction of an anticipated death is always inexact but ought to be anticipated to occur within two 
weeks to meet my understanding of actively dying.   
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1. (b)    The AMA-CEJA guidelines are appropriate to include in this 
section.  
1. (c)   Special effort to clarify patient consent/prior wishes (include copy 
of patient advance directive if available) and capacity needs documented.  
Need to document who (patient or surrogate) has requested or consented 
to TS.  
1. (d)   Clear documentation of surrogate/proxy selection if patient does 
not have capacity.   
1. (e)  Clearly document prior efforts to treat distressing symptoms in the 
medical record.  
 
Proxy selection, if not designated by the patient, ought to follow state statutes for 
physician assignment of surrogate. If no surrogate is available physicians ought to follow 
institutional policy for decision making on medical necessity for patients without family 
or surrogates.  
1. (f)  TS ought to be patient motivated for symptom relief and not payer, 
institution, or financially motivated. 
1. (g)  TS ought not be sought by family or caregiver unless the patient is 
unable to advocate for herself and must rely on surrogates.  
 
Guidelines (f) and (g) above are included in attempts to ensure that TS is enacted for the 
intention to relieve patient suffering and is primarily patient motivated whenever 
possible.  TS ought to be provided when it is in the best interest of the patient and free 
from any financial considerations. It is natural to assume that a patient‘s family is going 
to act in their best interest and this is usually, but not always, the case.  In cases where TS 
is authorized by the family‘s or surrogate‘s additional attempts are warranted to assure 
clear communication that the surrogate is acting in the patient‘s best interest.   
 
2. It is moral to show concern for the harms others may suffer and attempt 
to reduce them where possible. Since families may suffer harms related to 
having a loved one die while undergoing TS treatment for intolerable 
suffering the medical professionals ought to act to reduce their burdens 
where possible.  This may be done in part by:  
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2. (a) Increasing physician and nursing counseling skills to work with 
families. 
2. (b) Increasing staff time to allow family and staff discussions regarding 
the patient, the process of TS, and to encourage family questions. 
2. (c) Ensuring family support if possible, via social worker and chaplain 
services. Allowing increased family participation in deaths and education 
on dying.   
2. (d) Offering hospital support groups following deaths to allow families 
to share with others who have been in similar situations and express 
emotions related to the family stress involved in enduring a relative death 
by TS. 
   
As stated in guideline one above, the appropriate primary goal is the relief of patient 
suffering. Yet, as I described in Chapter 4, family members may also be affected in 
significant ways by patient suffering and may be suffering in significant ways 
themselves.  The patient will remain the primary focus of concern but once her needs are 
adequately met, or in addition to meeting patient needs attention may be given to the 
attending family.  Guideline 2 (a), relates to the need for additional skills in counseling 
for doctors and nurses so that the help offered to families will be more effective. There 
are specific skills involved in empathetic listening, reframing losses, and identifying 
those who will require ongoing therapeutic counseling following a death or who may 
suffer a complicated bereavement.  This training can be done using workshops or in-
service training.  Both are routine methods for gaining professional skills while 
maintaining daily employment. The next guideline refers to the additional time that will 
be required to allow the aforementioned counseling to occur.  This may require additional 
staffing for those floors where TS deaths are occurring.  Admittedly, this will be an 
administrative issue and one that may be difficult to achieve in many institutions.  
 198 
  Guideline 2 (c) is focused upon providing the family with additional support at 
the hospital while their loved one is dying.  Almost all hospitals have social workers and 
chaplains on staff and they are highly trained in providing family support and community 
referrals for ongoing support.  These individuals could easily be added as a routine 
referral when TS is being utilized for patient treatment.  This guideline also encourages 
providing families with a designated role in supporting patients during the dying process.  
This may be simply playing music that the patient may enjoy in the room, providing 
mouth care or repositioning, or perhaps holding a hand.  Family members should be 
educated as to the common signs that death is approaching and advised when the death is 
close to allow them to be present if desired.   
The final guideline in this section is to offer additional support to family and 
friends of those who have died using TS.  A support group for those who have endured 
the dying of a loved one by TS would allow participants to express their emotions 
following the experience and to obtain support from others who have had similar 
experiences. It may also be helpful in reducing complicated bereavement for many who 
had been primary caretakers for terminally ill loved ones and lose their primary role when 
the patient dies. Although this will require some additional staffing support from our 
hospitals, it is not unheard of for social workers or nurses to add group facilitator to their 
job function or do as a volunteer.  Similar hospital groups exist for example, for those 
have miscarried or had a stillbirth, child deaths, or who have had transplants.   
3.  It is moral to show concern for the harms others may suffer and attempt 
to reduce them where possible. Since medical professionals involved in TS 
may suffer harms related to providing TS treatment for intolerable 
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suffering the hospital and staff ought to act to reduce their burdens where 
possible.  This may be done in part by:  
3. (a) Ensuring that TS is done with the support of an interdisciplinary 
team when possible, rather than the MD acting alone.  
3. (b) Increasing training for staff in palliation in end-of-life care. 
3. (c) Encouraging MD’s to advocate in hospital systems (including with 
insurers) to allow TS to occur in a supportive environment.  
3. (d)  Creating a clear hospital policy for TS that will be followed by 
staff. This policy is to include physicians, nursing, chaplains, and social 
worker on care teams whenever possible to support families, when 
patient families are involved. 
 
Medical care is not provided by physicians alone. Orders are carried out by nursing and 
other ancillary staff in all hospitals today.  TS requires that the patient be rendered 
medically sedated to unconsciousness.  This precludes most of the usual interactions that 
occur between patients and those who provide them with care. It is these patient/staff 
interactions that provide a great deal of the professional and emotional gratification for 
those who work in medical care.  Providing ongoing care to those receiving TS will 
require additional skill sets, including assessment skills for the unconscious, careful 
medication monitoring and skills in communication with family members and teaching 
about TS and dying.   
Guideline 3 (a), focuses on the entire interdisciplinary team involved with the 
patient.  Ensuring that those others who are treating the patient are supportive of the 
decision for TS is important in respecting those others involved in patient care. It will 
also encourage mutual support of team members who are providing specialized care to 
the dying.  This may involve palliative care specialist, if available in the hospital, nursing 
and other ancillary staff.  While complete team endorsement may not be available at all 
times, the effort to obtain full support will increase communication and work towards a 
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more holistic team approach.  Where significant disagreement exists I would recommend 
referral to a hospital ethics committee for further evaluation.  Further, reassignment of 
duty is appropriate for those with a conscientious objection to participation in TS.  
Guideline 3(b) is to encourage additional training for hospital staff (physicians 
and others) in palliative and end-of-life care.  This would include learning how to talk to 
both patients and families more directly about dying, advance directives, and what is 
important to each individual concerning their dying.  This may be done by multiple 
methods such as attendance at workshops, in-service training by qualified professionals, 
as well as grand rounds or discussions about medical journal articles on death and dying 
issues.  
Guideline 3(c) addressed the work that physicians will need to do both within 
their hospital institutions and with their affiliated insurers to obtain both the staff time for 
work with the dying and their families and also insurance reimbursement for this work. 
As addressed in Chapter 5, evidence based medicine (EBM)  has yet to accept the 
treatment of TS and studies completed in the United States are needed to develop the data 
required for EBM endorsement of this practice.  The last guideline 3 (d) reiterates the 
need to develop clear policy for the ethical use of TS as an end-of-life treatment for 
patients.  Policy will provide needed guidance in the provision of TS as well as 
organizational legitimacy.  As we get better at treating the pain and suffering at the end-
of-life, the need to utilize TS will diminish. This would be a welcomed goal for the 
future.  
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Future TS policy 
 
 Both the minimal and the moderate guidelines for TS that I laid out above are 
fairly restrictive in that they have narrow recommendations for identification of patients 
who are appropriate for the treatment.  I have purposely kept my current focus on a 
narrow range for allowable TS.  My reasons for this are primarily to work towards 
obtaining a more general social acceptability for the practice. The practice of TS is 
clearly an ethical practice, yet it has not obtained wide social acceptance.  Allowing 
women the vote was always an ethical practice, as was allowing freedom to all persons. 
Yet it was years before social acceptability for these practices was accomplished. My 
guidelines are admittedly narrow, I accept this criticism and counter that they are an 
important step towards allowing better care for the dying while obtaining social 
acceptance for the practice.   
 One could endorse a much greater focus on the autonomy of the patients to 
determine when TS ought to be allowed.  They might hold that those persons who have 
progressively chronic diseases such as ALS or cerebral palsy (CP), and many other 
medical problems ought to be allowed TS.  I admit that I have great sympathy for the use 
of TS for those with ALS, locked-in syndromes, those who have suffered severe stroke, 
brain, or spinal cord injury and many others who could not meet my requirement of 
―actively dying.‖  I also believe that the practice of TS could be enlarged in the future to 
include some of those in the above sorts of conditions. Even allowing early TS, (ETS) 
could be ethically permissible in some situations.  But this is not the place to make the 
case for a greatly expanded use of TS.   
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If the practice were enlarged to allow ETS I would suggest that at least two levels 
be developed.  One for those who do have a terminal diagnosis (of less than six months) 
whose death is still assured and who could understandably be suffering and ought not to 
be forced to await the ―actively dying‖ phase.  Another level of evaluation would be 
required for those who do not have a terminal diagnosis but may have severe chronic pain 
or may have primarily existential suffering without pain, such as those who are locked-in 
or have ALS.  
 If some ETS was allowed, I would then require additional restrictions. One such 
restriction would be that any ETS not be done immediately, upon patient request.  Since 
chronic patients are not actively dying, they would have more time to attempt other 
options to relieve their symptoms. Less drastic attempts to ameliorate the pain or other 
distressing symptoms ought still to be considered prior to any requests for TS even for 
those with a terminal diagnosis.  These attempts ought to be well documented efforts for 
attempting alternative methods for alleviation of patient distress prior to using ETS.  It 
may also be appropriate to require an additional physician concurrence, similar to the 
requirement for PAS in Oregon.  
I would include a mandate for those requesting ETS that a prior advance directive 
address this request in writing.  For ETS, I would also require a psychological evaluation 
to assure that requests were not being made by those suffering a treatable depression or 
other mental illness.  This measure is included in many countries that allow other forms 
of assistance in dying.  If ETS were to be allowed, I believe it would then fall into the 
category of assistance in dying and ought to require some if not all of the additional 
safeguards I have outlined.   
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Lastly, I would not allow TS for those who are suffering only from dementia and 
who have TS requested for them by a proxy.  I agree that a long dying process from 
Alzheimer‘s disease or other dementias is a particularly sad way to die. I also agree that it 
is agonizing for loved ones to watch the person that they love both cease to exist and 
continue to go on living.  But, I have not been convinced that there is extreme suffering 
for the patient who has the dementia.  If they have no concurrent disease or illness then 
TS is not an appropriate treatment. Demented patients who do have additional illness or 
suffering ought to be evaluated by the prior guidelines, including proxy consent, for 
consideration of TS treatment.  
I can foresee larger practice parameters for ETS in the future, including those with 
grave disability or terminal but not imminently dying persons who request assistance in 
having a peaceful, arranged dying process. This would need to be accompanied by legal 
developments, for legal and moral reasons.  Concerns of slippery slopes will surface and 
progress will be slow, given the close moral evaluation that not only ethicists, but the 
public continues (and rightly) to focus on medical practice and especially on end-of-life 
issues. This work is only one step in that process.   
Future Needs & Conclusions 
  
 Ethicists are not immune to the need to identify where the communication 
breakdowns are occurring and to have a role in repairing them.  There exists a barrier 
between widely accepted ethical precepts and the practice beliefs of those involved in 
direct patient care.  Intense and ongoing discussions between ethicists and practitioners 
need to occur much more often to discover where these barriers exist and work to 
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develop methods to overcome them.  Further work is needed to develop TS policy with 
transparent language to assist both medical professionals and the general public in 
understanding the concepts involved in TS. We must work toward establishing both a 
clearly transparent policy and a willingness to reexamine such policy when needed.  
Medical progress will continue to occur and we can hope for better methods which will 
reduce the need for such extreme treatments in the future.  
 I have argued that terminal sedation is the appropriate and intentional use of 
medications (benzodiazepines and/or narcotics) to produce ongoing, deep 
unconsciousness upon 1) a terminal patient‘s (or surrogates) request due to 2) suffering 
intractable pain or other distressing clinical symptoms intolerable to the patient when 3) 
death is expected within hours or days (less than two weeks) due to terminal illness, 
injury or disease.  I have also argued for working toward wide social endorsement of my 
minimal guidelines as both appropriate and ethical care for the dying and have offered 
moderate guidelines for additional support to patients and others who are affected by TS 
deaths.  
  This is a much needed step forward.  That there will be other cases that vary just 
enough to fail to meet these guidelines is certain, just as it is now certain that there are 
cases where PAS or euthanasia would be welcomed as an appropriate death by many.  
Yet, in most of our nation, we have not allowed physicians to participate in PAS or 
euthanasia. The moral conversations about allowing persons the full dignity and right to 
choose the manner and timing of their death are far from over, but allowing TS under the 
conditions I have specified is a step in the right direction.  I have argued that the 
thoughtful provision of TS, following written hospital protocols, is morally allowable and 
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is a beneficent action.  TS is, in final evaluation, an ethically beneficent and 
compassionate treatment for the dying.  
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Appendix 2 AMA Policy on Palliative Sedation  
CEJA Rep. 5-A-08   American Medical Association Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs
339
 
 
The duty to relieve pain and suffering is central to the physician‘s role as healer and is an 
 obligation physicians have to their patients. Palliative sedation to unconsciousness is the 
 administration of sedative medication to the point of unconsciousness in a terminally ill patient. 
 It is an intervention of last resort to reduce severe, refractory pain or other distressing clinical 
 symptoms that do not respond to aggressive symptom-specific palliation. It is an accepted and 
 appropriate component of end-of-life care under specific, relatively rare circumstances. When 
symptoms cannot be diminished through all other means of palliation, including symptom2 
specific treatments, it is the ethical obligation of a physician to offer palliative sedation to 
 unconsciousness as an option for the relief of intractable symptoms. When considering the use 
 of palliative sedation, the following ethical guidelines are recommended: 
 
 (1) Patients may be offered palliative sedation when they are in the final stages of terminal 
 illness. The rationale for all palliative care measures should be documented in the medical 
 record. 
 
 (2) Palliative sedation to unconsciousness may be considered for those terminally ill patients 
 whose clinical symptoms have been unresponsive to aggressive, symptom-specific 
 treatments. 
 
(3) Physicians should ensure that the patient and/or the patient‘s surrogate have given informed 
 consent for palliative sedation to unconsciousness. 
 
 (4) Physicians should consult with a multidisciplinary team, including an expert in the field of 
 palliative care, to ensure that symptom-specific treatments have been sufficiently employed 
 and that palliative sedation to unconsciousness is now the most appropriate course of 
 treatment. 
 
 (5) Physicians should discuss with their patients considering palliative sedation the care plan 
 relative to degree and length (intermittent or constant) of sedation, and the specific 
 expectations for continuing, withdrawing or withholding future life-sustaining treatments. 
 
 (6) Once palliative sedation is begun, a process must be implemented to monitor for 
 appropriate care. 
 
 (7) Palliative sedation is not an appropriate response to suffering that is primarily existential, 
 defined as the experience of agony and distress that may arise from such issues as death 
 anxiety, isolation and loss of control. Existential suffering is better addressed by other 
 interventions. For example, palliative sedation is not the way to address suffering created by 
social isolation and loneliness; such suffering should be addressed by providing the patient 
with needed social support. 
 
 (8) Palliative sedation must never be used to intentionally cause a patient‘s death. 
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Appendix 3 Recommendations for Conducting a Family Meeting When the Patient 
Is Unable to Participate Prepare for the Meeting 
Review medical issues and history. 
Coordinate health care team. 
Discuss goals of meeting with team. 
Identify a meeting leader among the health care team. 
Discuss which family members will be present. 
Arrange a private, quiet location with seating for all. 
Try to minimize distractions: set aside adequate time and seating, turn off pager if possible. 
Open the Meeting 
Introduce all in attendance. 
Review the medical situation. 
Establish the overall goal of the meeting, by saying something like: “Today I’d like to make sure everyone understands how   
[the patient]is doing and answer all the questions that you have,” or “We wanted to meet today to discuss how [the patient] 
will be cared for at home.” 
Be prepared for the goals of the meeting to change based on family‘s desires. 
Elicit Family Understanding 
Ask family members questions, such as “What have you been told about [the patient’s] condition?” 
After hearing from the family, a helpful follow-up question is “Is there anything that isn’t clear that we can help to explain?” 
Elicit Patient and Family Values and Goals 
Elicit goals of all those present, especially if multiple perspectives are held. 
Begin with an open-ended question, such as, “Given what’s gone on, what are your hopes for [the patient]?” This may be 
followed by more specific suggestions for the family: “Sometimes getting home is an important goal for someone. Sometimes 
seeing a certain family member or friend is an important goal: are there things like this that you imagine are important for 
[the patient]?” 
Understand ethnic and cultural influences on communication styles, family relationships, medical treatments, and end-of-life 
care by asking: “Can you please help me to understand what I need to know about [the patient’s] beliefs and practices to take 
the best care of [the patient]?” 
Maintain focus on the patient‘s perspective. Often this can help to relieve guilt that family members may feel over making 
decisions. 
Such questions could include “What do you imagine [the patient] would have done or wanted in this situation?” or “Our goal 
is not so much to think about what you would want or not want but to use your knowledge of [the patient] to understand what 
he or she would want in this situation.” 
Deal With Decisions That Need to Be Made 
Achieve a common understanding of the issues. 
Find out if the patient had made his or her wishes about the decision known by asking, “Had [the patient] ever discussed what 
he would want or not want in this kind of a situation?” 
Reassure family members that they are making a decision about what is in the best interests of the patient, not necessarily what 
is in their own best interests. 
Begin with open-ended assessments and then turn to specific interventions if necessary. 
Offer clear recommendations based on patient and family goals, by suggesting, for example, “Given our understanding of the 
medical situation and what you’ve told us about [the patient’s] goals, I would recommend not pursuing dialysis.” 
Seek consensus whenever possible, agreeing on the decision or on the need for more information. 
Use summary statements, such as “It sounds like we are coming to an understanding that [the patient] would not want to 
continue on the ventilator. Is that how everyone understands his or her wishes?” 
Consider the possibilities of seeing the decision as a ―therapeutic trial‖ or as a health care team recommendation that requires 
only family assent. 
Check for understanding of the decisions made, by saying something like, “I want to make sure everyone understands that 
we’ve decided to . . . .” 
Close the Meeting 
Offer a brief summary of what was discussed.Ask for any final questions. Offer a statement of appreciation and respect for the 
family: “I appreciate how difficult this must be, but I respect everyone for trying so hard to do right by [the patient],” or “I 
want to thank everyone for being here and for helping to make these difficult decisions.”Make a clear follow-up plan, 
including plans for the next family meeting and how to contact the health care team. 
Follow up on the Meeting 
Document the meeting in the chart. Follow up with any information or reassessment agreed upon during the meeting, by 
saying, “When we last met, you were going to talk with your brother about our meeting. How did that go?”340  
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